

BRITISH RED CROSS' HAITI URBAN REGENERATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME (URRP) FINAL EVALUATION (Full)

Contains:

1. Management response | English
2. Evaluation summary | English
3. Full evaluation | English

Photo © Swaan Parker/BRC

Refusing to ignore people in crisis

British Red Cross (BRC) Management Response to URRP Final Evaluation

BRC welcomes the conclusion from the Final Evaluation of BRC's Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) that the programme *"represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work"*. The scale of devastation following the 2010 Haitian earthquake, as well as the complex urban environment in which affected communities lived, posed unprecedented challenges for those seeking to undertake meaningful recovery activities. With the benefit of hindsight, there were undoubtedly parts of the programme approach and decisions taken that could have been improved. However, it remains correct to acknowledge that the British Red Cross' intervention was *"successful in helping thousands of vulnerable people recover their homes and their communities, and move on with their lives."*

Evaluation Recommendations¹ :

BRC generally accepts all the recommendations presented by the evaluators.

Regarding Recommendation 1, and the *"establishment of international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts to help identify an on-going source of appropriate human resources"*, BRC notes that it did have existing registers, but its members were either unavailable or lacked the skillset that the urban context required. BRC did engage a large number of delegates, often in non-traditional areas of expertise for the organisation. Learning from the challenges associated with engaging appropriate resources in a competitive market, BRC has since made

a commitment to move away from direct implementation of construction programmes in the future.

BRC also notes Recommendations 2 and 6 regarding the engagement and inclusion of local authorities with caution. BRC acknowledges that it is absolutely correct to engage local authorities at all stages of a programme and notes that it did commit extensive time and resources to achieving this aim under the URRP. However, the challenges of effectively engaging the local Haitian authorities to support the implementation and maintenance of the infrastructure work made the desired outcome unlikely within a meaningful timeframe. An under-resourced, overwhelmed and dysfunctional administration made it extremely difficult to arrange even a face-to-face meeting, let alone engage on a meaningful level to support programmes in an inner city slum.

BRC also highlights Recommendation 3 concerning beneficiary involvement in housing design. While some did not receive the final designs and layouts they had requested, this was not due to a lack of participatory approaches, but rather resulted from Haiti's notoriously poor and dangerous building practices, as well as the need to ensure an equitable use of space and access.

Evaluators' Lessons Identified:

BRC agrees with the seven lessons identified by the evaluators and will ensure that efforts are taken to apply them to similar interventions in the future.

¹ As numbered in AdviseM's Evaluation Summary document.

Notes

Urban Context

The Final Evaluation references the challenges of working in the densely populated Delmas 19, which was characterised by endemic urban violence and a lack of community cohesion, and was also extremely vulnerable as a result of underlying poverty as well as the effects of the earthquake. BRC has undertaken extensive analysis of its engagement in Haiti and other contexts to inform programme approaches in such contexts². However, the social, political and economic networks of any densely populated, urban environment are incredibly complex and ceaselessly changing. At the time, BRC took the risky decision to locate its entire project team in the heart of the community, investing heavily to develop a 'Community Mobilisation Team' (CMT) in an effort to foster greater links, transparency and accountability with the community it was seeking to support. While the relationships and tensions between BRC and the community ebbed and flowed, it is important to highlight that BRC was able to work with the entire community to plan and design the URRP. The fact that there were no major security incidents, and that BRC was able to successfully close all areas of its intended programmes, speaks to the level of acceptance with which the URRP was received.

Community Engagement and Participatory Approaches

BRC intentionally pursued a participatory approach in the design and delivery of the URRP, which increased levels of engagement and transparency. However, it also led directly to delays in programme delivery, as it took time to consult and engage with the multitude of participants with vested interests, from single

individuals to local unelected committees up to Mayoral elected authorities. The CMT was central to the URRP delivery, convening the community and programme team, communicating information and mitigating challenges from pre-design to post-exit phases. Taking on the community mobilisation role in the absence of Red Cross volunteers, the CMT comprised a number of community members, and came to be seen as independent from any vested interest.

However, reaching consensus amongst stakeholders in an urban environment, let alone a dense urban slum such as Delmas 19, is incredibly difficult. Many of the delays incurred were due to the scale of the beneficiary assessment process, which ensured accurate and triangulated vulnerability data, but also involved negotiating with a large community of residents to determine the most appropriate programme option. With finite time and resources, and a physical location that restricted what was structurally possible (e.g. it was not appropriate to locate latrines and septic tanks inside the rear of each dwelling due to basic sanitation and access issues), compromise from all sides was to be expected in the final specification and coverage of support.

BRC did engage with local authorities³ to ensure that all activities were in line with local standards and national strategies. However, meaningful engagement was extremely hard to foster. Haiti's civil administration was badly affected by the earthquake and overwhelmed by the aftermath. The country's seemingly constant political turmoil would often create paralysis in government offices, making it extremely difficult to get traction and support for BRC's intervention in Delmas 19.

Infrastructure

Table 1

Construction Intervention	Number/size
Canal	302m
Marketplace	191m ²
Solar lamps	26
Paving	4,595m ²
Drainage	1,962m
Community clinic building	134m ²
Public areas	Basketball court Community garden Concrete planters ⁴

As Delmas 19 sits at the foot of the hills that surround Port-au-Prince, and parts of BRC's target area, such as Citie 4, were located approximately two metres below the existing canal, the intervention area was extremely vulnerable to flooding. The Final Evaluation highlights that the canal and other drainage and paving infrastructure works *"had the greatest and most positive impact upon the community"*. Table 1 outlines the final infrastructure outputs, which differ from those quoted by the Evaluation Team. While the infrastructure projects were identified through the PASSA, then designed and developed with widespread input from the community affected, the Evaluation accurately highlights the challenge of ensuring effective maintenance in the future. There were numerous attempts to create a shared responsibility within the community for minimum on-going care and maintenance of the infrastructure, but only time will tell whether this physical backbone of the community will survive if neglected.

Housing

Table 2

Housing Intervention	Quantity
New houses	149
Household toilets installed	135
Repairs (including 101 cash grants)	139
Households supported through INA	917
Masons completing apprenticeships	42

Any attempt to support housing and shelter solutions in a context such as Haiti, especially Delmas 19, was going to be challenging. The paucity of the land tenure system in Haiti is well known, and Delmas 19 provides its own challenges, being located on what essentially used to be a swamp and with a population comprised mainly of squatters. BRC took on a mixed modality approach to supporting Automeca Camp residents made homeless by the earthquake, which included house construction and repair, cash grants for repair, and financial and technical assistance to find, secure and pay for new rental accommodation through the IFRC's Integrated Neighbourhood Approach (see Table 2). The construction and housing intervention comprised the largest part of the \$4.48m budget. It is fair to say that BRC was not initially set up for such a construction project, was slow to scale up, and found it difficult to attract and retain appropriate staff, relying on some key dedicated individuals

² 'Humanitarian action in urban areas: five lessons from British Red Cross programmes', Samuel Carpenter, August 2013. <http://odihpn.org/magazine/humanitarian-action-in-urban-areas-five-lessons-from-british-red-cross-programmes/>

³ BRC worked closely with DINEPA (water) Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement, MTPTC (public works for construction designs etc) Ministère des Travaux Publics et Communications, SMCRS (waste management) Service Métropolitain de Collecte de Résidus Solides, MAST (social affairs for MuSo groups) Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail.

⁴ These planters' primary function is to prevent construction too close to the canal, as well as creating green space.

⁵ The difference in data could be linked to the Evaluation Team undertaking their field visit before the end of programme activities, due to logistical and security considerations.

who were able to drive and deliver all the agreed activities.

While the initial PASSA was taking place in Delmas 19, the wider humanitarian sector was investing heavily in thousands of transitional shelters. BRC sought to train and use local labour for construction, and supported each recipient of a complete shelter to formally register with the authorities, in order to legally demonstrate ownership. BRC also helped the Delmas 19 residents agree and submit a formal planning application to the Mairie's office, which required laborious consultation and negotiation.

Undertaking housing construction was one of the most sensitive interventions amongst the community. Beneficiary identification consumed a large amount of time and resources, where BRC went to great lengths to ensure it was targeting those households who were most in need and unable to undertake their own recovery. When negotiating rights of way and housing design in a densely-built environment, quite literally every inch is haggled over. For many, Haiti has proved to be an incredibly difficult context in which to engage in housing construction. The housing stock inside Delmas 19 has changed remarkably for the better and residents are without doubt better prepared to withstand future disasters – not only through the houses BRC built, which were designed to accommodate a second floor, but from the relatively large numbers of other homeowners who began to undertake their own repairs and reconstruction once they realised they would not benefit from the BRC intervention.

The humanitarian sector's community-driven approach can be seen to work against the need for quick decision making and heavy logistical supply chains. BRC recognises the challenges and criticisms raised regarding housing construction. BRC was able to deploy extremely experienced construction delegates – although forced to rely on a small and overstretched pool of expertise – and

draw on our experience in the Asian Tsunami reconstruction programmes. However, the programme and technical challenges of managing this type of post-disaster housing reconstruction programme has led BRC management to conclude that it is not able to maintain the necessary technical expertise and construction project management skillset. BRC will therefore not engage in future in the implementation of housing construction on this scale, but will seek to partner with other organisations instead.

Livelihoods

Table 3

Livelihoods intervention	Tally
Small Businesses receiving loans	26
Microfinance groups formed	81
Microfinance members	1,896
Health insurance beneficiaries	Over 7,000

Attempting to strengthen the economic security of residents and businesses in Delmas 19 was imperative to ensure a truly integrated recovery model. The range of livelihoods interventions was multifaceted, including business loans, establishment of savings groups, health insurance, literacy training and vocational training for youth. However, despite heavy engagement in sensitisation and training, impact in this sector was the hardest to achieve. BRC has reflected heavily upon the challenges of engaging in livelihoods in Haiti.

One of the largest obstacles was the predominance and influence of unconditional cash grants in the relief and early recovery

phases of the earthquake response. This created a very high expectation for unconditional cash dispersal and undermined longer-term approaches such as the mutual savings groups (MUSOs), which are a well-understood and oft-utilised approach in rural parts of Haiti.

The evaluators label the URRP programme "bold and brave", and this is perhaps most appropriate when describing the livelihoods approach. BRC's programme timeframe was limited, given finite funds, and had a clear strategy of focusing on earthquake recovery rather than establishing a long-term presence. It is accepted that in order to change attitudes towards savings in a meaningful and measurable way, a much longer programme lifecycle was needed. This short timeframe was compounded by BRC's inability to attract and retain appropriate staff for the Haiti URRP. However, the intervention was brave in that it attempted to energise a complex local economy through jobs and resilience-building savings schemes. There are many factors that will have an influence on the future prosperity of Delmas 19 and its residents, and only time will tell whether the small loans provided to 26 businesses, or the effort that went into creating 81 savings groups, will have a lasting effect. However, to not engage in livelihoods as part of the URRP would have been to neglect a fundamental area of recovery. BRC continues to learn in the area of livelihoods, and has committed to better understanding how to use cash effectively in the early stages of a response, as well as how to responsibly engage in livelihoods interventions later on in the disaster lifecycle.

Community Governance

The evaluation highlights the inadequacies of engaging with unelected and unrepresentative local community groups and committees. It was a constant challenge for BRC throughout the programme lifecycle to engage and consult with

those who would speak loudest, while trying to support those who were most vulnerable. However, BRC was rigorous in attempting to engage with the entire community, whether through a committee or otherwise. The CMT was a constant presence in the community, gathering feedback and recording every question and complaint, with a commitment to providing a response. With the introduction of 81 MUSOs, a multitude of structured groups sprang up who were able to mobilise and represent themselves. BRC underpinned its entire engagement with the community with complete transparency. Every committee meeting was minuted, and every recruitment process was detailed and made public with clear selection criteria (there were over 1100 applicants processed for the 50 mason roles from the community). While there will always be vested interests and powerful individuals in every context with whom to contend, BRC undertook more community participation and employed greater levels of transparency in Haiti than it had on any previous major programme.

Application of Lessons Identified

BRC has also undertaken to learn more from Haiti than it has done from previous programmes. In addition to this evaluation, BRC carried out regular audits of the URRP to ensure that appropriate levels of risk management and corporate assurance were applied and the programme team undertook a thorough learning review.

The URRP was an unusual BRC international programme, differing significantly in the type of programme activities, scale of funds, and the undertaking of a direct implementation role rather than the normal supporting or enabling partners. The programme therefore required different programme governance and management oversight, with tighter quality assurance and accountability mechanisms. BRC invested considerable efforts and resources to introduce and develop stronger

and more robust programme management for the URRP, such as accountable Major Programme Boards, comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks, and a Programme Cycle Methodology, none of which were in place at the outset. These programme management systems are now standardised and adapted for other BRC programmes, and two standalone workstreams have been established to continue enhancing the effectiveness of BRC support systems and HR recruitment and retention, learning from the Haiti experience.


Working in partnership with the residents, BRC was able to deliver a large and complex recovery programme in Delmas 19 following the devastating 2010 earthquake. Working in a participatory manner, BRC was able to design, develop and deliver all aspects of the URRP, and will commit to undertaking an impact study to better understand its full effects. BRC is wholeheartedly committed to ensuring it is accountable to those it seeks to support and will continue to work as part of the global Red Cross Movement to respond to humanitarian needs around the world and put people in crisis at the heart of everything it does.




David Peppiatt
Director of International, British Red Cross

Table 3

Activity	Cost (to the nearest \$1,000)
Support to Shelter and Housing Solutions	\$ 5,123,000
Community Infrastructure Construction	\$ 2,512,000
Micro-finance support	\$ 1,316,000
Small business loan support & training	\$ 1,196,000
Latrine Construction and Sanitation	\$ 557,000
Community Health and Hygiene Promotion Activities	\$ 201,000
Health Insurance	\$ 233,000
Community Trainings & governance (literacy, DPRR, waste mgt)	\$ 497,000
Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction awareness raising, training & governance	\$ 353,000
Haitian Red Cross Support	\$ 152,000
Total	\$ 12,140,000



BRITISH RED CROSS HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE





Final Evaluation of the British Red Cross'
**HAITI EARTHQUAKE 2010 RESPONSE AND
RECOVERY PROGRAMME:
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**



Presented to the British Red Cross
Submitted by AdviseM Services Inc.

Ottawa, Canada

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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS

AEDP	Association des entrepreneurs pour le développement de Delmas (Entrepreneurs' Association for the Development of Delmas)
BRC	British Red Cross
DINEPA	Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement (Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate)
GBP	Pound sterling
HRC	Haitian Red Cross Society
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
INFP	Institut national de formation professionnelle (Haitian National Training Centre)
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MTPTC	Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et Communications (Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication)
MuSo	Mutuelle de solidarité (community savings and credit association)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PASSA	Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness
RCRC Movement	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
SME	Small and micro-enterprise
URRP	Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme
USD	United States dollar

THE CONTEXT

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti near Port-au-Prince. More than 2 million people were affected—around 220,000 were estimated dead and 1.5 million were left homeless and living in one of about 1,200 temporary settlements.

The earthquake and subsequent aftershocks also caused extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas. The impact of the earthquake's effects was magnified by the chronic poverty and underdevelopment that have long plagued Haiti and were further compounded by the subsequent cholera epidemic in October 2010 (see Box 1).

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement) launched its biggest single country response, sending 21 emergency teams to provide food, water, shelter and health support. As part of this effort, the British Red Cross (BRC) implemented its Haiti 2010 Earthquake Response and Recovery Programme, which officially began in April 2010.

THE PROGRAMME

The Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme was a multifaceted initiative implemented by BRC over a period of five years ending in June 2015. It sought to provide both an immediate response to the most vulnerable earthquake victims, as well as lasting solutions for their recovery.

The programme evolved out of a process through which BRC learned from and built on the work it did. Following an early review in 2010, BRC saw the potential for an integrated approach with displaced camp populations that would combine livelihoods, shelter, and water and sanitation interventions. When the land owner evicted residents from the Automeca camp later that year, BRC saw an opportunity to use such an approach to help displaced families as they return to their neighbourhood and start rebuilding their lives. This final stage of the initiative, which ran from June 2012 to June 2015, was called the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP).

URRP was designed to meet the needs of people returning from Automeca camp to their original neighbourhood of Delmas 19, an inner-city slum of Port-au-Prince. A community-driven initiative, it promoted the regeneration of some of the most affected and vulnerable areas of the neighbourhood.

URRP delivered assistance to 4,000 households located mostly in Delmas 19, more specifically in three locations referred to as the “target area,” “zone 3” and “zone 5” (see in Figure 1). Specifically, the target area consisted of four small communes named Aloulou, Cité 4, Roman and St-Ange; Zone 3 extended across four small communes named Haut Spatule, Bas Spatule, Haut Renoncule and Bas Renoncule; and Zone 5 was made up of five small communes named Vye Blan, Tchocho, Italis, Mayòt and Kajou.

Box 1. The Situation in Pre-Earthquake Haiti

Before the earthquake, Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America, was facing numerous problems that made the Haitian context already extraordinarily complex. Among them were:


- Port-au-Prince, the capital city, is in fact a high density conurbation of several municipalities without common planning or urban authority aside from that held by the Government of Haiti. The need for land planning to solve this problem was well stated.
- An estimated 70% of the urban population lived in slums, and the same percentage of the urban population lived in rented houses.
- Rental arrangements are usually for one year, and fees must be paid in advance at the end of the previous year.
- Not all of the population is registered.
- Very low coverage of public services (water and sewer systems, electricity, waste management, etc.) in both urban and rural areas.
- Poor quality of infrastructure and housing stock; lack of urban planning and public spaces, especially in Port-Au-Prince.
- High population density, especially in the main urban areas.
- Deficient transportation and logistics infrastructure.
- Lack of land tenure and property clarity and a significant number of homeless people.
- Insecurity, poverty, inequity and lack of livelihood opportunities.
- Governmental institutional capacities were very weak. A United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti was established on June 2004 by the Security Council in the aftermath of an armed conflict that spread to several cities across the country.

Figure 1
Location of Programme Activities



Source: Google Maps. <<https://maps.google.com/>>.

The total budget for URRP was USD 12 million, broken down as follows:



URRP Expenditure, by Programme Component

The programme integrated a series of inter-related interventions grouped under three distinct components:

- *Housing and infrastructure*: Under this component, households received different packages of sheltering solutions, including house reconstruction, repairs, provision of repair materials, and technical assistance in seismic and general building and reconstruction techniques. The programme also built or repaired public infrastructure (rehabilitation of a canal to improve flow and drainage, walkways, public space, market), and provided complementary support in water and sanitation and public health education.
- *Livelihoods*: Under this component, the programme provided training and loans to small and micro-enterprises (SMEs), established saving groups called community savings and credit association (MuSos) to improve access to credit, and provided health insurance coverage.
- *Community governance*: Under this component, the programme provided guidance and capacity building in disaster risk reduction and protection, and engaged communities, Delmas mayor's office and other local stakeholders (committees) in decision-making, planning and implementation to promote long-term sustainability.

Box 2. Programme Partners and Other Stakeholders

- Members of the RCRC Movement, including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRC) and other national Red Cross societies.
- International bodies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO).
- Government agencies such as the Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC), the Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate (DINEPA), the Haitian National Training Centre (INFP) and the Haitian Secretary of State.
- Local governments and community groups such as the Delmas Mairie (mayor's office) and zonal committees established in selected areas of Delmas 19.
- Partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Development Activities and Services for Health, the National Popular Funding Council, Fonkoze/Zafen, and HelpAge International.
- Banks or microfinance institutions such as ID Microfinance and Sogebank.

BRC led the program from on-the-ground in Haiti, reporting to its head office in London. It also coordinated with multiple stakeholders (see Box 2).

EVALUATING THE RESULTS

Purpose of the Evaluation

BRC commissioned a final evaluation of the programme to reflect on and learn from its experience in Haiti. The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

- To provide a summation of the extent to which BRC’s engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions.
- To assess the effectiveness and impact of the integrated approach adopted in URRP in Port-au-Prince’s Delmas 19 area.
- To identify lessons (positive and negative) for improved programming and to inform strategic policy and planning.
- To inform management decision-making for ongoing and future work.

This report is a shorter version of the full evaluation report presented to BRC.

Methodology

An independent team of evaluators conducted the evaluation between June and September 2015. The team included: Maryvonne Arnould, Louis-Pierre Michaud, Aaron Budd, Patrick Robitaille and Luc Bourgie. The methodology included: a desk review (in-depth examination of 84 documents); individual interviews with 63 key stakeholders; consultations with 210 people in focus group discussions; a paper survey administered to collect information from 383 URRP beneficiaries living in Delmas 19; and a debrief with programme management in Haiti and London. The information gathered was triangulated in order to arrive at the findings recommendations and lessons presented herewith.

The evaluation team also travelled to London and Haiti to meet with people involved in the programme and to observe the operation first hand. The following are the evaluation team’s main findings.

Achievements

The programme has helped thousands of vulnerable people recover their homes and their communities, and move on with their lives. The following are some key achievements.

- Infrastructure upgrades had perhaps the most significant, positive and widespread impact on the community. Specific achievements included construction of 302 linear metres of new concrete and block canal, paving of 2,300 square metres of drainage, walkways and public space, and building a new marketplace (see Picture 1) with 34 stalls, a lottery shop and a barber shop. The programme also installed 26 solar-powered streetlamps. Canal and drainage interventions have had a significant and positive impact on the community and will greatly increase people’s resilience to future disasters. Capping the canal has provided a safe route for accessing shelter and other support and has helped prevent garbage from entering the



Picture 1. Front of marketplace.

canal system. The canal route, in combination with the paved paths, also provides the safest escape route in the event of another earthquake.

- The programme constructed 149 new houses with septic tanks using a basic, but flexible, design that was resistant to earthquakes and floods. It also repaired another 32 houses and distributed 101 cash grants to households so they could make their own repairs. In addition, and in collaboration with the ILO, the project trained 50 masons and provided other training related to construction and repair. This not only established a sustainable source of expertise right in the community; the training and accreditation increased the employability and earning potential of these community members.
- The programme also reduced health risks in the community by improving water supply and providing better access to facilities for sanitation and waste disposal. It promoted hygiene, the use of latrines and hand, washing and raised awareness about prevention and treatment of diseases (malaria, dengue, chikungunya). All beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluators reported that areas targeted by the programme were much cleaner now than before. There were also reported improvements in hygiene and disease prevention (see Box 3).
- The programme also helped people improve their ability to earn a living by helping them establish small businesses or learn new skills. URRP supported 26 SMEs with the provision of loans carrying no interest and no collateral requirement, and training. The amount of the loans granted fluctuated between USD 1,000 and USD 4,000, with the exception of one large loan of USD 15,000. As part of the housing and infrastructure component, the programme also trained masons and other construction workers. In addition, it created and trained 81 MuSos benefitting 2,000 people with loans averaging USD 123. It also provided health insurance coverage to SME and MuSo participants and their families—around 7,000 people. Members participating to focus group discussions (see Picture 2) confirmed that MuSos were very helpful in providing access to financial resources and had enabled them to conduct their income-generating activities or pay for household expenses and/or their children’s school fees.
- URRP took an innovative, community-driven approach to the regeneration of Delmas 19. Using a consultation process called the Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter Awareness (PASSA), BRC not only raised the community’s awareness on their built environment, but also fostered its engagement to improve its living environment and therefore helped the programme respond more closely to beneficiaries’ needs. It also trained participants to continue using PASSA as the community’s ongoing approach to problem-solving and planning. The project also established strong ties with the Delmas mayor’s office.

Box 3. Testimonies from Beneficiaries

“If we don’t know what causes the disease we cannot protect ourselves and our family. I know now that the water jar needs to be covered, and that stagnant water attracts mosquitoes and needs to be treated to prevent catching malaria or chikungunya.”

— A focus group participant

“Thanks to what we have learned with BRC, we now understand that hygiene and cleanliness in the household and surroundings prevent the occurrence of disease.”

— A female focus group participant



Picture 2. Focus group discussion.

Challenges

The project also faced a number of challenges that will affect the depth and sustainability of its impact. These included the following.

- Planning and implementing programme activities in a slum environment was an ongoing challenge. It made it more difficult to identify the causes of vulnerability—that is, those that already existed before the earthquake as opposed to those that were caused by it. Moreover, the slum environment made it more challenging to establish trust, solidarity and collaboration among participants and with programme staff.
- BRC made considerable effort to consult with the community and local government and provided many opportunities for local input. Still, there were misunderstandings by and disappointment among the beneficiaries about some aspects of the houses which could have been avoided through better engagement and communication with the community.
- As part of its efforts to engage the community, BRC worked with “zonal committees” that had sprung up spontaneously after the earthquake. However, these bodies were not representatives of the community, as BRC had assumed. The legitimacy of these committees was one of the most difficult issues confronting the programme.
- Difficulties in recruiting construction delegates, local authority planning requirements, poor labour productivity, security issues and disease outbreaks all caused delays in construction.
- Loan repayment for SMEs and MuSos has been very slow and a high percentage of loans remained unpaid by the end of the project. The problem of loan repayment has prompted BRC to assess the market to identify a sustainable supplier for managing the SME programme in the future. It was determined that the most appropriate solution was to set up a formal SME community committee—legally constituted as the Entrepreneurs’ Association for the Development of Delmas (AEDP)—and to transfer funds to this body. BRC also set up formal MuSo committees to be responsible for follow-up of the loan repayment after the end of the programme. However, the burden on these committees will be great, including the pressure from zonal committees wanting to access funding.
- The capacity of national and local government bodies to maintain the infrastructure is weak and they have limited resources. The Delmas 19 community has not shown signs of being proactive. It is not clear from the evaluation who will take on ownership and maintenance of these systems.
- The governance mechanisms established and involvement of community groups are unlikely to be sustainable over time which, in turn, could threaten the sustainability of other aspects of the programme.

Appropriateness and Coherence

BRC’s decision to launch the programme was bold and brave, especially as Delmas 19—where urban violence is high and the sense of community and solidarity weak—was a particularly challenging environment. The programme was well-justified, evolving over time from the initial response and recovery stages to meet the longer-term needs of people returning to their communities. URRP aligned with the Haitian government’s strategy to move people out of camps and return them to safe homes, and Delmas 19 was a priority neighbourhood—60 percent of those being evicted from the camps were returning there. The project components responded to key needs expressed by the beneficiaries

themselves. Livelihoods support, governance and resilience were all sound approaches to ensuring that the project would achieve sustainable results.

However, despite its strengths, URRP was ambitious, and BRC lacked both the time and the critical means to fully realise its ambitions in the face of numerous constraints. Some of these were internal (it took nearly a year to set up the full URRP team of delegates and to organise support services); others were external (the challenging socio-economic context of an urban slum like Delmas, space in the city was limited, the land tenure system was complex, and there was a lack of defined and practical urban planning processes in Delmas).

BRC also made a major contribution to the operation of coordination mechanisms within the RCRC Movement, in order to prevent duplication of efforts and maintain a central focus on equitable housing solutions. In support of this role, BRC seconded senior delegates to IFRC and HRC and nurtured a spirit of close collaboration between both organisations. In the early stages of the programme, BRC worked fairly closely with HRC, playing an instrumental role in developing the latter's strategy for the 2010 to 2015 period. Nevertheless, as the programme evolved it became increasingly difficult for BRC to align its objectives and strategies with those of HRC, which were focused on community health, disaster preparedness and the administration of a blood bank.

Efficiency

In short order, BRC established the equivalent of a medium-sized NGO in Haiti,¹ operating in a complex and challenging environment. In implementing its response and recovery programme in Haiti, BRC had to pursue avenues that are outside its normal mandate and expertise, which made it very difficult to create adequate control frameworks. Key informants interviewed by the evaluation team argued that ongoing resources put into administration and human resources were insufficient for an operation of such magnitude. The head office in London had limited capacity to assist with logistics, finance and human resources, and some of its personnel lacked field experience. Numerous problems in recruiting and retaining key staff resulted in implementation delays and involved more than 50 delegates in the programme.

Because URRP was unlike BRC's usual programming, considerable time and effort was spent developing new tools for addressing the programme's specific needs. A positive outcome has been the new systems that are now being rolled up and used for a series of responses in other countries, such as Nepal. Overall, however, the programme lacked of proper monitoring and evaluation tools.

URRP suffered significant delays in implementation, caused by a mix of external factors, staggered decision-making, recruitment issues, and operational challenges. The project was extended several times and the delays made it difficult to synchronise activities. In mid-2013, a major programme board was established to oversee operations and ensured that BRC's corporate strategy, policy and procedures were an integral part of programme development, implementation and learning. The board has fostered a change of culture characterised by more involvement, less siloing and piece-meal working, and bringing the right people around the table to discuss and make decisions. Financial management greatly improved with the adoption of an activity-based budget, leading to more efficient use of resources.

Impact

It is too early to determine with any certainty the long-term effects of the programme. Nevertheless, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and survey results have all confirmed that the PASSA consultation process not only gave the community a voice and a way of channelling their concerns to

¹ With an annual turnover of some GBP 5 million.

BRC, but also introduced a structured, logical approach to identifying needs and/or problems, setting priorities and adopting a plan of action. The infrastructure and housing initiatives have improved the quality of life in Delmas 19. The construction of the canal and other infrastructure has probably had the greatest and most positive impact on the community.

The community is livelier and cleaner than before. People have become more aware of health issues because they have been sensitised to the risk associated with mosquitoes and stagnant water. Testimonies from Delmas suggest that the hygiene campaign conducted by BRC has inspired people to adjust their behaviour to minimise potential sources of contamination. Waste disposal habits have changed: 41% of survey respondents said they now place waste in garbage bags rather than throwing it in the canal. People are also much more informed about diseases such as fevers and diarrhoea and methods to prevent them—65% attributed this to the health campaign. The community has gained from such developments that promote the adoption of sustainable healthy habits.

The support provided to SMEs has slightly enhanced the potential for business development by building capacity in administrative and financial management and improving access to credit. Despite some challenges faced by the SMEs, support provided by BRC has sparked economic activity in the community. Programme activities have also contributed to generating employment opportunities. The training of masons and other construction workers has given several beneficiaries new employable skills. The MuSos introduced savings and financing instruments to marginalised people who otherwise had no access to credit and even less to banks.

Sustainability

Implementation delays, the challenging socio-economic context of Delmas 19, and shortcomings in community governance have all limited the sustainability of the programme's results. The community is fragmented and remains highly vulnerable. Some livelihoods results have been achieved, but the sustainability of MuSos remains a concern. Certainly, the community in Delmas 19 is more organised now than before, and PASSA consultations have given them some tools and understanding about organising. However, community-level governance remains fragile. BRC's focus was on delivering housing, infrastructure and livelihoods support as a means to improve resilience, but what the community needed to build its self-reliance was a sound and functioning governance model. Although BRC involved the appropriate government authorities in planning and decision-making, it failed to establish, early on, mechanisms to ensure government's responsibility for maintaining infrastructure. Given the issues with the zonal committees, it is questionable if they provide the best structure on which to build for sustainable community governance. There are no indications in the behaviour of community members to suggest that they are motivated to maintain the infrastructure themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team proposes the following to improve the implementation or delivery of future programming.

1. Appoint a team experienced in construction and livelihoods to prevent delays associated with lengthy recruitment and to be able to initiate recovery interventions as soon as possible. Establishing an international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts would help identify an ongoing source of appropriate human resources.
2. Fully incorporate local authorities into the planning and implementation of infrastructure interventions to ensure that ownership and maintenance of infrastructures will continue to be their responsibility.

3. Ensure that beneficiaries are involved in and adequately informed about housing designs, to reduce the gap between their expectations and what is delivered. Use models and other public-friendly ways of communicating design and make sure that what is represented is exactly the same as what is delivered.
4. Expand the timeframe for developing livelihoods interventions, especially if it is supporting the establishment of savings groups, which require significant sensitisation and regular monitoring and coaching over time. Usually such interventions require at least two years (two full savings cycles) and follow-up lasting from six months to a year. Consider using proven methodologies and adopting existing software to monitor the health of savings groups. One example is VSLA Associates' Savings Groups Portfolio Tracking System, an off-the-shelf application used to monitor savings groups.
5. Pay more attention to the legitimacy and representativeness of the local structures with which to collaborate, or limit the influence of non-representative groups in the early stages and throughout the programme, so they do not interfere with the implementation of its interventions.
6. Consider applying processes that shift responsibilities to appropriate governmental authorities once the programme is finished. These processes should be discussed early on in the programme, with a view to ensuring the viability of interventions.
7. Prepare and deploy advocacy and awareness-building efforts with the community and authorities to ensure that mechanisms are discussed and established, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of interventions.
8. Enforce a more rigorous monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approach that features a clear, overarching vision of outcomes to be achieved (logic model), a precise description of how programme components fit into each other, the development of "SMART" (which stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely) indicators, and the utilisation of effective tools to measure progress in achieving the expected results (performance measurement framework). Assign M&E delegates in the field to ensure timely, complete and accurate data collection. BRC should plan sufficient investments in M&E training, coaching and supervision to ensure that team members have all the required skills.

LEARNING FROM THIS EXPERIENCE

The evaluation has identified seven lessons stemming from the implementation of URRP:

1. Rapid scale-up of large programmes can only be achieved if significant inputs are invested to ensure that administrative, human resources, finance and logistics systems are in place, as well as to support recruitment and training for local and international technical programme staff.
2. In developing a large programme, particularly in a complex environment such as post-Haiti earthquake, it is essential that the focus and scale of any intervention are consistent with the organisation's mandate, experience and delivery capacities. A thorough risk assessment, with appropriate governance sign-off, should be undertaken where such parameters will be exceeded.
3. It is essential to develop strong relationships with government authorities, not only to ensure they are informed, but also to foster their collaboration in planning efforts and their involvement in important decisions; this way, buy-in can be secured, and responsibilities can be formalised and handed out beyond the programme completion period, thus promoting greater sustainability.

4. In urban settings, it is essential to have good knowledge and understanding of the social fabric and local economic and political structures, with a view to identifying and selecting the proper community structures with which to work, set common interests, foster beneficiary engagement and promote sustained participation in order to facilitate programme delivery.
5. The sequencing of livelihoods activities, from emergency to recovery, needs to be clearly defined and communicated to beneficiaries and must be sustained with effective, ongoing technical support and expertise from head office and from the field.
6. The creation of savings groups may require more time and a different sequencing of operations than anticipated at first, due to the need for programmes to sensitise beneficiaries beforehand in order to generate their trust and collaboration, train them in and build their understanding of financial concepts and administrative procedures, and give them a chance to work together to apply new concepts they have acquired.
7. A sound understanding of local culture and behaviours and a good knowledge of the national language are critical assets for communicating effectively with members of the community and for fostering their collaboration.

CONCLUSION

The evaluation team believes that, even though the results appear to be mixed, URRP still represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work.

On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially in public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for the lack of time and the high turnover in programme staff. Of all three components, governance was the most severely affected by the programme's tight implementation deadlines. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable.

Unlike emergency humanitarian aid efforts that rely primarily on short-term technical assistance, development interventions need to address longer-term issues, such as sustainability and empowerment. Nowhere is this difference more evident than in the programme's governance component. BRC sought to promote a significant shift in mind-set within a poor and highly vulnerable community; however, this was a goal that required far more time and greater investment than the programme could afford. For instance, the training on good governance practices was useful, but without subsequent coaching—especially in a setting where people were so disempowered—it had little lasting impact. Similarly, supplying funding directly to MuSos not only ran against one of the fundamental operating principles of community savings groups, but was ill-advised in a context where survival instincts outweighed community spirit. These longer-term issues are best addressed by building relationships with communities and creating partnerships with local stakeholders. They also require an intimate knowledge of the local context and the way targeted beneficiaries think. An organisation from outside the country and with no history in the community can only gain such knowledge by building close partnerships with trustworthy, local counterparts that can implement programme activities at the community level, and continue as a local resource after the programme ends.

ABOUT THE EVALUATION TEAM

AdviseM Associates is a Canadian consulting firm that specialises in conducting evaluations, surveys and studies to determine the success of international development programming around the world. Its clients include donor agencies, international organisations, foundations, NGOs and government departments. Through its team of experienced partners and associates, AdviseM provides its clients with enlightened advice, while adhering to the highest quality and ethical standards.

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Final Evaluation of the British Red Cross' Haiti Earthquake 2010
Response and Recovery Programme

FINAL REPORT



Presented to the British Red Cross
Submitted by Advisem Services Inc.

Ottawa, Canada

March 2016

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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS

AEDP	Association des entrepreneurs pour le développement de Delmas (Entrepreneurs' Association for the Development of Delmas)
AJECODECODE	Association des jeunes compétents pour le développement de la commune de Delmas (Association of Qualified Youth for the Development of the Delmas Area)
AJPNH	Association des jeunes pour l'avancement de la production nationale d'Haïti (Youth's Association for the Promotion of Haiti's National Production)
ASEC	Assemblée des sections communales (Assembly of Communal Sections)
BRC	British Red Cross
CASEC	Conseil d'administration des sections communales (Commune Board Council)
CMT	Community mobilisation team
DASH	Development Activities and Services for Health
DINEPA	Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement (Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate)
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
GBP	Pound sterling
HRC	Haitian Red Cross Society
HTG	Haitian gourde
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
INFP	Institut national de formation professionnelle (Haitian National Training Centre)
KNFP	Konsèy Nasyonal Finansman Popilè (National Popular Funding Council)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MFI	Microfinance institution
MTPTC	Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et Communications (Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication)
MuSo	Mutuelle de solidarité (community savings and credit association)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS (CONTINUED)

PASSA	Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness
RCRC Movement	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
SMCRS	Service métropolitain de collecte des résidus solides (Metropolitan Solid Waste Collection Service)
SME	Small and micro-enterprise
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UKO	United Kingdom office
UNIFDEJ	Unité des femmes pour le développement et l'éducation des jeunes (Women's Unit for Youth Development and Education)
URRP	Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme
USD	United States dollar
VfM	Value for Money

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme was a multifaceted initiative implemented by the British Red Cross (BRC) over a period of five years ending in July 2015. It sought to provide an immediate response to victims of the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, along with lasting recovery solutions. The final phase of the programme, called the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP), emerged to meet the needs of families returning to Delmas 19, an inner-city slum of Port-au-Prince, after being evicted from Automeca—one of two large camps for displaced earthquake victims. URRP was a community-driven initiative that promoted the regeneration of the most affected and vulnerable communities in selected parts of Delmas 19. The programme integrated a series of multi-sectoral interventions grouped under distinct components: housing and infrastructure (including a water and sanitation and public health component), livelihoods, and community governance. The total final budget for URRP was USD 12 million.

BRC's Response and Recovery Programme was led by BRC in Haiti, reporting to its United Kingdom Office (UKO) in London. It also involved multiple stakeholders, including constituents of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement), such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRC) and other national Red Cross societies; international bodies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO); agencies of the Government of Haiti; local governments and community groups such as the Mairie (mayor's office) in Delmas Municipality and zonal committees established in selected areas of Delmas 19; partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Development Activities and Services for Health, the National Popular Funding Council, Fonkoze/Zafen, HelpAge International; and banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs), such as ID Microfinance and Sogebank.

In total, URRP delivered assistance to 4,000 households located mostly in Delmas 19, more specifically in three locations referred to as "the target area," "zone 3" and "zone 5." The target area consisted of four small communes named Aloulou, Cité 4, Roman and St-Ange; zone 3 extended across four small communes named Haut Spatule, Bas Spatule, Haut Renoncule and Bas Renoncule; and zone 5 was made up of five small communes named Vye Blan, Tchocho, Italis, Mayòt and Kajo.

The final evaluation of the programme was carried out between June and December 2015 by a team of four Canadian evaluators. The evaluation focused on seven evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence, and sustainability and connectedness of the BRC interventions. The evaluation followed five lines of enquiry, including a desk review; key informant interviews with 63 key stakeholders involved in the design, planning, delivery and/or monitoring of BRC activities in Haiti (such as BRC UKO personnel, BRC country delegates, Haitian staff, representatives for the RCRC Movement, representatives of national partner NGOs or MFIs, municipal authorities and some government representatives); focus group discussions with 210 individuals; field observation and a survey with 369 beneficiaries in Delmas 19. Most of the data collection work was carried out during a three-week visit to Haiti by the evaluation team in July 2015 and concluded with validation workshops with in country staff and Community Mobilisation Team (CMT). Data analysis continued until September 2015. Quantitative and qualitative data gathered through the five lines of enquiry was organised into an evidence matrix designed to facilitate the triangulation of information.

Appropriateness of the Programme

The development of URRP was an evolutionary process that built on learning from and reassessment of work undertaken in the initial stages of the programme. In 2010, the scale of the disaster in Haiti had prompted BRC to build

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

on lessons from previous operations (such as post-tsunami reconstruction in Bangladesh and Indonesia) by undertaking an early review of recovery needs. At the end of this review, BRC saw the potential for an integrated approach with the camp population under its jurisdiction that would combine livelihoods, shelter, and water and sanitation. Following the partial closure of the Automeca camp in the latter half of 2010, BRC elected to use this approach with the displaced families as they returned to their neighbourhood of Delmas 19.

The programme was an entirely justified response to the earthquake and its aftermath. URRP was well aligned with the Haitian government's recovery and reconstruction strategy to move people out of camps and return them to safe homes and communities. URRP's focus on Delmas 19 was appropriate, since 60% of the camp population originated from there, and its design was particularly appropriate to the needs of vulnerable populations living in the target area and in zones 3 and 5. Housing, canal and drainage construction, livelihoods and health were among the key needs identified in assessments undertaken by BRC or expressed by beneficiaries who participated in consultations using the Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) methodology. Livelihoods, community governance and resilience were all sound approaches to ensuring sustainability.

BRC's decision to launch the programme was a bold and brave one, especially as this was a particularly challenging environment for such a project (urban violence is more prevalent and the sense of community and solidarity are weaker in Delmas 19 than in other parts of Haiti). However, the scale of the response was not proportionate to the organisation's capacity, experience and mandate. URRP in particular was too ambitious, as BRC lacked both the time and the critical means to fulfil its ambitions in the face of numerous constraints. Some of these were internal (it took nearly a year to set up the full URRP team of delegates support services); and others were external (space in the city is

limited, the land tenure system was complex, and there was a lack of defined and practical urban planning processes in Delmas).

Coherence of the Programme

With its programme, BRC made a major contribution to streamline existing coordination mechanisms within the RCRC Movement, in order to prevent duplication of efforts and maintain a central focus on equitable housing solutions for Haiti. In support of this role, BRC seconded senior delegates to IFRC and HRC and nurtured a spirit of close collaboration between these organisations. In the early stages of the programme, BRC worked fairly closely with HRC, playing an instrumental role in developing the latter's strategy for the 2010 to 2015 period. Nevertheless, as the programme evolved, it became increasingly difficult for BRC to align its objectives and strategies with those of HRC, which were more focused on community health, disaster preparedness and the administration of a blood bank.

Housing and Infrastructure Component

In the face of chronic poverty, it was difficult for BRC to distinguish between people affected by the earthquake and vulnerable people already living in Delmas 19. Nevertheless, the widespread nature of the planned infrastructure upgrades was adequate to reach people most in need of assistance. The 2010 earthquake had destroyed or badly damaged approximately 80% of houses in the target area, and, all in all, URRP constructed 149 new houses with septic tanks.¹ Furthermore, URRP also repaired another 32 houses and distributed 101 cash grants to households so they could make their own repairs. In addition, and in collaboration with the ILO, the project trained 50 masons and provided other training related to construction and repair. This not only established a sustainable source of expertise right in the community; the training and accreditation increased the employability and earning potential of these community members. The quality of work was high (by

¹ See full report for a discussion on initial targets.

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Haitian standards) and deficiencies were minimal. The houses were basic, but sound, and constructed using techniques adapted from local knowledge. The design was flexible and incorporated features to make the houses more earthquake and flood resistant. **Still**, despite BRC's considerable efforts (such as complying to local regulations, seeking approval for housing design from the relevant authorities, and giving the community a chance to comment the design and be involved in the process), housing work was greeted by beneficiary criticism after its implementation. The Mairie believed neither it nor the community were sufficiently involved in the design or in the implementation process. This sentiment was also echoed by participants in focus group discussions, who conveyed that they were not sufficiently involved in the design, which led to misunderstandings and disappointment among the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries frequently complained that their houses were not complete and that they were waiting for BRC to finish it. Although there are people in Delmas 19 who will always complain and ask for more from donor agencies, a fair number of beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with what they received, but did share expectations that they would be receiving a finished house. For some this only meant painting or a skim coat on the concrete. BRC took measures to ensure sanitation was considered in the design and could be accommodated on a very tight site. There was, however, a particular issue with the location of the toilet and septic tank on the porch of houses built using programme funds. Difficulties in recruiting construction delegates, local authority planning requirements, poor labour productivity, security issues and disease outbreaks all caused delays in construction.

As part of the programme, BRC also constructed 302 linear metres of new concrete and block canal and paved 2,300 square metres of drainage, walkways and public space. It also built a marketplace with 34 stalls, a lottery shop and a barber shop, and installed 26 solar powered streetlamps. Again, the quality of work was generally high, with the exception of the metal

grating used to cover culverts in zones 3 and 5. The canal and drainage interventions seem to have had the most significant and positive impact on the community and will greatly increase its resilience to future disasters. The capping of the canal has provided a main route through the community—a key factor in providing safe access for shelter and other support and interventions. The canal route and paved paths also provide the safest escape route in the event of an earthquake. In addition to improving access, the capping also prevents large amounts of garbage from entering the canal system, although much will depend on proper maintenance of the infrastructure, which does not appear likely to be undertaken. Not only are the capacities of national and local government bodies weak and their resources limited, but the Delmas 19 community has not shown signs of being proactive. Once the source of cash-for-work is gone, it is not clear who will take on ownership and maintenance of these systems.

Water and Sanitation and Public Health Component

Health issues featured among the needs identified by community members participating in the PASSA consultation process, including garbage polluting drinking water, and poor health and safety practices associated with human waste disposal. BRC engaged in activities designed to improve the water supply and provide better access to sanitation facilities and waste disposal in the target area, leading to fewer health risks. The programme also invested in hygiene promotion and health insurance coverage. Several campaigns were conducted to raise awareness of chikungunya, dengue fever, malaria, cholera, the use of latrines, and hand washing. Participants in focus groups discussions indicated that zones and cities targeted by the programme were much cleaner now than before, and reported improvements in hygiene and disease prevention resulting from people being more conscious of risks associated with mosquitoes and stagnant water, and more

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

knowledgeable on how to protect themselves from related diseases.

Livelihoods Component

URRP took a sustainable approach by supporting 26 small and micro-enterprises (SMEs) with loans and training. Although gaps in and accuracy of data made it difficult for the evaluators to assess results in job creation, these SME interventions demonstrate positive strides towards employment objectives. The programme also created and trained 81 community savings and credit associations (called MuSos) comprising 2,000 members—as of July 2015, with an average loan of USD 123 per person. BRC gave each MuSo a start-up fund based on membership. It also supported health insurance coverage to SME and MuSo participants and their families, reaching 7,000 people. In addition, it undertook a literacy initiative with Haiti's Secretary of State that benefitted around 100 people.

The SME and MuSo interventions increased beneficiaries' access to credit; however, the loans to SMEs (ranging in size between USD 1,000 and USD 4,000, with the exception of one large loan of USD 15,000) were too small to cover their needs. Loan repayment was very slow, which prevented the national partner (Fonkoze/Zafen) from enforcing the planned loan repayment schedule, ultimately leading it to transfer all amounts collected from SMEs to BRC (USD 30,432) and to withdraw from the project at the end of the current contract. To continue providing support to borrowers while addressing the problem of loan repayment and ensuring the viability of a revolving community fund beyond July 2015, BRC assessed the market to identify a sustainable supplier that could manage the SME programme in the future. It determined that the most appropriate solution was to set up a formal SME community committee—legally constituted as the Entrepreneurs' Association for the Development of Delmas—and to transfer funds to this body, which will be responsible for future follow-up and recovery. The burden on this committee will

be great: a high percentage of loans have still not been repaid, and the committee will be under pressure from zonal committees wanting to access funding. While start-up funds enabled the MuSos to provide loans quickly, they contravened the basic principle of establishing a savings culture over time; as a result, several beneficiaries failed to grasp the basic principles. As of July 2015, MuSo members still owed USD 25,000 in outstanding loans. Before exiting Haiti, BRC transferred the remaining funds to a formal microfinance committee, which will be responsible for future follow-up and recovery.

Community Governance Component

This component reflected URRP's innovative, community-driven approach to the regeneration of Delmas 19. To engage the community, BRC chose to work with the zonal committees that had sprung up after the earthquake, assuming that these bodies were representatives of the community. However, the legitimacy of these committees proved to be one of the most difficult issues confronting the programme. To counterbalance their influence, BRC conducted two rounds of the PASSA consultation process, which engaged the community and helped the programme respond more closely to beneficiaries' needs. It also trained participants to continue using PASSA as the community's ongoing approach to problem-solving and planning—a worthwhile investment in community resilience and sustainability. In addition, BRC strengthened linkages with the Delmas Mairie. The programme also established the CMT, which played an important role in strengthening communication between BRC and the community.

Engaging the community and building local consensus and capacity took longer than expected. This was partly due to the intense nature of working in an inner-city slum and the weak community spirit witnessed in this environment. While PASSA helped the community prioritise its needs, it fell short of establishing lasting community ownership. Through its material, financial and training

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

support, the programme undoubtedly helped individual beneficiaries increase their resilience to disasters and other risks. However, the sustainability of the governance mechanisms and community groups remains unclear at this point, which, in turn, undermines the sustainability of other programme achievements.

Efficiency of the Programme

In short order, BRC established the equivalent of a medium-sized NGO in Haiti,² operating in a complex and challenging environment. In implementing its response and recovery programme in Haiti, BRC had to pursue avenues that are outside its normal mandate and expertise, which made it very difficult to set up adequate control frameworks. Resources invested into the staffing and administration of URRP were insufficient to sustain such a large-scale operation. Furthermore, UKO had limited capacity to assist with logistics, finance and human resources, and some of its personnel lacked field experience. Numerous problems in recruiting and retaining key staff resulted in implementation delays and caused more than 50 delegates to become involved, at one point or another, in the programme.

Because URRP was unlike BRC's usual programming, considerable time and effort was spent developing new tools for addressing the programme's specific needs. A positive outcome has been the new systems that are now being rolled-up and used for a series of responses in other countries, such as Nepal. Even so, a consolidated, coherent central data system was lacking. The logical framework was insufficient for documenting properly the achievement of specific results. Initially, components were implemented in silos and with little synergy; instead of sharing common systems, BRC staff developed their own management and monitoring systems within their respective components.

URRP suffered significant delays in implementation, caused by a mix of external factors, staggered decision-making, recruitment issues, and operational challenges. The project was extended several times and the delays made it difficult to synchronise activities. In mid-2013, a Major Programme Board was established to oversee operations and ensure that BRC's corporate strategy, policy and procedures would become an integral part of programme development, implementation and learning. The programme board was successful at fostering a new culture conducive to more involvement, less siloing and piece-meal working, and bringing the right people around the table to discuss and make decisions. With the introduction of activity-based budgeting, financial management greatly improved over time, resulting in a more efficient use of programme resources.

Impact of the Programme

It is too early to determine with any certainty the long-term effects of the programme. Nevertheless, the PASSA consultation process not only gave the community a voice and a way to channel their concerns to BRC, but also introduced to it a structured, logical approach to needs assessment, problem-solving and planning of future action. The infrastructure and housing initiatives have improved the quality of life in Delmas 19. People have become more aware of health issues and have changed their behaviours. The support to SMEs has somewhat enhanced the potential for business development by building administrative and financial management capacity and improving access to credit. Notwithstanding some of the challenges faced by the SMEs, support provided by BRC has had a triggering effect on economic activity in the community. Programme activities have also contributed to generating short-term employment opportunities. The training of masons and other construction workers has given several beneficiaries new employable skills. The MuSos introduced savings and financing instruments to marginalised people who otherwise had no access to banking.

² With an annual turnover of some GBP 5 million.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

Sustainability and Connectedness of the Programme

Implementation delays, the challenging socio-economic context of Delmas 19, and shortcomings in community governance have all limited the sustainability of the programme's results. The community is fragmented and remains highly vulnerable. Some livelihoods results have been achieved, but the sustainability of MuSos remains fragile. Certainly, the community in Delmas 19 is more organised now than before, and PASSA consultations have given them some tools and understanding about organising. However, community-level governance is still inadequate. BRC's focus was on delivering housing, infrastructure and livelihoods support as a means to improve resilience, but what the community needed to build its self-reliance was a sound and functioning governance model. Although BRC involved the appropriate government authorities in planning and decision-making, it failed to establish, early on, mechanisms to ensure government's responsibility for maintaining infrastructure. Given the issues with the zonal committees, it is questionable if they provide the best structure on which to build for sustainable community governance. There are no indications in the behaviour of community members to suggest that they are motivated to maintain the infrastructure themselves.

Conclusions of the Evaluation

Even though the results appear to be mixed, the programme still represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work.

On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially with respect to public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for a lack of time and high turnover in programme staff. Of all components, community

governance was the most severely affected by the programme's tight implementation deadlines, and public health was the least resourced. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable.

Whether this integrated model of development intervention is the way of the future remains a question for BRC to explore internally. If it is, then the lessons learned from the Haiti experience can inform strategies going forward. If not, they may still be useful to BRC for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations and programming. There is promise in an integrated approach, as long as it comes with a clear, overarching vision of the expected outcomes, a precise description of how programme components fit together, and specific indicators with effective tools for measuring them in order to assess progress in achieving results.

In addition, unlike emergency humanitarian aid efforts that rely primarily on short-term technical assistance, development interventions need to address longer-term issues, such as sustainability and empowerment. These longer-term issues are best addressed through relationships with communities and collaboration with local stakeholders achieved by building close partnerships with trustworthy, local counterparts that can implement activities in communities, and continue as a local resource after the programme ends.

In the immediate future, one of the key challenges BRC faces will be to mitigate the reputational risks that are likely to arise in seeking repayment of the loans granted to SMEs and MuSos—a serious issue that will linger beyond BRC's withdrawal from Haiti. The first victim of popular discontent could be HRC. It is regretful, perhaps even unfair, that BRC has withdrawn without having first developed close ties with HRC and invested meaningfully in building the latter's organisational capacity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

Moreover, since most beneficiaries fail to see the difference between HRC and other members of the RCRC Movement, BRC's own reputation could also suffer.

Recommendations of the Evaluation

The following recommendations are meant to improve the implementation or delivery of future programming:

- Before delivering a programme, BRC should pay special attention to setting up a suitable control environment to ensure all required support services are in place (human resources, finance and administration), and appointing a team experienced in integrated programming, to prevent delays associated with lengthy recruitment and to be able to initiate recovery interventions as soon as possible. The establishment of an international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts, experienced in setting up similar interventions, would help identify an ongoing source of appropriate human resources.
- BRC should ensure proper induction of new delegates filling field positions to ensure they have access to basic knowledge on the status of the programme and access to key information pertinent to their field of expertise.
- BRC should also consider the possibility, if financially feasible, of hiring delegates on long-term contract to ensure programming continuity in the field and to reduce extended absence of delegates in key management positions.
- BRC should adapt its programming to include a step that fully incorporates authorities into the planning and implementation of infrastructure interventions and not just the approvals, to ensure that ownership and maintenance of infrastructures will continue to be their responsibility.
- BRC should ensure that beneficiaries are involved in and adequately informed about housing designs, to allow their expectations to align properly with the final product and delivery method. In doing so, BRC should remember that most communities are not adept at understanding technical drawings and that other forms of communication may be necessary, including physical models and 3D renderings—but remembering that what is shown should be the same as what they are receiving.
- UKO should adopt a livelihoods policy to support programme teams in the field.
- BRC should consider expanding the timeframe for developing livelihoods interventions, especially if it is supporting the establishment of savings groups, as they require significant sensitisation and regular monitoring and coaching, given that the acquisition of financial skills and establishment of group procedures is a slow process. Rigorous and ongoing monitoring is key to ensuring members follow procedures, that savings shares are paid regularly and that loans are reimbursed. Usually such interventions require at least two years (two full savings cycles) and follow-up lasting from six months to a year. In urban settings, the duration of the sensitisation process should not be underestimated, as it takes time for people to get to know and trust each other.
- BRC could consider relying on tested and proven methodologies that work well in the relevant context, and adopting existing software to monitor the health of savings groups. VSLA Associates has developed the Savings Groups Portfolio Tracking System, an off-the-shelf application used by practitioners in several countries to monitor savings groups. It provides essential data for monitoring, rolling up information, and documenting progress achieved.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

- Without significant investment in skills and resources, BRC should refrain from financing the establishment of savings groups. The essence of savings groups is to teach the importance of savings and build loan capital as a group. The infusion of capital was perceived as another cash grant and may have reduced the level of members' accountability to reimburse their loans.
- BRC may want to consider sub-contracting a specialised organisation to manage and supervise the savings groups throughout the intervention, as well as to provide post-programme follow-up and mentoring, and facilitate data collection for a future impact evaluation.
- BRC should either pay more attention to the legitimacy and representativeness of the local structures with which it wants to collaborate, or limit the influence of non-representative groups in the early stages and throughout the programme, in order not to interfere with the implementation of its interventions.
- BRC should consider applying processes that shift responsibilities to appropriate governmental authorities once the programme is finished. These processes should be discussed early on in the programme, with a view to ensuring the viability of interventions.
- BRC should prepare and deploy advocacy and awareness-building efforts with community and authorities to ensure that mechanisms are discussed and established, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of interventions.
- BRC should enforce a more rigorous monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approach featuring a clear overarching vision of outcomes to be achieved (logic model), a precise description of how programme components fit into each other, the development of "SMART" (which stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely) indicators, and the utilisation of effective tools to measure progress in achieving the expected results (performance measurement framework).
- BRC should have M&E delegates in the field to ensure proper supervision of efforts aimed at gathering programme information on a timely basis, and to set up quality assurance mechanisms that provide for accurate data collection. BRC should plan sufficient investments in M&E training, coaching and supervision to ensure that team members have all the required skills, especially with respect to M&E activities.
- BRC should develop and define a list of standard indicators for sustainability and resilience (financial inclusion) to be able to measure livelihoods improvement and impact. The use of proxy indicators—asset acquisition, household goods, transportation means, human assets (skills, knowledge)—could be considered when working with highly vulnerable populations. Alternatively, BRC could opt for existing tools such as the "progress out of poverty" index or the "poverty assessment tool."

Lessons from the Programme's Experience

- Rapid scale-up of large programmes can only be achieved if significant inputs are invested to ensure that administrative, human resources, finance and logistics systems are in place, as well as to support recruitment and training for local and international technical programme staff.
- In developing a large programme, particularly in a complex environment such as post-Haiti earthquake, it is essential that the focus and scale of any intervention are consistent with the organisation's mandate, experience and delivery capacities. A thorough risk assessment, with appropriate governance sign-off, should be undertaken where such parameters will be exceeded.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

- It is essential to develop strong relationships with government authorities, not only to ensure they are informed, but also to foster their collaboration in planning efforts and their involvement in important decisions; this way, buy-in can be secured, and responsibilities can be formalised and handed out beyond the programme completion period, thus promoting greater sustainability.
- In urban settings, it is essential to have good knowledge and understanding of the social fabric and local economic and political structures, with a view to identifying and selecting the proper community structures with which to work, set common interests, foster beneficiary engagement and promote sustained participation, in order to facilitate programme delivery.
- The sequencing of livelihoods activities, from emergency to recovery, needs to be clearly defined and communicated to beneficiaries and must be sustained with effective, ongoing technical support and expertise from head office and from the field.
- The creation of savings groups may require more time and a different sequencing of operations than anticipated at first, due to the need for programmes to sensitise beneficiaries beforehand in order to generate their trust and collaboration, train them in and build their understanding of financial concepts and administrative procedures, and give them a chance to work together to apply new concepts they have acquired.
- A sound understanding of local culture and behaviours and a good knowledge of the national language are critical assets for communicating effectively with members of the community and for fostering their collaboration.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Structure of the Report

This report¹ presents the findings of a final evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme, implemented by the British Red Cross (BRC) from April 2010 to July 2015.

The specific objectives of this evaluation, as per the Terms of Reference (ToRs) featured in Appendix 1, were:

- To provide a summation of the extent to which BRC’s engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions.
- To assess the effectiveness and impact of the integrated approach adopted in the last phase of the BRC Response and Recovery phase, called the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) in Port-au-Prince’s Delmas 19 area.
- To identify lessons (positive and negative) for improved programming and to inform strategic policy and planning.
- To inform management decision making for ongoing and future work.

The evaluation was carried out between June and September 2015 by Advisem Services Inc. (“Advisem,” a Canadian consulting firm). The evaluation team was composed of four evaluators, namely, Maryvonne Arnould, evaluation team leader; Patrick Robitaille, international humanitarian assistance expert; Louis-Pierre Michaud, livelihoods expert; and Aaron Budd, housing and urban planning expert. Statistical analyses and overall quality assurance were performed by Luc Bourgie, analyst. Étienne Côté Palluck, a Canadian consultant based in Haiti, worked as an agent responsible for assisting the evaluators during their visit in the field.

The report is set out as follows:

- Chapter 2 gives an overview of the programme.
- Chapter 3 introduces the evaluation approach and methodology.
- Chapter 4 presents the evaluation findings, including those pertaining to the appropriateness and coherence of programme interventions, expected programme outcomes, and support services associated with the programme.
- Chapter 5 outlines the conclusions and recommendations transpiring from the evaluation.

The contents of this report derive from a review and cross-examination of information supplied by sources canvassed over the course of the evaluation. The opinions are strictly those of the evaluation team, as informed by a large body of evidence gathered from these various sources.

The evaluation team is grateful for the support and insights provided throughout this study by Annalisa Tidona, from the BRC United Kingdom office (UKO), and Wendy McCance and Melvin Telbutt, from the BRC Haiti delegation, who helped the evaluators grasp the essence of a complex programme in very short order. The team is also grateful for the assistance provided by members of the Community Mobilisation

¹ This document is a revised version of a report that was originally submitted in October 2015, as per the requirements of the contract signed with BRC.

Team (CMT) in setting up focus group discussions and conducting a survey of recipients of BRC programming in Haiti.

2. BRC HAITI EARTHQUAKE 2010 RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

2.1 Emergency Response

The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 was an exceptionally devastating disaster, killing more than 100,000 people (by the most conservative estimates) and affecting the lives of three million more. It left Port-au-Prince in ruins, crippled most public infrastructures and wiped out one-fourth of the Haitian government's civil service. The earthquake made a chronically difficult situation even worse, posing a tremendous challenge to both the Haitian people and its institutions, as well as to donors and humanitarian agencies from all over the world.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement²) launched its biggest single country response, which turned out to be a unique experience in its recent history.³ The RCRC Movement sent 21 emergency teams called Emergency Response Units (ERUs) to the country to provide food, water, shelter and health support. BRC immediately contributed support to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) multilateral response with its logistics and mass sanitation ERUs, cash pledges, in-kind goods, and delegates—including a psycho-social team.

In this context, BRC made a major contribution to the operation of coordination mechanisms within the RCRC Movement, to prevent duplication of efforts and maintain a central focus on equitable housing solutions. In support of this role, BRC-seconded senior delegates to IFRC and the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRC) nurtured a spirit of close collaboration between both organisations. BRC worked fairly closely with HRC, seconding a delegate into HRC to support the development of the latter's strategy for the 2010-2015 period.

During this phase, a total of GBP 23,039,194 (approximately USD 35.5 million) was raised by the BRC Emergency Appeal, including contributions from the Disasters Emergency Committee.

2.2 Transition to Recovery

From April 2010, BRC transitioned from emergency relief into a bilateral recovery phase sitting under a framework jointly operated with the Movement. Thus began the Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme, a multi-sector initiative implemented over a period of five years that ended in July 2015. The programme sought to provide an immediate response to victims of the earthquake, as well as lasting recovery solutions through infrastructure rehabilitation, urban planning and livelihoods support, in order to help beneficiaries regain control over their lives and sustain their own needs in the shortest possible order.

² The RCRC Movement is the world's largest humanitarian network. It is made up of nearly 100 million members, volunteers and supporters in 190 national societies. The RCRC Movement has three main components: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 190 member Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Source: <<http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement/>>.

³ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. *Final Report. Haiti Operation – Second Learning Conference*. Panama, September 18-19, 2013. [N.p.], IFRC, [2013].


The Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme was conducted in three phases.⁴ Phase 1 (April 2010 to July 2011) focused on initial relief-to-recovery transition in Port-au-Prince and targeted rural areas of the South Department. Phase 2 (July 2011 to April 2012) concentrated recovery efforts on two large camps in the capital city named Automeca and La Piste, and supported livelihoods in both Port-au-Prince and the South Department. Between 2010 and 2012, BRC also responded to a cholera outbreak in the country, establishing two cholera treatment units and three rehydration treatment points in camps in Port-au-Prince and the South Department. BRC's overall field costs for Phase 1 and 2 were USD 15.3 million (GBP 9.7 million).⁵ In total, Phases 1 and 2 supported approximately 400,000 people in devastated parts of Haiti, primarily through BRC's cholera prevention programme.

Phase 3 (June 2012 to December 2013, and subsequently extended to July 2015) was the Delmas 19 URRP, with a total expenditure of USD 12 million. URRP emerged to meet the needs of families who had returned to Delmas 19, a section of the Delmas municipality in Port-au-Prince Arrondissement, after being evicted from Automeca camp.

2.3 Urban Regeneration

URRP was meant as a community-driven initiative that promoted the regeneration of the most affected and vulnerable communities in selected parts of Delmas 19. It integrated a series of multi-sectoral interventions grouped under distinct components: housing and infrastructure (including a water and sanitation and public health component), livelihoods, and community governance. The expected outcomes of URRP are summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Expected Outcomes of URRP, by Programme Component



⁴ Although commonly mentioned in the programme documentation, these phases were not part of the initial programme design. Instead, they were defined more or less arbitrarily, after they had occurred.

⁵ [British Red Cross]. *Haiti Budget Variance Report. Whole Project Summary* [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], May 2015.

Over the URRP phase of the programme, up to 80 national staff and 8 delegates were employed at any one time in two BRC offices in Port-au-Prince, Haiti reporting to BRC UKO in London, Great Britain. The programme also involved a wide range of external stakeholders, including:

- Constituents of the RCRC Movement such as IFRC, HRC and other national Red Cross societies.
- International bodies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO).
- Government agencies such as the Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC), the Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate (DINEPA), the Haitian National Training Centre (INFP) and the Haitian Secretary of State.
- Local governments and community groups such as the Mairie (mayor’s office) in Delmas Municipality and zonal committees established in selected areas of Delmas 19.
- Partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or banks/microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as Development Activities and Services for Health (DASH), the National Popular Funding Council (KNFP), Fonkoze/Zafen, ID Microfinance,⁶ Sogebank and HelpAge International.

In total, URRP delivered assistance to 4,000 households located mostly in Delmas 19, more specifically in three locations referred to as the “target area,” “zone 3” and “zone 5” (see location in Figure 2).

The target area consisted of four small communes named Aloulou, Cité 4, Roman and St-Ange. Zone 3 extended across four small communes named Haut Spatule, Bas Spatule, Haut Renoncule and Bas Renoncule. Zone 5 was made up of five small communes named Vye Blan, Tchocho, Italis, Mayòt and Kajou.

3. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Overall Evaluation Approach

The emergency response, Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the BRC Haiti Response and Recovery Programme had all been previously evaluated. There had also been a mid-term review and case studies of Phase 3, but as URRP came to an end, BRC sought to evaluate its achievements throughout the response and recovery programme lifecycle—with particular focus on results achieved between June 2012 and July 2015 (URRP). To this end, the evaluation ToRs focused on seven evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence, and sustainability and connectedness of the BRC interventions.

To address these, Advisem was appointed in June 2015 and developed a methodology featuring five lines of enquiry, namely: a desk review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, a survey and field observation (see more details in Section 3.2). Field work took place during three weeks in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in July 2015 and concluded with validation workshops with in country staff and CMT. Data analysis continued until September 2015. Quantitative and qualitative data gathered through the five lines of enquiry was organised into an evidence matrix designed to facilitate the triangulation of information. This led to the coding and processing of 635 distinct pieces of evidence. Based on the contents of the evidence matrix, Advisem prepared a preliminary draft evaluation report, which was presented to BRC stakeholders at a workshop in London in October 2015. At the workshop, BRC provided feedback and reflected on recommendations for improved programming and strategic planning.

⁶ Now called Palmis Mikwofinans Sosyal.

Figure 2
Location of Programme Activities



Source: Google Maps. <<https://maps.google.com/>>.

In addition, Advisem and BRC collaborated to analyse financial and programmatic data using the BRC “Value for Money” (VfM) model as outlined in Section 3.3. The final report was compiled on the basis of Advisem’s independent analysis, completed in October 2015, and stakeholder feedback supplied from January to March 2016.

3.2 Data Collection

Desk Review

A total of 80+ documents were examined between June and September 2015 (see list in Appendix 2). The evaluation team reviewed background documentation and programme material relevant to BRC activities in Haiti, as well as quantitative and qualitative information supplied by BRC’s internal and external communication mechanisms. Sources included: design documents, need assessments, strategies and work plans, budgets and financial documentation, monitoring data and reports, periodic progress reports, programme evaluations and audits, past programme learnings, and additional material gathered by the evaluators over the course of fieldwork in Haiti.

Key Informant Interviews

The evaluation team conducted semi-structured, one-on-one interviews with 63 representatives of key stakeholders involved in the design, planning, delivery and/or monitoring of BRC actions in Haiti, including BRC UKO personnel, BRC country delegates, BRC local staff, representatives for the RCRC Movement, representatives of national partner NGOs or MFIs, municipal authorities and government representatives (see list in Appendix 3). While visiting BRC headquarters in London to attend a formal briefing session, two members of the evaluation had the opportunity to talk to members of UKO personnel involved in the programme. Other interviews with selected UKO personnel were conducted later, remotely by phone or skype. Discussions with programme stakeholders in Haiti took place during the evaluators’ three-week visit in Haiti. Protocols to conduct the various interviews were developed and reviewed by BRC.

Focus Group Discussions

While in Haiti, the evaluators facilitated 16 focus group discussions and group meetings with 210 people. Each group involved a number of men and/or women who belonged to one of the following beneficiary categories: recipients of new houses or repairs, recipients of loans issues to small and micro-enterprises (SMEs), members of community savings and credit associations (MuSos), recipients of literacy training or public health services supplied by the programme, mason trainees and labourers, CMT members, zonal committee representatives, market traders, and participants involved in the Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) process. For full details, please refer to Appendix 3.

To guide the identification and recruitment of individual participants, wherever possible and appropriate, participants were selected randomly by the evaluation team, using a custom-made Excel application that processed the full lists of participants extracted from the programme database. Focus group discussions and meetings were held away from BRC offices in premises rented especially for the occasion. They lasted on average approximately 60 minutes and were conducted according to agreed protocols.

Survey

A paper survey was administered to collect quantitative information from residents of Delmas 19, both direct and indirect beneficiaries of BRC interventions. The questionnaire was developed in English by Advisem in collaboration with BRC staff, and translated and field tested into Creole by evaluators, staff and enumerators. This was taking into consideration the fact that an endline survey targeting the same populations had been conducted a few months earlier by programme staff.

The questionnaire explored seven main areas of interest, namely: socio-demographic information, housing situation, sanitation practices, health status and access to health services, awareness of disaster risks, livelihoods status, and satisfaction with Red Cross services.

Advisem sought to survey approximately 380 households (out of a total of 4,000 recipient households), with a view to achieving a margin of error of 5% or less and a confidence level of 95%—assuming that no more than 5% of questionnaires would be rejected due to missing or incomplete data. The sampling strategy was as follows:

- Survey all households that received a new house or obtained materials or cash grants to repair or rebuild a damaged house, based on beneficiary lists. The vast majority of these households were located in the target area.
- Survey an additional 200 households from zones 3 and 5 with the intent to capture both direct beneficiaries (recipients of micro-credit support and loans, and recipient of health insurance coverage) and indirect beneficiaries of the public infrastructures and awareness campaigns carried out by the programme. Spatial sampling based was used to select households systematically. A route was planned and agreed for each enumerator within each zone, and every 2th door on the left was sampled in both zones.

To minimise bias, up to three attempts were made to talk to an adult representative in each sampled household. Advisem recruited and trained a team of 14 Haitian enumerators who had no connections to the programme. However, for logistical and security reasons, Advisem called on three CMT members to accompany each group of 4-5 enumerators. The CMT were briefed to direct and support the enumerators in each location visited, but they were specifically advised to keep at a distance and not to introduce the enumerators to respondents so as to avoid influencing the results of the survey.

In total, 392 paper questionnaires were filled out by the enumerators over the course of one week, with 383 found to be valid. A total of 177 households were surveyed in the target area and 206 in the rest of the programme area (88 in zone 3 and 118 in zone 5).

Data entry was done by enumerators in the field using a custom-made Excel database under the supervision of Advisem. Data cleaning and analysis was carried out by the Advisem team using Excel.

Field Observation

During the field visit, the shelter and infrastructure evaluator led the review and inspection of the various infrastructures built by the programme, with special focus on potential sustainability and proper maintenance strategies. Five field inspection forms were developed for this purpose: new house inspection form, canal and paving inspection form, public toilets inspection forms,⁷ marketplace inspection form, and office inspection form. Out of 149 new houses built, 10% (n=15) were randomly sampled from the plot layout plan. The inspections included both a visual inspection of the houses and a series of questions for the beneficiaries.

3.3 VfM Methodology

To assess the extent to which URRP provided value for money, the evaluation team collaborated with BRC staff to conduct a VfM analysis (see Box 1), integrating financial analysis for URRP with evaluation findings.

⁷ However, the toilets had been torn down by the community and the market toilets were locked so the form was not used.

Box 1. VfM in BRC

We [BRC] subscribe to the National Audit Office’s definition of VfM as “the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes.” [1]

As captured in this definition, we believe that at the core of VfM thinking is the need to relate outcomes to the range and magnitude of the resources deployed to achieve them. By “optimal,” we mean: “the most desirable possible, given expressed or implied restrictions or constraints.” [1]

VfM thinking therefore explicitly recognises the implications of restrictions and constraints which may affect our work. By its very nature, our work—for example, in emergencies, or in conflict-affected or fragile states, serving those in greatest need—faces many constraints and restrictions. These could and sometimes do include the relative absence of relevant information for decision-making (for example in an emergency response situation), or the need to operate in conflict-affected environments, or in or after natural disasters. These and other factors often have effects on the range and quality of the outcomes we can achieve. Within this definition, we recognise these potential effects and strive for the best use of resources in the circumstances, and where relevant, within the time constraints of the work.

[1] National Audit Office. *Analytical Framework for Assessing Value for Money*.

Source: British Red Cross. Value for Money Working Group. *Value for Money Position Paper*. January 2014.

The evaluation team revised the URRP logical framework in collaboration with BRC staff. This allowed mapping the chain of results based on the evaluation team’s comprehension of the programme after the completion of the field mission. Activities were conceptually re-organised around four outcomes: safer living environment, increased economic security, improved public health, and improved community governance. For the revised logic model see Appendix 4.

Advisem then assigned weights to each outcome according to the degree to which it contributed to the achievement of urban regeneration and resilience of Delmas 19 (the URRP programme goal).

Based on the revised logic model and assigned weightings, BRC allocated all URRP costs to outputs and calculated costs per outcome.⁸

In order to assess to what extent inputs and outputs translated into outcomes and therefore into “value” for beneficiaries, the evaluation team used evidence from the five line of enquiries (desk review, key informant interviews, focus groups discussions, survey and field observation) to draw conclusions on the delivery and the effects outputs and outcomes had on the community in Delmas 19.

3.4 Challenges, Issues and Limitations

Advisem was selected to conduct the final evaluation late in the programme life cycle. In the face of severe time constraints, BRC and Advisem agreed on a strategy to fast-track field work and set up a formal briefing in London and a field mission in Haiti without delay—a critical consideration, as programme operations would be coming to a close very soon and BRC wanted the evaluation to canvass local staff before the end of their appointment. As a result, the briefing in London took place approximately one week after the contract was signed, followed two weeks later by the launch of a complex three-week field mission. This resulted in a number of challenges, issues and limitations for the evaluation.

URRP operated in a challenging and fast-changing environment, which meant that changes to plans were not necessarily documented in the logical framework. As a result, measuring any variance between targets and actual numbers achieved proved challenging for the evaluation team.

In addition, the evaluation team had difficulties obtaining updated quantitative data to assess achievements and progress according to the URRP logical framework indicators. The focus group

⁸ All budget lines, including direct and indirect costs, were allocated to outputs on the basis of usage by BRC. Where exact information on usage was not available, a standard formula was used.

discussions, interviews and survey work all allowed documenting several indicators, but other indicators were not regularly documented as part of the monitoring strategy, and the evaluation team had no reliable quantitative evidence to inform these indicators (for example, the reduction of disease in the community). The report highlights where this is the case.

Another set of issues pertained to security and access to communities in Haiti. Security was and is still an ongoing concern throughout Haiti, and particularly in certain parts of Port-au-Prince. The area where BRC was working sits within an inner-city slum, controlled by gangs and with frequent outbursts of violence. BRC put security measures in place to deal with the frequent security incidents, including staff curfew on the programme site after dark, the requirement that all staff walk in pairs and international staff be accompanied by at least one CMT member while walking on site. The evaluators followed BRC security procedures while in Delmas 19⁹ and although overall there were no security incidents during the evaluation, the survey team did witness episodes involving violent threats among community members.

Access to beneficiaries in Delmas 19 turned out to be challenging, as local populations did not necessarily trust or welcome outsiders, including those who were clearly identified as humanitarian assistance workers. The CMT played a key role in helping the evaluation team administer the survey and contact individuals targeted for participation in data collection activities set up in the field. In spite of this critical contribution, participation by beneficiaries was less than expected, especially in focus group discussions. However, consistency seen in indications from multiple sources suggests that this limitation did not significantly undermine the overall validity and reliability of evidence used to draw the evaluation's findings.

4. FINDINGS

This section makes up the bulk of the report and is divided into three parts.

- Part One (Section 4.1) discusses the coverage, relevance and appropriateness of the BRC response and recovery programme, considering the needs of the beneficiaries and the capacity, experience and mandate of BRC. This section also looks at the programme's overall coherence with other IFRC and HRC initiatives.
- Part Two (Section 4.2) reviews the degree of achievement of expected outcomes for each component of the BRC response and recovery programme, namely: housing and infrastructure, public health, livelihoods, and community governance. The discussion highlights some of the factors that may account for results attained by the programme. Where applicable, issues regarding the impact and sustainability of individual components are also raised.
- Part Three (Section 4.3) examines how support services functioned to achieve programme outcomes. Topics addressed include: human resources, management tools and systems, financial management, logistic and procurement services, decision making processes, timeliness, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

⁹ This meant for instance that the evaluators were not able to visit the site at night to see whether the street lighting was working as the risk was deemed too high.

4.1 Coverage, Relevance and Appropriateness of the Programme

4.1.1 Coverage

From 2010 until 2012, as a result of its multilateral engagement, BRC implemented operations in four areas: Automeca camp, JMV La Piste camp, and Delmas 19 in Port-au-Prince, as well as the South Department. From June 2012 onwards, with interventions in the camps finished and the livelihoods interventions in the South successfully completed, BRC decided to focus entirely on Delmas 19.

The scale of the disaster in Haiti had prompted BRC to build on lessons from previous operations (for example, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami) to undertake an early review of recovery needs.¹⁰ At the end of this review, BRC saw the potential for an integrated approach with the camp population under its jurisdiction that would combine livelihoods, shelter and water and sanitation since the first BRC recovery joint assessment in June 2010.

In light of assessment data indicating that 60% of Automeca residents had come from Delmas 19, BRC decided to follow the displaced families as they returned to their neighbourhood of Delmas 19. This became even more of a necessity with the partial eviction of the Automeca camp in September 2010, while BRC was distributing cash grants.¹¹

Another motivation for choosing an integrated approach was to gain knowledge from recovery interventions in an inner-city slum setting. At the time, there were fairly few documented experiences and tools involving community-driven, multi-sectoral integrated programming in urban areas, and BRC felt its efforts in Haiti would provide an opportunity to stimulate learning—for itself, the RCRC Movement, and the wider sector—in this relatively new field of action.¹²

Compared to other parts of the country, Port-au-Prince was a more difficult setting in which to take on the challenge of reconstructing communities destroyed by the earthquake. Even before the earthquake (see Box 2), space in the city was limited, land ownership issues were more complex, urban violence was more prevalent, and the sense of community and solidarity were weaker.

Box 2. The Situation in Pre-Earthquake Haiti

Before the earthquake, Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America, was facing numerous problems that made the Haitian context already extraordinarily complex. Among them were:

- Port-au-Prince, the capital city, is in fact a high density conurbation of several municipalities without common planning or urban authority aside from that held by the Government of Haiti. The need for land planning to solve this problem was well stated.
- An estimated 70% of the urban population lived in slums, and the same percentage of the urban population lived in rented houses.
- Rental arrangements are usually for one year, and fees must be paid in advance at the end of the previous year.
- Not all of the population is registered.
- Very low coverage of public services (water and sewer systems, electricity, waste management, etc.) in both urban and rural areas.
- Poor quality of infrastructure and housing stock; lack of urban planning and public spaces, especially in Port-Au-Prince.
- High population density, especially in the main urban areas.
- Deficient transportation and logistics infrastructure.
- Lack of land tenure and property clarity and a significant number of homeless people.
- Insecurity, poverty, inequity and lack of livelihood opportunities.
- Governmental institutional capacities were very weak. A United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti was established on June 2004 by the Security Council in the aftermath of an armed conflict that spread to several cities across the country.

Source: Calzadilla Beunza, Alfonso, and Ignacio Martin Eresta. *An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010 Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, Achievements and Constraints*. Geneva, IFRC, October 2011.

¹⁰ British Red Cross. *Assessment Summary. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration (URR) Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, May 2012.

¹¹ Rule, Amelia. *Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter Awareness (PASSA). PASSA in the Post-Disaster Urban Context of Port au Prince, Haiti – 2011/2012*. [N.p.], BRC, 2012.

¹² British Red Cross. *Concept Note. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration (URR) Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, October 2012.

Delmas 19 had been completely destroyed by the earthquake: the canal that ran across the area was damaged, drainage water flooded the area, and people were left to survive in unsafe buildings. People living in what became known as the “target area” had been particularly affected by the earthquake, but also by recurrent flooding because of poor infrastructures and the commune’s location downhill.

Although it was challenging to distinguish between the population affected by the earthquake and vulnerability that already existed in the community due to chronic poverty, BRC believed that the widespread nature of infrastructure upgrades was likely to reach those most in need. Decided therefore to focus its support on the target area, only later expanding to the adjacent zone 3 and zone 5.

Zones 3 and 5 benefited from a number of other interventions and initiatives, such as livelihoods, training, canal upgrade and access to the marketplace, but did not benefit from the construction of new houses. Noting this difference, participants in focus group discussions commented about what they saw as unfair treatment of beneficiaries based on their geographic location. Interviews with key informants and desk reviews underlined the need to balance different needs through equitable support in rebuilding Delmas 19.¹³

This raises the thorny issue of deciding whether organisations should give more to the few or less to the many. While the evaluation was not able to reach any conclusions on this based on the information available for the programme, examining how the latter was designed led to interesting findings on the prioritisation of needs, especially regarding the construction of housing.

4.1.2 Relevance and Appropriateness

Needs Assessment Process

BRC invested considerable resources in undertaking assessments and leading consultations with key stakeholders in Delmas 19 in order to fully and accurately determine needs and target legitimate programme beneficiaries. As a result, the development of URRP was an evolutionary process that built on learning and reassessment of work undertaken in the initial stages of the programme, outlined below.

The 2010 earthquake left approximately 80% of houses in the Delmas target area either completely damaged (MTPTC “red tag” designation) or badly damaged (MTPTC “yellow tag” designation). The joint livelihoods and shelter assessment in June 2010 also identified starting a recovery programme as soon as possible in Delmas 19 to improve the shelter situation.¹⁴ By the fall of 2010, a significant number of evictions from Automeca prompted people to return to Delmas 19, thus increasing the need to build housing as soon as possible.

Shelter work began in Phase 1 (April 2010 to July 2011) with the goal of increasing the resilience of the most vulnerable in the target area and in zones 3 and 5, and with the objective of an integrated shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene initiative that would provide access to safe housing. Several architectural and structural surveys, as well as sanitation surveys and a cadastral and geographic information system survey, were carried out during this period. Work began with the construction of five pilot houses in March 2011 to understand the design, building process and cost. However, evidence clearly suggests that construction started with overpayment of labour, no detailed planning, budgets or

¹³ Both the mid-term review of the Haiti recovery programme (Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Patrick Elliott. *British Red Cross Haiti Recovery Programme. Mid-Term Review*. [N.p.], [n.p.], September 2011) and the final evaluation of the South programme (Sikamo, Charity. *British Red Cross Cholera Response Final Report. South Department, Haiti. December 2010-October 2011*. [N.p.], [n.p.] November 2011) called attention to the need for equity and integration of interventions and made specific recommendations addressed at the programme in Delmas 19.

¹⁴ Chazali, Catherine, and Melvin Tebbutt. *Joint Livelihoods and Shelter Assessment. Needs and Opportunities for Vulnerable Households Living in Automeca Camp – Port-au-Prince – Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], June 2010.

bill of quantities. Thus the project was initially faulted for a very high cost paid per house (estimated at USD 40,000¹⁵). As discussed in later sections of the evaluation, the pilot houses had raised community expectations significantly. However, from July 2011, it was clear that shelter work was not meeting the objectives, due to inadequate controls over resources in shelter construction activities, linked to poor internal communication, insufficiently detailed designs and inaccurate budget and forecasts. The decision was therefore made to interrupt the programme.¹⁶

Phase 2 (July 2011 to April 2012) was spent rebuilding a relationship with the community to show that the BRC was not an “open cash machine.” Documents examined by the evaluation team suggest that the re-integration of BRC took a lot of time after the shortcomings of the five pilot houses. The evaluation found that it is likely that BRC may not have fully recovered in the eyes of community from these events, as community members often inferred that these five pilot houses were superior to what was later built, and they expected BRC to provide more.

The joint-assessment also indicated that the community in the camp was in need of generating income. Overall, eight livelihoods assessment and SME development and microfinance assessments were carried out in Phases 1 and 2. Cash was injected into the community, and livelihoods interventions were designed. However, it soon became evident that the implementation of any sustainable recovery programme needed to be preceded by infrastructure upgrades in Delmas 19.

To take stock of the different expectations and help the community and BRC prioritise, a PASSA assessment was carried out during Phase 2 in Delmas 19. Between August and October 2011, the PASSA methodology was used to identify priority needs in the community.¹⁷ The community selected 40 participants that formed a PASSA group. This group identified flooding due to the drainage canal which runs through the target area as the main concern. This priority was followed by health and waste management issues, poor access to safe, open spaces which for the community was interlinked with personal safety.¹⁸ Job creation and training in safer building practices were again identified as priority needs.¹⁹ It is important to note here that housing was not identified as a top priority by the community, but came after the set of issues highlighted above.

In light of the PASSA assessment, participants made suggestions to implement solutions based on an analysis of their own capacity and the longer-term needs for the zones, which led to the development of community action plans. Finally, the plans were presented to the representative committee of Delmas 19 and then to the wider community. These formed the basis of what was to become URRP.

¹⁵ The total cost was USD 200,000 for five houses. However, the cost breakdown (materials, labour, office, staff, etc.) remains unclear, as very little tracking took place during the construction of these houses.

¹⁶ Fairley, Laura-Louise, and Wendy McCance. *Final Project Review: Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme – Phase 3*. [N.p.], BRC, [draft, July 2015].

¹⁷ PASSA was developed from participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation in the water and sanitation sector, and field tested in Uganda 2009 and Bangladesh 2010. The methodology is meant to assess risks and vulnerabilities around safer shelter practices and to build community capacity for change through action plans. This was the first application in an urban setting.

¹⁸ The target area, and parts of Zone 3 and Zone 5 are characterised by dense living conditions and narrow corridors between houses. During the earthquake, these were one of the main causes of mortality, as evacuation or the use of stretchers was not possible in such confined spaces. Two people are unable to pass each other or stand side by side in the corridors, some of which are dead ends. At night, in the absence of street lighting, this increased the sense of insecurity in the population. In addition, the corridors become open drains which carry rubbish and grey water from houses. See: Rule, Amelia. *Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter Awareness (PASSA). PASSA in the Post-Disaster Urban Context of Port au Prince, Haiti – 2011/2012*. [N.p.], BRC, 2012.


¹⁹ British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.

One challenge that arose during the PASSA process worth mentioning here, is that many of the solutions identified by the community were not feasible in the near future without significant funding and government input, so PASSA facilitators encouraged the community to concentrate on solutions that could be achieved by the community themselves with some support from BRC.²⁰ In fact, a key aspect missing in the implementation of PASSA (and later of URRP) was the inclusion of municipal authorities for the governance of the interventions. They were identified in the programme’s urban development plan as part of the process in obtaining approvals; however, engaging with authorities more closely and including them in the reconstruction process flow chart²¹ would have helped to determine the governance model for operations and maintenance of interventions, and would potentially have added a level of sustainability to the project.

Programme Design and Delivery

URRP was designed to support PASSA action plans through an integrated multi-sectoral set of interventions regarding improved security and public health, improved economic security and improved community governance, as outlined in Figure 3. However, over the course of the programme, BRC ended up taking on board more and more responsibilities for the physical regeneration of Delmas 19 on behalf of the community. An examination of the final expenditure by programme component gives clear indication of this.

Figure 3
URRP Expenditure, by Programme Component



BRC focused on delivering shelter and infrastructures (55% of the total expenditure) and livelihoods (20%) as a means to improve resilience. Despite the fact that public health and waste management were directly identified as main concerns by the community, expenditure in public health improvements only accounted for 11 % of total expenditure, although the rationale was that infrastructure upgrades would also have an impact on public health outcomes. In addition, for reasons that are unclear, the construction

²⁰ Rule, Amelia. *PASSA: Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter (Habitat) Awareness. PASSA as part of an Urban Integrated Neighborhood Approach, Haiti, Port au Prince, August-October 2011*. [N.p.], BRC, 2011.

²¹ British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.

of houses became the main output in the strategy to create a safer living environment in Delmas 19 and the programme's single largest expenditure across all components, despite the fact that shelter had not been identified by the community as a priority.²²

During the course of the evaluation it emerged that the community was most in need of a governance model to build self-reliance, as discussed in the Community Governance section. BRC invested significant effort and funds into community governance (14% of total expenditure), mainly in the form of zonal committees that had been expected to serve as the primary bodies governing and driving construction, infrastructure and livelihoods components. However, interventions with these committees fell short of fostering their ownership of and engagement in maintaining the infrastructure after the programme ended.

Despite this, BRC took a bold and brave decision to support the physical regeneration of Delmas 19, as this was a particularly difficult environment in which to undertake such a project. Indeed, as explained in this report, BRC had a very hard time delivering the planned activities, given the intense nature of working in an inner-city slum, and the multiple stakeholders and entrenched vested interests that had to be navigated at every turn.²³

Informants interviewed by the evaluation team argued that the URRP was perhaps too elaborate, and that BRC did not have sufficient time or lacked the critical means to fully pursue its ambitions in the face of numerous internal and external constraints faced over the course of the programme. As such, the scale of the BRC response was not appropriate and proportional to the organisation's capacity, experience and mandate, and it was only at great human and financial cost that BRC managed to achieve some of the programme's expected outcomes. Furthermore, the programme suffered significant delays in implementation, caused by a combination of external factors,²⁴ staggered decision-making, recruitment delays, and operational challenges²⁵—notably, liaison with the zonal committees to meet programme commitments. The project cycle was stretched, with a number of extensions²⁶ all well documented and related to the challenges mentioned throughout this report.

4.1.3 Coherence

Coherence with IFRC Initiatives

URRP was developed in alignment with the Haitian Government's recovery and reconstruction strategy to move people out of camps and return them to safe homes. It also sat firmly within the broader RCRC Movement strategy of taking an integrated and neighbourhood-based approach to supporting communities. This strategy, known as the Integrated Neighbourhood Approach, encouraged integration of key programmes in targeted neighbourhoods, with a view to increasing access to sustained basic services and improved infrastructure through proven participatory techniques designed to build

²² See: British Red Cross. *Project Proposal. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration Programme (URRP)*. [N.p.], [n.p.], May 2012; and also Appendix 4.

²³ *Decision to Extend. Haiti EQ Recovery*. [N.p.], [n.p.], December 2014.

²⁴ Hurricanes, tropical storms, endemic outbreaks and security issues are part of Haitian life and so buffer time must be added to mitigate them. For instance, in 2012, approximately two weeks were lost due to preparing, reacting and cleaning up after extreme weather, which also generated delays in supply, increased staff illnesses, and reduced transport availability.

²⁵ Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

²⁶ First decision to extend, on July 26, 2013. Second decision to extend, on November 25, 2013, to extend the timeframe from June until September 2014 (3 months). Third decision to extend, on December 16, 2014, to extend the closing date to allow for construction work to be completed and community engagement to be responsibly closed down, given that exit at this time would leave commitments to beneficiaries unmet, resulting in a high risk to BRC's reputation by leaving the programme unfinished.

community ownership. Clearly, IFRC’s approach was inspired by the visionary thinking of BRC regarding the development of integrated programming. BRC’s approach was also different from the wider humanitarian community, which was about to deploy a large number of T-shelters. BRC felt that T-shelters had a short lifespan and, although incremental in approach, would likely not be upgraded in the future.

As both organisations had closely-aligned objectives, BRC was in a position to take on a strong leadership role within the RCRC Movement, with respect to the recovery phase of interventions in Haiti. Due to limited human resources, however, BRC had to prioritise its cooperation efforts and attendance to RCRC meetings, based on its assessment of the importance of meetings and the degree of specialisation required. Some key informants felt that both BRC and the RCRC Movement would have gained from maintaining strong communication, seeing how much there was to learn from building a network of resources of partner organisations and accessing each other’s experiences and best practices. In that sense, BRC possibly missed the opportunity to invest in sustaining relationships with key actors in the development scene in Haiti.

Coherence with HRC Initiatives

As noted earlier, BRC worked fairly closely with HRC during the early stage of the programme. Nevertheless, as the programme evolved, it became increasingly difficult for BRC to align its objectives and strategies with those of HRC, which were focused on community health, disaster preparedness and the administration of a blood bank. The evaluation team asked BRC UKO personnel and delegates in Port-au-Prince how they felt about stronger collaboration with HRC, and their response was that HRC was overwhelmed by the international response to the earthquake and lacked the capacities to allow such collaboration to take place. These circumstances prevented BRC and HRC from implementing interventions together in Delmas 19, with BRC taking the lead in direct implementation. A stronger collaboration would have resulted in a more coherent set of strategies for both organisations (see section on “Linking the community with the Haitian Red Cross”).

4.2 Achievement of Expected Outcomes

4.2.1 Housing and Infrastructure

The integrated URRP was rolled out in June 2012. URRP set out to improve security and public health through the implementation of different shelter solutions that met the needs of renters and households with varying levels of house destruction. The evaluation examined work undertaken by BRC and its partners to offer shelter solutions, build or repair houses and construct or rehabilitate public infrastructures.

Targets and Achievements

The rationale for taking an approach to upgrading infrastructure with the community was that this would ensure wider coverage and that even the most vulnerable would benefit from the outcomes. URRP set out to undertake the following interventions to support the community in addressing the key concerns that emerged through PASSA:²⁷

- The construction of 302 linear metres of new concrete and block canal.
- The paving of 5,000 square metres of pathways including 1,500 linear metres of drainage.

²⁷ British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.

- The creation of 800 square metres of open space.
- A 191-square-metre covered marketplace with 34 stalls and toilet facilities.
- A community facility.
- Four water points and committees to support the operation and maintenance.
- Twenty-five solar-powered street lights.

The implementation of these projects enabled BRC to work with the community and, through urban planning and construction, address other priorities, such as:

- Improved safety for the community through the construction of 149 new houses with toilets and septic tank.
- The employment of skilled and unskilled labour.
- The training of 50 masons.
- The supply of materials and technical support for the repair of 61 identified homes.
- The safe relocation of Automeca camp residents.


Infrastructure work was carried out from June 2012 to December 2013, with multiple extensions required until July 2015. To succeed at this very ambitious undertaking, BRC drew on its experience in tsunami reconstruction in Bangladesh and Indonesia. However, as it lacked some of the core competencies required (such as expertise in seismic engineering design and specialised architecture), the programme had to recruit skilled, experienced and committed staff to undertake initiatives on the ground, to work with technical advisers in BRC UKO who guided the project. During the key informant interviews, multiple BRC sources noted the difficulties in recruiting experienced construction delegates. The delays in recruitment also caused delays in implementing the programme; however, BRC did eventually bring in a number of experienced and qualified international staff, some of whom were committed for the long term as well as a number who could not make such a commitment. Those that could not commit to long-term contracts left a number of gaps in programme implementation, such that specific interventions had to be put on hold. BRC was not able to quickly find or manage local staff to take on positions of the international staff when they were vacant.

The housing repairs were completed for 32 houses versus the proposed 61. This was largely due to the difficulties in retaining technical staff to oversee the construction. Without the required technical support, and as a means to meet the need for repairs, BRC provided cash grants to 58 households to undertake their own repairs. The actual number of cash grants delivered could potentially have been higher, as many of them were being disbursed in the final days of the programme.

With the construction of the first houses starting in March 2014 and 149 houses finished in July 2015, the 16-month timeframe seems reasonable for this scale of construction, which also required training approximately 50 masons to undertake the work. Although the community, which seems to be used to waiting, did not seem too concerned about the time it took to start construction, the evaluation team believes the four-year timeframe to start construction is fairly long. This has mainly been attributed to issues of recruitment (it took nearly a year to set up the full URRP team of delegates), housing target revisions (see section below) and the challenges of working with this particular community in Haiti.

As mentioned, more resources were given to housing construction than to infrastructures (see Figure 4) despite the opposite prioritisation by the community.

Figure 4
Safer Living Environment Created and Maintained, Expenditure by Output



The rest of this section examines BRC's housing efforts, followed by its infrastructure work in Delmas 19.

Urban Planning

BRC made it a priority to engage in ongoing, transparent communication with the community and the Mairie for the urban regeneration of Delmas 19. This was confirmed by the latter, which was very involved in ongoing discussion and with the implementation of URRP. Although the Mairie was a vocal advocate of re-planning and rebuilding the entire target area, and of rebuilding housing with a minimum of 35 square metres, BRC made a compelling case for the construction of smaller houses. Eventually the Mairie gave its approval of the plan and agreed to provide land security through taxation, as well as to guarantee rental rates for a set number of years.

BRC also engaged with two other key institutions—DINEPA on water supply and drainage, and MTPTC for public works and construction. BRC was very successful in getting buy-in for the project and approval from the appropriate authorities; however, a challenge remains in having the Mairie (and community) take ownership of the interventions beyond programme completion, as discussed below under sustainability issues.

Land Tenure

As rightfully pointed out by BRC, land tenure issues in Haiti are very complex. Many owners lost paperwork in the earthquake (if they ever had it) and governmental systems, checks, and procedures have not been robust. The state lost thousands of government workers during the disaster, making all departments under-function, which was part of the reason why coordination with municipal agencies was slow and required a lot of time and effort to establish.²⁸

²⁸ Fairley, Laura-Louise, and Wendy McCance. *Final Project Review: Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme – Phase 3*. [N.p.], BRC, [draft, July 2015].

BRC made considerable efforts to ensure some level of land security was established, as it would not begin construction of a house until appropriate permits were in place. This included an agreement with the Delmas Mairie to accept a declaration of honour that occupants have rights to the land or form an agreement that they could use the land and pay the appropriate taxes. There was already a precedent for occupants paying municipal construction taxes²⁹ to the tax office³⁰ through registration with the Mairie. BRC worked with a land expert to determine the security that this provided and felt it was an acceptable measure. BRC was then effective in working with the Mairie and the beneficiaries to have this approach accepted.³¹ This level of security is key for vulnerable groups who receive new housing that is likely to be of a higher standard than what is generally built.

Key informants consulted for this evaluation noted that all new houses had to complete the official registration process with the Mairie in order for owners to obtain their keys. The registration process required occupants to pay taxes, but was also a first step towards land entitlement. The occupants of these houses feel that the process has made them owners, and BRC local staff have noted that the registration papers will make it difficult to evict the beneficiaries.

Housing

BRC undertook appropriate research and analysis to understand both the technical requirements of building in Delmas 19 and also to gain a cultural understanding of housing in Port-au-Prince. This included undertaking detailed land survey and identifying individual plots, soil testing, social mapping and housing surveys, as well as learning from residents how they use their houses. The programme team responsible for shelter work initiated a process called “Talk to the Buildings” that maps the architectural patterns that make a house a home. One of the biggest findings was that the area immediately off the street, which the evaluators would normally consider to be a “porch,” is considered very much a part of the house in Haiti. Based on this research, and the availability of local materials and building techniques well known to local builders, a cost-effective design was developed.

The design was flexible enough to accommodate different sites and allowed for a size ranging from 17 to 25 square metres. This was larger than what was being discussed at shelter coordination meetings in which BRC had participated, but BRC was taking a different approach. BRC’s approach to permanent housing rather than T-shelters is what sets this programme apart with a greater level of resiliency.

A few options were explored for the design and delivery of the shelter works in 2011 by the shelter team in Haiti, and a “design development” report³² was produced that outlined the design methodology based on the research and analysis outlined above. This report proposed a structural frame where the infill walls and roof would be finished by the owner, to allow the configuration that would fit their needs. Although this approach was advocated by the shelter team, the decision was taken by BRC UKO to include the infill



Picture 1. Entrance to one of the five BRC pilot houses.

²⁹ Called “contribution foncière des propriétés bâties,” or CFPB.

³⁰ Called “Direction générale des impôts,” or DGI.

³¹ British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.

³² Potangaroa, Regan, Rafael Mattar Neri, and Dan Brown. *The Design Development and Costs of Several Key Housing Issues for Delmas 19, Port au Prince, Haiti*. Haiti, [N.p.], December 2011.



Picture 2. New two-level house.

panels and roof in order to provide a more complete house. The community expectations had also been raised by the building of the five pilot houses which were complete

Thus, the number of houses was revised down from the proposed 252 to 149, although records differ on the original targets.³³ It was not clear what level of finishing this entailed and how well this aspect was communicated to the beneficiaries. During the evaluation, it was frequently raised by the beneficiaries that the house was not complete and that people were waiting for BRC to finish it. Although there are many people in Delmas 19 who will be critical of everything they receive and always push for more, a good number of beneficiaries expressed they were content with what they received, but did share expectations that they would be receiving a finished house. For some this only meant painting or a skim coat on the concrete.³⁴

Despite any dissatisfaction from the community, the house design is commendable for a number of key aspects, including:

- Using all local and readily available materials.
- Building to the Haiti 2013 building code.
- An earthquake-resistant design that is relatively straightforward to construct and does not require complex reinforcing or extensive concrete work that has greater quality control issues.
- An incremental approach that provides the potential to expand upwards with a second level.
- Flexibility that allows the house layout to vary in size and configuration based on plot layout, including multi-unit blocks with party wall construction.

Nevertheless, the desk review conducted by the evaluation team indicates that there are large gaps between how housing is constructed in Haiti and the expectations of BRC to provide a safe shelter design with a consistent level of quality. Those involved in construction easily reverted to less effective Haitian practices. Considerable time was spent on training and revising the methodology to reduce wastage; this was noted to be an inevitable part of the process, but also contributed to delays and an increased budget.³⁵

³³ The original URRP proposal states 252, but the decision log of the URRP acknowledges a reforecast in 2013 to decrease the number of complete houses. The mid-term review of the programme, in 2013, claimed that the number was decreased to 140. However, initial assessments in Phases 1 and 2 surveyed all houses in the target area, a number over 400, which might have led to the assumption that all would be rebuilt. This might explain why some informants interviewed by the evaluation team believed that the original target in Phases 1 and 2 was 400.

³⁴ In retrospect, to be clear on exactly what it was delivering (an unfinished core house) and on the expectation that owners would have to complete, BRC could have built the structural frame or “core house” and provided owners/renters with materials, money or vouchers to complete the work. This could have been done in much the same way as the renters were supported.

³⁵ McCance, Wendy. *Haiti Report – 2012. Key Challenges, Learning Points and Achievements*. [N.p.], BRC, January 2013.

Overall construction quality was high for Haiti and deficiencies were minimal. The materials had been sourced within Port-au-Prince and were also of high quality for the context. A competent procurement department was able to find materials that met the design requirements. The houses have raised floors that consider the potential for flooding. Where there was a second floor there was also a steel roof, to deter further floor construction where the soil conditions in the target area could not support the extra weight.

The inspections of 15 houses found the following (see Table 1):

Table 1
Findings from the Field Inspections

Question (n = 15 new houses)	Answers	
	Yes	No
Did the beneficiary participate in the design of the house?	27%	73%
Does the house get good ventilation?	53%	47%
Does the house get good daylight?	87%	13%
Did the beneficiary add additional doors or windows?	60%	40%
Does the house have any issues with flooding?	7%	93%
Does the house have access to electricity?	53%	47%

All the houses were provided with two windows and one door, and in more than 50% of the houses inspected a second door opening had been done at the request of the house owner and/or an additional window had been installed. In some cases, this was through a structural wall section, which further demonstrates that safe shelter knowledge was not widespread among the population of home owners in Delmas 19. In most cases, the interiors received adequate daylight and cross-ventilation appeared to be sufficient, but in general this was because of the additional window. Where neighbouring houses surrounded the house on three sides, the interiors were dark and damp, and ventilation was poor.³⁶



Picture 3. Location of septic tank cover in front of door with toilet to right (beneficiary has enclosed toilet area).

In the 15 houses visited during the field inspections, the toilet was generally not used unless it was piped directly into the canal or where the land area was sufficient that the toilet could be installed at the back of the house. Some septic tanks were used to store water but, after inspecting a number of them, they were mostly empty. Some beneficiaries said that they use neighbours’ toilets, although they would not say who; likely, they are finding “alternative” places.³⁷

³⁶ In Cité 4, for instance, housing work consisted primarily of multiple unit construction, based loosely on the existing plot layout. Discussion with individual households about moving a few meters away to get a better plot and more space between houses was not warranted at the time.

³⁷ This finding from the field inspections is not entirely consistent with survey results showing that 70.1% of 361 respondents indicate that people living in their households used their own latrines, as opposed to shared latrines (11.6%) or public/community latrines (9.4%). This discrepancy could be due to a demand effect, i.e., participants in



Picture 4. New house with second floor addition.

BRC took measures to ensure sanitation was included in the design and could be accommodated on a very tight site. There was, however, an issue with the location of the toilet and septic tank (right on the porch) that was almost unanimously raised by the beneficiaries participating in focus group discussions and by respondents in the survey carried out by the evaluation team (see Box 3). Although the design drawings in the URRP show six potential toilet configurations, all with the septic tank cover inside the washroom, the houses built mostly had the toilet enclosure accessed from the porch with the tank cover outside. With the amount of dissatisfaction raised by the beneficiaries on the toilet location, this raises the question of how well involved and empowered the community was in either the design or construction of their houses. Although the BRC provided the community with many opportunities to provide input on the design and be involved in the process, the outcome has led to wide criticism after its implementation.

Interviews with key informants and focus group discussions with programme participants strongly suggest that once the housing design was finalised, it was shared with the community rather than developed in collaboration with it. Although BRC conformed to local regulations and sought appropriate approvals for housing design from the relevant authorities, the Mairie believed neither they nor the community were sufficiently involved in the design of process, to the point that they felt the houses were “built without respect.” This sentiment was also echoed by the community, whose members felt they were not involved in the design of the houses and that the only reason they had accepted one was because they felt they had no choice. It was clear also from the placement of the toilet and septic tank on the front porch that the community was not aware of or well informed about what BRC was providing. Most participants in focus group discussions thought they would be receiving a house similar to the five pilot houses that were built earlier.

Apart from the issue with the location of the toilets, people visited during the field inspections were satisfied with the house they had received³⁸ and felt it was built to a good standard. However, almost unanimously people felt that the five pilot houses

Box 3. How Occupants Perceive their House in Delmas 19

When asked if they liked the house they were living in, 40.3% of 370 people participating in the survey carried out by the evaluation team said “yes,” 37.0% said “more or less,” and 22.7% said “no.” The proportion of respondents who claimed to like their house was higher in the target area (46.3%) where occupants had received a BRC house, but was even higher in zone 3 (48.2%), where BRC had not built any houses. It was lowest in zone 5 (25.0%), and was slightly higher for males (45.5%) than females (37.9%).

The features of their house that respondents liked best were its solidity (39.8%), the feeling of safety and security it provided (25.7%), the quality of its design (23.0%), the absence of any flooding (16.0%), its spaciousness (14.1%), and the pride they took in owing it (11.2%). Solidity was cited more frequently by respondents from the target area (50.0%) than by respondents from zone 3 (34.5%) or zone 5 (20.6%).

The features of their houses that respondents liked least included lack of space (36.6%), poor latrine design or location (24.2%), lack of access to electricity (17.5%), and the fact that the facility was not painted (15.0%) or that it couldn't be expanded (10.5%). Lack of space was raised more frequently by respondents from zone 3 (25.4%) than by respondents from the target area (39.1%) or zone 5 (40.6%). Poor latrine design or location appeared to matter more to respondents from the target area (29.8%) or zone 3 (25.4%) than to respondents from zone 5 (14.6%). The fact that the house was not painted was apparently more of a concern for respondents from the target area (21.2%) than for respondents from zone 3 (10.4%) or zone 5 (8.3%).

the survey not wanting to “admit” they use shared or public latrines. Whatever the cause, further investigation would be needed to clarify this issue.

³⁸ The evaluation gathered mixed evidence about people's overall satisfaction with their new house. All 15 house owners interviewed during the field inspections said they were satisfied. In focus group discussions with 30 house

were “built better.”³⁹ Based on this perception, as well as a review of the new construction activities taking place in the community, it would appear that safe shelter awareness did not entirely filter down to the beneficiaries.

Repairs

BRC undertook to repair a number of houses where damages sustained from the earthquake did not affect major structural elements. BRC provided the beneficiaries with the materials based on an inspection by an engineer and the technical support to oversee the work. The beneficiaries were responsible for finding and paying for the labour.⁴⁰ Of the five houses inspected by the evaluator that had received such support, the main work completed was the installation of a new roof. In all cases, the beneficiary hired the labour, which took anywhere from one to three months to complete the work. This was mainly because beneficiaries had limited funds to pay for labour, something that the programme did not take into consideration (although a few owners received help with repairs when they were too vulnerable).



Picture 5. House that received materials and technical support for repair of roof.

Overall this process seemed successful in delivering high quality repairs. In all cases, BRC engineers were on site daily to oversee the construction when it was taking place. However, in the interviews, some BRC staff noted a number of issues with there never being enough materials, which made the work expensive to undertake.

Cash for Repairs

BRC downsized the technical team at the end of the initial house repair works. Further repairs were needed due to footpath and drainage work where it was necessary to raise solid houses about the foot path level. As the programme ran out of time, with savings made on other parts of the programme it was possible to initiate a cash-for-repairs model that assessed repairs and provided the beneficiaries with money to purchase high quality materials. One of the evaluators inspected homes in which this model was implemented, but could not clearly determine how the money had been used. Focus group discussions with cash-for-repairs recipients found that beneficiaries had purchased low-quality material and/or spent part of the money on other basic necessities such as food and school fees. This echoes a comment by the CMT that, in most cases, people did not upgrade their houses and those that did used very low quality materials and did the minimal patching work required. This evidence suggests that, although the cash-for-repairs approach was instrumental in increasing the number of beneficiaries

owners, most people said they were not entirely satisfied with their house—in particular the location of latrines—and they felt the house was “unfinished” (i.e., not painted, no real window or door). In the survey, 370 people were asked if they liked the house they were living in; 40.3% said yes, 37.0% said more or less and 22.7% said no. Notwithstanding potential demand effects associated with each line of enquiry, the sum of evidence suggests there is a significant body of beneficiaries who are not entirely happy with their new house.

³⁹ This is consistent with testimonies from participants in focus group discussions indicating that the pilot houses were bigger, had interior partitioning, painting, windows and doors, and on the whole looked much better.

⁴⁰ It should be noted that the BRC repair programme was to provide for repair of structural elements only. Many householders were looking for cosmetic repairs on top of structural repairs. Cosmetic work was at the expense of the householder, similar to the completion of the new houses.

reached through BRC shelter support, there were no measures in place or follow-up planned to ensure that the money was actually used as intended. In retrospect, seeing just how vulnerable the beneficiaries were, it would have been useful to set up a follow-up mechanism to ensure that cash-for-grant allocations were properly used.

Canal, Drainage and Paving and Open Space

The canal project was to complete the work that had been started by the International Organization for Migration and IFRC, but left unfinished due to issues with existing houses standing in the way of the proposed path. This was an issue that BRC was now in a position to tackle due to the proposed spatial re-planning of the area.

BRC undertook a number of necessary steps and assessments in order to ensure the canal would function effectively and to reduce the risk of flooding. This included undertaking flow rate calculations using historical rainwater data and producing both a physical plot and a topographical survey to determine the path of the canal and the level of the bed, to ensure that all future drainage could be connected.⁴¹ BRC also worked with the Delmas Mairie, MTPTC and the community to relocate families who were living within the canal exclusion zone and who could easily be moved without major changes to the canal design.⁴² This approach was successful in implementing the canal improvements; however, the evaluation raises some concern over rental grants for relocation, as several informants noted that those who took the subsidy and left Delmas 19 will likely be back one day to claim the land that they once occupied even if now part of the canal or open space.



Picture 6. Open space adjacent to the canal.



Picture 7. Paved pathways sloped to drainage below.

At the time of the evaluation, BRC had completed the following, confirmed through the desk review and by visual inspection:

- Construction of the canal was completed and, in addition to the original target, almost the entire length was covered.
- All pathways in the target area were paved and sloped to the linear drains connected to the canal.
- Concrete culverts for road drainage were installed in zones 3 and 5; however, the steel grates were substantially damaged.

⁴¹ British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.

⁴² According to BRC staff interviewed by the evaluation team.

- Public space had been created and concrete was being poured during the evaluation team's inspections and completed by end of the field visit.

The field inspections showed little sign of standing water, indicating that water flows well through the canal. However, shortly after BRC cleaned the canal, a moderate amount of garbage had already begun to accumulate. Overall, community members noted that the drainage works very well after a rainfall. However, garbage in the canal will likely be a long-term issue that will affect how well it functions in major storm events.

The materials required to build the canal were primarily concrete, concrete masonry units and reinforcing bar, all of which could be found in Haiti. BRC managed to source all the materials locally, though at times at prices that were not competitive.

One exception to using quality materials was the metal grating used to cover the culverts in zones 3 and 5, which appeared to be of such inferior quality that it was damaged beyond repair when vehicles drove on it. This was widespread in all locations where this particular type of grating was used. A higher quality grating was used on portions of the culvert that crossed a street, and these sections remain in good condition. The same quality should have been used everywhere with the potential for vehicular traffic. For reasons unknown, BRC did not anticipate that cars would drive or park on the edges of the road. It was not clear how or whether this would be fixed prior to BRC's departure.



Picture 8. Metal grating used inferior materials on culverts in zones 3 and 5.

It is widely felt by the community and the Delmas Mairie that the interventions relating to the canal and drainage had the greatest and most positive impact on the community and will contribute to improved health and safety. The capping of the canal has provided a main route through the community that has been key in providing safe access for shelter and other support and interventions. The canal route, in combination with the paved paths, also provides the safest escape route in the event of an earthquake. In addition to improving access, the capping also prevents large amounts of garbage from entering the canal system. The canal construction and corresponding drainage systems will lead to improved resilience of the community in the face of future flooding and other natural disasters; however, much of this will depend on the quality of maintenance and future construction.

Marketplace

The community identified that selling items by the side of the road proved to be dangerous and that safety could be improved by having a designated market space. BRC then decided to construct a 200-square-metre covered marketplace place with 34 stalls, a butchery, two public toilets, a shop and barber shop.

In 2012, BRC completed the construction of a market space that included a covered area with 34 stalls, a lottery shop, a barber shop, two public toilets and a private room/house. At the time of the evaluation team's field inspections, the two toilets were locked, and a representative of the marketplace noted that they were full and were awaiting BRC to empty them.

The field inspections found that the butchery was not used, as the community did not want this activity to take place in this location. How, then, it was included in the design drawings raises the question of how much the community was involved in the design.⁴³ Observations showed that the original construction

⁴³ The laundry facility was never built as it appears the community did not agree on its location/need.

had undergone some modification along the street façade to improve the amount of shade, as the current design does not provide much protection from the afternoon sun. Environmental analysis integrated into the design could have led to a design that incorporated shading from the beginning versus the addition afterwards, as shown in Picture 9.



Picture 9. Front of marketplace with additional shading installed on west façade.

The overall quality of the construction and the material is high for Haiti, and the design considers the impacts of flooding and provides sufficient openings for cross ventilation and daylight, while giving protection from the elements. Apart from the open space created in front of the market, the building does not allow for expansion, nor does it allow for barrier-free access for those with disabilities.

One of the unforeseen outcomes of building the marketplace and moving people from the streets to a safer location was that there would always be someone willing to risk his or her safety for the increased visibility that selling at the edge of the road provides. This meant

that, although the marketplace originally functioned well, over time, people migrated back to the streets, using their space in the marketplace as storage. A small number of people use the marketplace exclusively, and it is likely that it will be used more once the community facility across the street is functioning.

Community Facility

Following consultations with the Mairie and community members, plans had been made to convert BRC's office in Delmas 19 to a facility with a basketball court and a clinic for the community. This was still very much in progress during the evaluation team's visit, with the dismantling of the trailers and reworking of the site to accommodate the planned facility.

Evidence gathered through interviews suggested that the Mairie and the zonal committees would take a large role in managing this centre, whether or not to the benefit of the greater community.

Street Lighting

The target for this activity was to install 25 solar powered street lamps that were provided by IFRC with the goal of improving security in the target area.

At the time of the evaluation, BRC had completed the installation of the street lamps, which were noted to be functioning. The community had previously agreed on where the lamps would be located, and their current placement, as identified in the drawings examined by the evaluation team, provides fairly good coverage of the area. The first 10 lights were provided by IFRC, and BRC sourced the remaining 15 units.



Picture 10. Solar powered street lamp.

The street lamps have been slightly problematic in the dry season, when evidence suggests that dust covers the solar cells and prevents them from charging. The high value of the batteries has also made

them the target of theft. BRC has since welded all batteries into the cases, which may prove problematic when the time comes to replace them.

As with all infrastructure interventions, there are short-term maintenance requirements such as cleaning or repairing broken lamps, and longer-term maintenance such as replacing the batteries, which have a shortened lifespan in the heat. To the evaluation team's knowledge, at no point has the responsibility or cost of maintaining these fixtures been discussed with the Mairie or the community.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, evidence gathered by the evaluation suggests that at least the lamps were provided free of charge to the community and people will have lighting for a certain number of years.

Water Supply

The programme aimed to provide access to clean water through four water points and setting up committees to manage the sale of water and maintenance of these kiosks.

BRC engaged with DINEPA in December 2011 to look at potential sites for public water kiosks in the four small communes covered by the target area, which already had private water sellers. The plan was for BRC to build standard DINEPA kiosks and for DINEPA to supply the water for sale. The system would be set up to allow for future expansion to private homes, but connections would not be made by BRC.

BRC tried to work with DINEPA to provide water in Cité 4; however, DINEPA wanted substantial money to do it, probably because it was not interested in maintaining a water system in this part of Delmas 19. Alternative approaches were not explored, and as a result the communities were left to continue to purchase water from one of the private sellers. In retrospect, it seems that the most sustainable method for maintaining the water supply infrastructure in the community would have been to put it into private ownership where there is an incentive to maintain it.

Despite this, access to sources of clean water appears to have been improved, with 91% of the beneficiaries being able to access a clean water source within 15 minutes' distance from their homes.⁴⁵

Automeca Camp Relocation

Between September 2012 and December 2013, BRC also partnered with IFRC in the resettlement of remaining Automeca camp residents through rental and relocation grants. In total, 917 families were relocated either to their provinces of origins (121 families chose this option) or in accommodations rented with BRC/IFRC financial and technical assistance in Port-au-Prince (796 families, 80% of which moved to Delmas commune⁴⁶).⁴⁷ This model was in line with the generally agreed approach in Haiti (either through the IFRC-led Haiti Shelter Cluster⁴⁸ or the Haitian Government's 16/6 Housing Plan for Earthquake Victims) to provide a cash grant equivalent to USD 500 per year so that people could find

⁴⁴ The evaluator who conducted the interview with the Deputy Mayor discussed with him the cost of replacing each battery (USD 500) and made a personal suggestion to consider adding a line item to the municipality's budget, at some point in the future, to cover the cost of replacing these fixtures.

⁴⁵ Endline survey results [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [June 2015].

⁴⁶ Delmas 19 is one area of the Delmas commune which also includes Delmas 17, Delmas 33 and Delmas 60, among others.

⁴⁷ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. *Final Pledge-Based Report Haiti: Earthquake. Automeca Camp Closure and Relocation*. March 31, 2014.

⁴⁸ The Haiti Shelter Cluster is a group of all stakeholders involved in the shelter response in Haiti. It is made up of international and national NGOs, emergency and/or development bilateral or multilateral agencies, United Nations agencies and the RCRC Movement. National authorities also take part in this body. Source: Calzadilla Beunza, Alfonso, and Ignacio Martin Eresta. *An Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010 Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, Achievements and Constraints*. Geneva, IFRC, October 2011.

alternative rental housing. According to key informant interviews, the primary issue with the widespread approach to cash grants was that rents increased because so many people at once had a good amount of money for rent. Furthermore, evidence gathered in the interviews with BRC staff suggests that, after the cash grants were provided, there was no follow-up on where beneficiaries had moved, unless they found accommodations within Delmas 19.

Improving the Quality of Life

The sum of evidence on hand suggests that BRC absolutely contributed to improving the community environment with the drainage system, enhancements to the canal, installation of lighting and other infrastructures. One stakeholder noted, “A significant reduction in the number of houses flooded within Delmas 19 due to canal overflows.” Narrow alleys have been replaced by broader paved walkways that better facilitate transport and circulation. Other improvements include a communal space and a marketplace. Beneficiaries confirmed that the infrastructure enhancements and new houses have improved the quality of their lives. In the evaluation team’s survey, 61.3% of respondents in the target area⁴⁹ reported either receiving a new house from BRC or repairs to a damaged one, and according to the endline survey,⁵⁰ 62% feel safe in their new homes. In addition, 20% of those surveyed by the evaluation team felt that BRC had significantly improved the drainage in the area⁵¹ and 22 % noted reduced flooding.⁵² Moreover, 89% of those responding to the endline survey corroborated the impression that as a result of BRC’s interventions, the living environment has greatly improved.

Job Creation and Enhanced Building Practices

URRP contributed to create jobs in Delmas 19 as skilled and unskilled labour were sourced from within Delmas 19 as part of an agreement with the community. Results from the endline survey indicate that 26% of respondents worked either on the construction of the canal or the construction of BRC’s office in Delmas 19, giving a further injection of cash into the community. The overall construction and detailing appears to be of high quality, and deficiencies are very minor given the context. BRC had put in place a number of measures to ensure quality construction, from simplified design and details through to procedures such as batch processing of concrete and mortar mixes to ensure consistency. Technical oversight by BRC staff and ILO⁵³ also seemed to be very high, as indicated by beneficiaries, masons and local BRC staff consulted by the evaluation team.⁵⁴

Masons have been trained and certified by INFP, creating for them the potential to earn a living working on other construction sites. In addition, the training of masons (see Box 4) and apprentices, as well as community groups, in best practices for repair and reconstruction should provide a pool of people trained in seismic construction techniques in the case of future earthquakes. However, during field inspection the evaluation found that new construction and additions to the BRC houses did not follow safe shelter concepts. Furthermore, the URRP approach to planning and housing seems to have been only marginally

⁴⁹ 38.9% overall; 61.3% in the target area vs. 22.6% in zone 3 and 4.9% in zone 5.

⁵⁰ Endline survey results [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [June 2015].

⁵¹ 27.0% overall; 38.7% in zone 3 and 32.1% in zone 5 vs. 20.2% in the target area.

⁵² 19.6% overall; 22.0% in the target area and 24.7% in zone 5 vs. 6.5% in zone 3.

⁵³ Daily by BRC engineers and twice a week by ILO.

⁵⁴ Focus groups discussions with masons, apprentices and labourers revealed that construction was difficult at the beginning, but became easier as workers were trained and led to understand what the engineers wanted. ILO training helped the workers expand their knowledge of earthquake design, as witnessed by the fact that participants in the focus group discussions were able to describe several methods used to increase resistance and improve construction. Having taken part in four earthquake reconstruction projects since 2011, ILO had expertise in this sector. Furthermore, ILO had developed and tested a reconstruction training programme in Haiti and was already very familiar with the local context. These factors made the worker training partnership between BRC and ILO all the more relevant and cost-effective.

effective in terms of resilience in the face of future earthquakes, as open space remains very limited and owner-built housing rarely uses earthquake resistance measures.

Box 4. Training of Masons

The integration of reconstruction-specific livelihoods was key to implementing shelter and infrastructure interventions, as the community was found to be lacking in skilled labour and management. The URRP proposal identified that 100 skilled labourers would be required, and it was later determined that about 50 new masons and boss masons would need to be trained to support the construction of housing and infrastructure. The approach selected provided several benefits to Delmas 19, some of which were also identified as priority areas. These included income generation, on-the-job training, safe shelter awareness and a skilled workforce to implement ambitious infrastructure and housing projects.

According to BRC, 54 masons received training provided in collaboration with ILO. Focus group discussions led by the evaluation team revealed that most masons passed the evaluation and were awaiting certification at the time of the evaluation; however, they were uncertain about future work and, although all would have liked to remain employed as masons, some expected to take on other employment after BRC leaves due to lack of opportunities. Other organisations were said to have also trained masons, and such an approach could have been integrated either on a larger scale or in coordination, so as not to have too many trained individuals looking for work once the reconstruction efforts were completed.

During the focus group discussions, it was determined that the masons had been trained in and were knowledgeable about safe shelter design and construction, as well as personal safety when doing construction work; however, they did not feel the community would pay for higher quality materials and methods for such construction.

Personal protection of masons on the construction sites was supported early on by providing a set of safety equipment at the beginning of the project, but as these sets wore out they were not replaced, nor were they required on the job sites. BRC was fortunate not to have any major accidents occur during the programme (or at least any that the evaluation was made aware of). For future construction programmes, BRC should consider implementing a policy where personal safety has a higher priority and is made mandatory on the job site. The issues cited for not doing so are often the cost of providing safety equipment and the cost of replacing them when they wear out or are lost.

Factors Influencing the Sustainability of Housing and Infrastructure Work

Despite BRC attempts to engage with the authorities, it did not appear that the Mairie, DINEPA or MTPTC would be taking ownership and responsibility of the various pieces of infrastructure as no clear mechanisms were established to ensure proper takeover of maintenance of the infrastructures built by BRC. It was not evident that general maintenance such as cleaning the canal, clearing drainage systems and substituting damaged metal grating over culverts would take place, let alone larger maintenance issues should they be required. The Mairie claimed that it would take responsibility for everything, but had not been in communication with BRC or the community about this. Prior to the evaluation team's field visit, BRC was still paying to have the canal cleaned by members of the community. Once the source of cash for work is gone, it is not clear who will assume the ownership and maintenance of these systems.

This situation raises a question about how appropriate it is to implement interventions that could only have medium-term lifespans if they are not maintained. In retrospect, it would have been useful to include municipal bodies in the PASSA process, as this would have helped identify right from the onset the potential role of each authority in maintaining the proposed interventions.

BRC also made efforts to engage with HRC early on by involving it in PASSA. However, sources consulted by the evaluation team noted that HRC did not have capacity to be involved nor was this type of project within its mandate.

The main issue in ensuring a sustainable outcome of the interventions is the fragmented community that is still highly vulnerable and the lack of adequate governance at the community or municipal level. As discussed in Section 4.2.4, BRC's efforts to build ownership and full participation within the community were obstructed to a large extent by the actions of zonal committees and by the fact these committees were not attuned to the needs of their communities. In the future, one potential approach would be not to build anything until a representative governance model was established.

4.2.2 Public Health

This section reviews the activities that URRP implemented to achieve improved health among the population living in areas targeted by the programme.

Targets and Intervention Design

Among the needs identified by the community through the PASSA process, poor household and human waste management were key concerns because of their link to health. The PASSA community action plans outlined a number of community projects to address these issues:

- The development of voluntary community groups to manage solid waste disposal.
- The recycling of solid waste to generate income.
- The construction of shared latrines and hygiene promotion.

In parallel to the infrastructure work on water and sanitation that has already been described in this report, URRP endeavoured to support the community in the implementation of these projects. However, targets are not entirely clear. It must also be noted here that the community had also identified poor health as a key concern during the PASSA process. The PASSA groups felt that a health centre in the area would address this issue, but since the community projects were meant to be implemented directly by the community, the assessment team encouraged the groups to think of solutions that were lower in costs and did not rely on significant funding and government input to maintain.⁵⁵ BRC nevertheless continued to explore ways to facilitate access to health care, as outlined below, and conducted a major public health campaign to increase the understanding of and measures to prevent diseases associated with lack of hygiene, as well as diseases common in Delmas 19.

However, the ambitious nature of the expected outcome of URRP in terms of improved health among the target population was never fully explored in the design of the programme. Whereas water and sanitation needs were assessed by a number of surveys linked to the housing and infrastructures component of the programme, the design of the health component does not seem to have been informed by health needs assessments. There is no record in the documentation examined by the evaluators of any assessment that looks at health needs or any baseline of health issues. Similarly, the programme never had any health delegates among staff in Port-au-Prince, and it is unclear what level of support was offered by UKO in this area. This might partly explain the mismatch between the stated intended outcomes and the activities chosen to achieve them.

Solid Waste Management

The original target for this activity was to provide a number of waste collection points around the target area and to work with the community, the Mairie and the Metropolitan Solid Waste Collection Service (SMCRS) to ensure waste was properly discarded and removed. A number of waste collection points were established as part of the URRP's urban master plan and a trial number of locations tested with bins. However, the bins were removed by community members, and the initiative became nearly impossible to implement, as no one wanted them near their house.

Nonetheless, at the time of the evaluation team's visit in Haiti, SMCRS continued to regularly collect garbage in specific pickup points. In addition, as a result of PASSA community action plans, some outreach and waste management activities were organised locally. For instance, the Youth's Association for the

⁵⁵ Rule, Amelia. *PASSA: Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter (Habitat) Awareness. PASSA as part of an Urban Integrated Neighborhood Approach, Haiti, Port au Prince, August-October 2011*. [N.p.], BRC, 2011.

Promotion of Haiti’s National Production (APJNH) is collecting plastic bottles and water bags in their neighbourhood and recycling them to produce garbage cans and handbags that they then sell. Similarly, the Association of Qualified Youth for the Development of the Delmas Area (AJECODECODE) has decided to organise waste collection.

Some progress has been made, and according to programme monitoring data 41% of beneficiaries now place waste in garbage bags⁵⁶ rather than throwing it in the canal. Participants in focus group discussions also felt that the areas targeted by the programme were much cleaner than they were before.

Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

To address bad practices around urinating in the open and defecating in plastic bags thrown into the air or in the canal (the so-called “parachute technique”), the programme aimed to provide 10 communal latrines, including toilets at the marketplace, and rehabilitate 39 private latrines. The first public latrine was built near the canal and lasted a number of months until it was eventually torn down by the community because it was not taken care of. It was not clear from BRC how it determined that the community would take responsibility for maintaining these facilities—likely an early sign that the community would not take any responsibility for public infrastructure.


The toilets at the marketplace were still standing when the evaluation team visited; however, when inspected, the door was locked because the toilets were full. Although the marketplace appeared to be managed by a committee, it either did not have the know-how to plan for maintenance of the toilets or was used to the free services that BRC provided the community, as focus groups discussion indicated that the community was awaiting BRC to clean them out.

BRC also worked in close cooperation with AJPNH; the Women’s Unit for Youth Development and Education (UNIFDEJ); and the Youth’s Association for the Development of Delmas 19 to sensitise the community to environmental health issues. Training on the Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation methodology was supplied to each association, who was then responsible to train 10 participants. However, this was not closely monitored so no conclusions can be drawn on the effects this had on the community. Other hygiene promotion activities are discussed below, but similarly no evidence is available on their effectiveness.

Public Health Campaigns

Through the life of the programme, several campaigns were conducted to raise awareness of chikungunya, dengue fever, malaria, cholera, the use of latrines and hand washing (see Figure 5). These campaigns involved several activities, including: visits to the community and observations; a short survey (where needed) to get a better understanding of the particular health issue and assessment of the situation; meetings with associations or community representatives to share results,

Figure 5
Sample Material Used in Campaigns



⁵⁶ Endline survey results [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [June 2015].

define campaign themes and seek support; door-to-door visits to discuss with beneficiaries and let them know when information sessions would be held; sociocultural activities; visual media; a newsletter called “Sa kominote a dwe konnen” (Your community must know); and community meetings to discuss specific health themes. Posters (96 of them in 2014-2015) with slogans in Creole⁵⁷ and community bulletin boards were other means used to reach the beneficiaries. Two guides—one on hygiene and one on waste management and sanitation⁵⁸—were also published for distribution in the community. BRC established a call centre to improve communications with the community, and this also contributed to health sensitisation. A report published by BRC in 2015 indicates that 5,338 people were sensitised to health issues between 2013 and 2015.⁵⁹

According to programme monitoring data, 65% of sampled beneficiaries attributed increased knowledge about diseases such as fevers and diarrhoea and methods to prevent them to the campaigns conducted by BRC.⁶⁰ The survey conducted by Advisem during the field mission corroborated knowledge of basic prevention measures against vector-borne diseases among beneficiaries, with over 90% of respondents being able to identify at least one correct preventative answer.⁶¹

Focus group discussions also suggested that beneficiaries perceive improvements in hygiene and sanitation conditions and commented on the fact that children have fewer illnesses than before.

Access to Health Care

In order to facilitate access to health care, BRC partnered with DASH, a local NGO. The provision of health insurance was perceived by BRC as a relevant measure to help marginalised beneficiaries have improved access to health care by reducing costs associated with health and allowing them to focus on economic activities. BRC therefore made a contribution of USD 124,500 to DASH to provide health insurance coverage to recipients of livelihoods programme support (see Section 4.2.3) and their immediate families.⁶² This intervention reached 7,000 people, an impressive number of beneficiaries.

Beneficiaries attended sensitisation sessions with a DASH representative who explained the amount and type of coverage available and directed them to a network of 10 centres and three hospitals where they could receive health consultations and other services. DASH also established a clinic specifically for the target area, with three nurses. In addition, DASH collaborated with BRC on a consultation process to identify the most pressing health problems in the community. These consultations identified infectious and chronic diseases as a major concern. DASH collaborated with HelpAge International to organise joint

Box 5. Beneficiary Voices

“If we don’t know what causes the disease we cannot protect ourselves and our family. I know now that the water jar needs to be covered, and that stagnant water attracts mosquitoes and needs to be treated to prevent catching malaria or chikungunya.”

— A focus group participant

“Thanks to what we have learned with BRC, we now understand that hygiene and cleanliness in the household and surroundings prevent the occurrence of disease.”

— A focus group participant

⁵⁷ Such as: “Always keeping the place clean to prevent piles of garbage, dirty water and disease—such is my pledge, your pledge, our pledge.”

⁵⁸ Awareness plan – chikungunya campaign [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [n.d.]; Community log describing locations and key messages used in the campaign. [N.p.], [n.p.], [n.d.]. In the field, the evaluation team could not examine any of the bulletin boards, as they had been removed from the premises.

⁵⁹ Community Mobilisation Team. *Rapport de sanitation. Hygiène corporelle et environnementale. Delmas 19/Haiti*. [N.p.], BRC, Mai 2015.

⁶⁰ Endline survey results [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [June 2015].

⁶¹ Common answers include cleaning places where there is still water (49.7%), using mosquito nets (42.3%), using larvicide to treat water (39.9%), spraying mosquito repellent on walls (23.4%), covering exposed skin (21.0%) and covering water collection recipients (12.7%). This evidence indicates that beneficiaries have assimilated the different concepts conveyed through the campaigns.

⁶² Six-month coverage for adults under 50 years old and one year for those aged 50 and over.

sensitisation sessions to discuss chronic disease, diabetes and other ailments. BRC's own partnership with HelpAge International enabled the provision of complementary services to beneficiaries not able to visit a clinic due to health reasons. Home visits by a nurse were organised and three people specially trained to provide basic health services to 137 older beneficiaries.

According to the survey conducted by Advisem, seven out of ten respondents who reported having health insurance claim to have used it at one point. Focus group discussions with DASH beneficiaries revealed that the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries on the services provided by DASH is clearly divided. While some considered the service life saving, others complained about being badly treated and receiving only aspirin at clinic visits.⁶³ There were also unconfirmed allegations to the evaluation team claiming that patients visiting the clinic in the target area were pressured by some individuals from the committees to pay prior to entering the clinic.⁶⁴



Picture 11. Mobilisation around health coverage activity.

None of the programme beneficiaries chose to renew their insurance at the end of the free coverage period. Focus group participants felt that the annual subscription fee of HTG 1,500 was too high. This is corroborated by the survey conducted by Advisem, which indicated that 30% of those who had decided not to renew the insurance had done so because it was too costly, whereas over 20% declared it was not worth renewing in relation to what was on offer.

There is no baseline data on access to health care in Delmas 19 prior to the programme. According to DASH, 681 project beneficiaries visited the different DASH clinics in 2013, but since statistics for other years were not available, no conclusions can be drawn on whether the intervention had any impact in increasing access to health care or health outcomes.

4.2.3 Livelihoods

The evaluation reviewed the outcome of various activities designed to help people in Delmas 19 improve their livelihoods, including the provision of cash grants during the first two phases of the programme, as well as support to SMEs and development of MuSos achieved through URRP.

Cash Grants

Grant Distribution

The distribution of cash grants was a central feature of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the BRC response and recovery programme, and it shaped URRP significantly. In June 2010, while BRC was still busy maintaining sanitation activities in the camps and undertaking the assessment for its recovery programme, the owner of Automeca camp began evicting people. The assessment, which was completed in July 2010, identified livelihoods support as a priority need of the displaced persons living there, and safe housing as a

⁶³ During key informant interviews, DASH representatives explained that all medication was provided by the World Health Organization. This included a total of 73 different generic medications, all of them white, which may explain the confusion on the part of beneficiaries. DASH personnel faced several challenges in providing the services in Delmas 19—they had to overcome overwhelming distrust by the community when entering the project area; the space provided for the consultation clinic in Delmas 19 was not adequate, with no bed for consultation; and zonal committees only promoted health coverage sensitisation activities when they saw opportunities for personal gains.

⁶⁴ However, over 22% did not know the insurance could be renewed at all.

secondary need. As a result, BRC designed a cash grants and revitalisation of credit initiative for livelihoods. A target had been set to issue grants to 4,000 beneficiaries.

Although the initial plan was to work with the entire population of Automeca, it was eventually decided to select beneficiaries based on their geographic location, as people were all visibly very vulnerable and because other agencies had little experience to share with BRC on how do other forms of targeting in an urban setting. At that point, the programme was already behind schedule, so the decision was taken to stick to blanket coverage for the area. A total of USD 750 was to be provided to each family in three instalments—one unconditional instalment to support an immediate coping strategy and two conditional instalments to support income-generating activities, as well as training and the development of business plans.⁶⁵

Planning of the cash grant initiative was interrupted in the fall of 2010 because BRC had difficulty securing a livelihoods manager.⁶⁶ In light of assessment data indicating that 60% of Automeca residents had come from Delmas 19, BRC decided to shift the distribution of cash grants to the target area.⁶⁷ This strategy was considered a brilliant move by the humanitarian stakeholders working in the region and particularly relevant because it “brought people back from the camp to integrate them in their community.”⁶⁸

The distribution of cash grants in the target area began in December 2010, initially reaching 947 beneficiaries and increasing to 1,028. In June 2011, the cash grants initiative rolled out to a larger, extended area (zone 3 and zone 5), adding a further 2,982 beneficiaries and bringing the total for the cash grant initiative up to the planned 4,000 beneficiaries.⁶⁹

Unlike with the cash grants in the target area, BRC applied a more targeted approach to beneficiary selection in zones 3 and 5. Selection was based on community-defined vulnerability criteria to reduce the possibility that people from outside of the programme area would benefit from the grants. Making this change was not an easy process, and BRC faced difficulties because the changes in targeting were neither clearly communicated nor understood.⁷⁰ On the one hand, as one RCRC Movement representative told the evaluation team, BRC had tenacity and “really took the bull by the horn to work in Delmas 19.” However, the misunderstanding created much resentment among those who were not selected, underlining the importance of maintaining good communications with the affected population to build confidence and trust.

Grant Monitoring

The cash grants instalments were made through Unitransfer via text messaging or voucher. Overall the system was effective in allowing BRC to disburse a large number of cash grants safely and securely. However, the system was not without challenges, including beneficiaries changing their phone numbers frequently, local corruption, and fraud. The call centre operated by BRC was key in identifying and solving these problems. In addition, households were monitored after the payment of each cash instalment.

⁶⁵ *British Red Cross Haiti Recovery Programme. Delmas 19 Target Area Cash Grants Handbook & Lessons Learned.* [N.p.], [n.p.], March 2012.

⁶⁶ The first cash grant instalment was made in August 2010, under the supervision of a BRC household economic security delegate. Other instalments were made after suitable livelihoods delegates had been found.

⁶⁷ This portion of Delmas 19 was identified by the BRC shelter team as physically very vulnerable due to the overcrowded nature of the area and level of destruction of houses.

⁶⁸ According to RCRC Movement representatives interviewed by the evaluation team.

⁶⁹ *British Red Cross Haiti Recovery Programme. Delmas 19 Target Area Cash Grants Handbook & Lessons Learned.* [N.p.], [n.p.], March 2012.

⁷⁰ According to participants in interviews conducted by the evaluation team. The evaluators did not find documents documenting the criteria used for targeting.

The second instalment was monitored to verify that beneficiaries had spent their grant according to their business plan and had used their cash book and profit book as they had learned in a one-day preparatory business training session.⁷¹ The monitoring exercise took more than two months, a delay caused by the lack of expertise of BRC staff in charge of managing this aspect of the programme. Key results from the conditional cash grants were extracted, but full results were never analysed due to very limited resources.⁷²

Monitoring of the third instalment looked at results arising from that payment and the impact of the grant package overall. The findings indicate a reduction of the household debt level after receiving the grants, with 36% of respondents saying they had cleared their debts, while another 30% confirmed they had reduced them.⁷³ This exercise was also time consuming, underlining the necessity for large-scale cash initiative to dedicate people with appropriate M&E skills to collect and analyse data, especially if changes to income and debt are key indicators for measuring economic security.⁷⁴

Transition to URRP Livelihoods Support

The desk review, focus group discussions and key informant interviews all point to the fact that cash grants supplied by BRC met some of the priority needs of the beneficiaries and were valued by them for the support that helped them cope in a difficult time. In contrast with this “emergency relief” type of solution, primarily geared towards addressing basic needs, URRP was designed to deliver livelihoods support through financial support and training to SMEs and savings and microfinance programming (MuSos)—more “developmental” solutions aimed at promoting economic recovery and short- and medium-term financial security, at the household level and within the community, through stronger business activities, improved savings and greater opportunities for employment in the programme zone.

As BRC began preparing the transition to these new forms of livelihoods support, it faced the challenge of communicating changes in its approach and clarifying the criteria for selecting beneficiary households with the urban population in Delmas 19.⁷⁵ Notwithstanding serious efforts put into re-assessing, re-planning and restructuring the programme, BRC was not entirely successful at meeting this challenge, as evidenced by the high percentage of loans not repaid (see “Repayment of Loans” section). Moreover, the BRC recovery team and BRC UKO management apparently underestimated the potential benefits of updating the programme’s initial assessment of the target area, in order to fully understand how having

⁷¹ According to BRC sources who commented on an early draft of this evaluation report, while it is great that BRC provided this training, an additional half day or full day of training would have been beneficial. This was probably the first time many of the beneficiaries had been exposed to this kind of intervention, and although Haitians often have business skills, few of them possess the acumen needed to sustainably manage a business.

⁷² The staff component of the cash grant initiative was very small and has no field officer with M&E skills.

⁷³ An evaluation conducted by Fonkoze/Zafen using funds received from the American Cross found that, following the earthquake, much of the stress on households was generated from being in debt from the taking of loans to engage in productive and non-productive activities; therefore, the awarding of grants was probably very timely. Once these debts had been cleared or reduced, it would have been useful to recapitalise the lenders, to allow them to re-engage successfully with business/productive activities. Recapitalisation of the lenders was part of the original programme proposal. Unfortunately, BRC could not recruit candidates with the needed expertise to deliver the proposal as planned.

⁷⁴ Other indicators, such as acquisition of assets, can be used as proxies to measure economic security. The survey of recipients conducted by the evaluation team’s field visit explores this concept, and a specific question asked the respondents to compare their current assets (such as personal items, vehicles, tools, appliances, furniture, domestic goods and other valuables) to those they had before the earthquake. Of those surveyed, 83.2% declared they had fewer assets, 7.5% that they had more assets, and 9.2% that they had as many assets now as they did in 2010.

⁷⁵ Sokpoh, Bonaventure, and Samuel Carpenter. *Urban Livelihoods Recovery: Lessons from Port-au-Prince, Haiti. A Study of Assessment, Decision-Making and Management in the Livelihoods Component of the British Red Cross 2010 Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme*. [N.p.], Groupe URD and BRC, [May 2014].

once-displaced populations return from the camps could affect the social fabric of Delmas 19. As a result, the evaluation team believes the transition to URRP was perhaps not as effective as it could have been, notwithstanding the various operational constraints faced by the programme such as lack of M&E tools and ongoing monitoring, limited staff expertise, low retention/high turnover among the personnel, and deficient communication with beneficiaries.

Another important finding related to how cash-based interventions, such as conditional/unconditional cash grants, were designed. According to interviews, more time should have been taken to assess the profiles and needs of the beneficiaries before distributing cash. Cash-based interventions should be implemented quickly following a humanitarian crisis—after too much time has passed, interventions become developmentally- rather than emergency-based, and cash distribution is less appropriate. In fact, even if designed as a transition between emergency response and reconstruction, conditional cash grants are more appropriate than unconditional ones.

Support to SMEs

SME Landscape

The economic situation in Port-au-Prince was and still is characterised by high unemployment rates, a largely unskilled workforce and the financial exclusion of people operating in the informal sector.⁷⁶ Facilitating the emergence of local production and service activities with job creation potential, developing the skills of business owners and encouraging people to join the formal economy were considered difficult but essential in fostering sustainable economic recovery in the area.

The rationale for BRC's action in this sector was to support SMEs in Delmas 19 that had the potential to create jobs and be useful to the community. The SME sector was identified as pivotal in the reconstruction of Haiti by the international community and national stakeholders, including the Haitian government. BRC support was therefore relevant, aligned with national priorities and supported overall sustainable development goals for the country.

As the earthquake destroyed a large number of businesses, Haitians came to rely even more than they used to on petty trade⁷⁷ or street selling for an income. Even though cash grants delivered by BRC proved to be useful to sustain the income of many of these people,⁷⁸ this form of support needed to be combined with more sustainable livelihoods interventions. Cognizant of this fact, BRC conducted an assessment of SMEs to facilitate the mapping of businesses and provide insights on the current and pre-earthquake market situation. This assessment not only captured economic data, strengths and weaknesses, information about jobs and employment, marketing practices and community perceptions about enterprises in the area, but it also highlighted the need for business development services, including training and access to credit, in order to grow enterprises in the target area of Delmas 19.


⁷⁶ At the time of the earthquake, an estimated 57.1% of all jobs in Haiti were in the informal sector. Source: *Enquête sur l'emploi et l'économie informelle (EEEI). Premiers résultats de l'enquête emploi (Phase 1)*. [N.p.], Haitian Institute of Statistics and Computer Science, July 2010.).

⁷⁷ The assessment of Automeca camp demonstrated that most of its population relied on petty trade prior to the earthquake.

⁷⁸ Evidence shows that 82% of recipients of BRC assistance in the target area used their cash grants for petty trade. Source: *Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) in Delmas 19. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. British Red Cross Assessment Report*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March 2012.

Due to constraints in time and financial and human resources, the assessment started in October 2011 and was only completed in March 2012. The end product did not provide a full value chain analysis; nevertheless, interviews confirmed that sufficient information was gathered to identify which sectors or sub-sectors to target at the local level. A total of 120 SMEs were identified to be operating in Delmas 19 and extended areas.⁷⁹ Business activities identified in Delmas 19 and extended areas included a significant number of boutiques, lottery shops, restaurants, and carpentry shops. Overall, 45% of businesses were services providers; 44% involved in commerce; and 6% each worked in production and construction (see Figure 6).

Figure 6
Type of SMEs in Delmas 19



Source: *Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) in Delmas 19. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. British Red Cross Assessment Report.* [N.p.], [n.p.], March 2012.

Partnership with Fonkoze/Zafen

Because enterprise support and development was a new area for BRC, the organisation chose wisely to partner with a national organisation that understood the Haitian context and had prior experience supporting SMEs. Since 1994, Fonkoze/Zafen, the country's largest MFI, had been providing a full range of financial and development services to Haiti's rural poor, with an average 74% loan repayment rate on micro-credit. Fonkoze/Zafen's philosophy was that a starter loan should be based on establishing a trust relationship with the client, and that transparency, regular accompaniment and reciprocity had to be built in from the beginning to ensure adequate control over loan repayment and independence from the funder (in this case, BRC). Fonkoze/Zafen had more than 200,000 account holders in 46 branches spread out in 10 departments of Haiti. The MFI also provided technical assistance packages to SMEs according to their needs, including support for legal registration, business guidance and training in skills such as accounting and financial record-keeping.⁸⁰

BRC first signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Fonkoze/Zafen, and then made a contribution of USD 115,000 for the purpose of supporting SMEs in Delmas 19's target area, zone 3 and zone 5. Of this amount, USD 92,444 were a contribution to a permanent investment fund and USD 22,356 were allocated to support salaries and administration costs.

The main targets and interventions established for SMEs in the MoU were:

- A minimum of 20 and a maximum of 30 SMEs benefiting from loans.
- Creation of 40 to 60 new permanent jobs.⁸¹
- Access to credit services with no interest and no collateral, provided over a one-year period, with a grace period of two months.
- Loans ranging between USD 1,000 to USD 15,000 granted based on SMEs' needs.

⁷⁹ It was found that very few businesses in Delmas had more than 10 employees.

⁸⁰ Fonkoze/Zafen was featured in a stakeholder analysis performed by BRC, which rated its influence as "high." However, the evaluation team found no evidence of assessments on whether Fonkoze/Zafen was an appropriate partner for the programme or if it provided good service or good value for money.

⁸¹ The target fluctuates from one document to another.

- Business development training provided one to two days per month for the duration of the programme and services provided to assist in the profitability of the SMEs.
- Beneficiary coaching, including regular monitoring visits.
- Providing SME recipients with health insurance coverage for a period of six months, in partnership with DASH (see Section 4.2.2).

The value added by the partnership with Fonkoze/Zafen is that such a partnership enabled BRC to support SMEs without setting up its own infrastructure for vetting and monitoring loans directly. At the same time, the funds will sustain a permanent investment fund that will continue to revolve after the first round of loan repayments and benefiting other SMEs (assuming of course that loans are repaid in full, which did not turn out to be the case; see “Repayment of Loans” below).

BRC shared with Fonkoze/Zafen the SME assessment conducted in Delmas 19, and the two organisations collaborated to finalise the selection criteria.⁸² In order to be as participatory as possible, a selection committee was established comprising a livelihoods manager from BRC, a programme manager from Fonkoze/Zafen and selected board members and representatives of each of the three zonal committees found in the target area, zone 3 and zone 5. The selection criteria were very clear and focused more on business viability than vulnerability, since one of the objectives of the programme was to create jobs.

Box 6. Sample of Small Loans Granted

- Tailor – Obtained a USD 1,200 loan and used it to purchase a sewing machine and sewing materials.
- Petty trader – Obtained a loan of USD 1,000 and used it to purchase food items.
- Purified water business operator – Obtained a loan of USD 1,700 and used it to purchase pumps and tanks.
- Petty trader – Obtained a loan of USD 1,200 and used it to purchase inventory.
- Soft drink seller – Obtained a loan of USD 2,000 and used it to pay for transport and refrigeration equipment.

Source: Focus group discussions with SME representatives.

Support Delivered to SMEs

SMEs were assessed based on their individual profile, and selected progressively following specific criteria at each stage. In total, 26 SMEs were selected: 12 in the target area, and 7 each in zone 3 and zone 5. Selected SMEs came from three major sectors—trade, services and production. Monitoring data obtained from BRC show that the amount of the loans granted fluctuated between USD 1,000 and USD 4,000, with the exception of one large loan of USD 15,000. A wide array of business types was supported. The largest loans were granted to a cold storage business, a drinking water shop, a cyber café, a construction

warehouse and a carpentry shop, which received USD 15,000, USD 4,000, USD 3,500 and USD 3,000. Much smaller loans were granted to boutiques, restaurants, beauty salons and bakeries, on the basis of a business plan they had to submit.

Monitoring data available for 22 SMEs⁸³ indicate that 50% of the loans granted were used to purchase new materials, 23% for renewing stock, 23% to cover rent and repairs to equipment, and 4% to cover unforeseen expenses (see Box 6). Of grant beneficiaries, 73% declared that the volume of their monthly sales had increased. Ten SMEs registered sales volume between HTG 15,000 and HTG 96,000 and four

⁸² SMEs had to be in operation for at least three years, be located in Delmas, have no negative impact on the environment, and have at least two employees, excluding the owner.

⁸³ The fact that monitoring reports based their calculations on a reduced number of participating SMEs suggests that it was difficult for the BRC M&E team to capture information on all loan beneficiaries, despite the fact that the pool of SMEs benefiting from loans was quite small.

between HTG 96,000 and HTG 200,000;⁸⁴ information on the other SMEs is not specified. A review of sales books suggests that 48% of the SMEs⁸⁵ saw their profit increase.

SME selection was participatory, although Fonkoze/Zafen commented that the selection process lacked rigour and neutrality.⁸⁶ Involving zonal committee members in the process certainly introduced a bias in the choice of candidates, as they tended to select people they knew.

Many, if not most, small and micro-entrepreneurs in Haiti do not have access to business management training and assistance in formulating strategic business plans to help them grow. To address this need, BRC developed and facilitated an adapted SME training for entrepreneurs who were about to be recipients of loans. This training was offered one or two days per month throughout the duration of the programme. Fonkoze/Zafen's experience indicates that SMEs absorb business skills better when training is offered before the loan is granted, providing a strong incentive to participate in the training. URRP took a different approach, with some training delivered before the loan and the rest after; as a result, lower attendance at the training session was observed. Monitoring data confirm a trend of attendance rates decreasing over time and sessions. This underlines the necessity of regular and ongoing coaching to ensure that beneficiaries not only acquire but apply correctly the knowledge.⁸⁷

Repayment of Loans

SME representatives participating in focus group discussions led by the evaluation team indicated that the financial support provided was needed, as access to credit was a major constraint for all of them. They also confirmed that the training was relevant and appropriate. They spoke positively about training in sales, stock and contingency management, and marketing, as those they found most useful. However, they were less positive about the size of the loans granted, saying they had received a lower amount than they had requested, which had proven insufficient to cover their business needs.⁸⁸

Some of the participants also felt that the criteria for qualifying for loans were too strict. However, when asked about the repayment status of their own loan, only a few participants had fully or even partially repaid it. Explanations they gave included that the increase in the volume of sales did not bring enough profit margin to reimburse the loan once business expenses had been paid.⁸⁹ A file review by Fonkoze/Zafen confirmed a very slow loan repayment rate: only seven SMEs had completely repaid their loans, five were up to date with their payments and fourteen were in arrears by more than 181 days.

⁸⁴ The monetary unit was not specified in the reports, but the evaluation team assumed that it was the Haitian gourde. This oversight underlines the need to ensure that quality information is collected and to provide accurate and precise data by which to judge the success of this type of initiative.

⁸⁵ Based on data available for 21 of the 26 SMEs.

⁸⁶ The evaluation team did not find written documentation on the selection process in English or French.

⁸⁷ Setting up conditional loans linked to attendance at training would be another interesting idea for the future.

⁸⁸ This discrepancy could be due to the fact that the amounts granted were based on the business plan presented and the repayment capacity of the SME. Source: Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

⁸⁹ According to BRC sources who commented on an early draft of this evaluation report, anecdotal evidence in Haiti suggests that usually, when people request money for loans, they do not always invest the full amount into their business, as the interest rate is levelled immediately, and few if any businesses generate a profit after one month. Even where they do a "typical" business, this does not generate profit for several months (it also takes time for businesses to change bad behaviours around things that "eat into their profits," such as providing credit to customers. Part of this issue goes back to the terms and conditions offered by the loan. Under ideal conditions, loans should have a two-month period where no interest is paid.

As of July 2015, participants had reimbursed only USD 30,432 (48.5%⁹⁰) of the USD 62,600 in total loans disbursed. Had the SMEs repaid their starter loans, they would have had the opportunity to continue borrowing, build their credit and expand their business. Instead, defaulting on those loans will be very detrimental to those SMEs, as they are now listed in a national database of bad debtors⁹¹ and, consequently, will not be able to receive another loan from an MFI. Unfortunately, behavioural changes in terms of credit worthiness did not materialise as expected. A short timeframe in which to support SME interventions, the lack of ongoing and rigorous monitoring, a change in personnel,⁹² and the absence of livelihoods technical expertise at BRC UKO may explain the less than satisfactory results achieved with SMEs.

The mid-term review of the programme in 2013 did raise concerns about SME loan repayment and highlighted the need to resolve the problem before URRP communicates its next round of eligible businesses, stressing the impact it could have on beneficiaries and the permanent investment fund.⁹³ Unfortunately, Fonkoze/Zafen was unable to enforce the loan repayment schedule and came to agreement with BRC that it would withdraw from the project at the end of the current contract, after repaying the amounts reimbursed by SMEs to BRC (USD 30,432). The evaluators were not able to ascertain the reasons why more follow-up was not done following the mid-term evaluation to address issues associated with loan repayment.

Job Creation

Job creation was one of the key objectives of the livelihoods component and of paramount importance, considering the vulnerability of the population and the unemployment rate in the target area and in zones 3 and 5. Out of the 40-60 jobs expected to be created, 29 were generated in 2013. Of these, 24 were new workers and five were former workers who had lost their jobs after the earthquake. More recent information gathered during the field visit with Fonkoze/Zafen indicates that only three formal part-time jobs were created, and that they were in the bakery and home furniture sectors.

Based on the gaps in information and questions about the accuracy of the data, the evaluation team is unable to assess the results achieved in terms of job creation and can only speculate that the SME interventions demonstrate anecdotal evidence of increased beneficiary knowledge about business practices that are useful in their day-to-day operations.

Development of Community Savings and Credit Groups

BRC's rationale behind supporting the development of microfinance programming was to help the most vulnerable households still grappling with economic loss to access savings and credit in order to reduce their economic vulnerability and increase their resilience. MuSos were created to allow beneficiaries to support their income-generating activities after the cash grant initiative had expired. The model, which was adapted from rural communities in Haiti, was intended to create a solidarity network with loans and savings for people who could never qualify for banking services. The MuSo system is organised around three cash boxes: a green box collecting savings and used for credit, a red box collecting savings to use in

⁹⁰ [McCance, Wendy]. *Haiti URRP Recovery Programme. Highlights Phase Three (Jun 2012-Jul 2015)*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [July 2015].

⁹¹ According to a representative from Fonkoze/Zafen interviewed by the evaluation team. This is standard practice in microfinance initiatives.

⁹² The SME programme had one delegate livelihoods delegate. When this person left, BRC assigned the delegate's functions to two experienced Haitian staff who had developed the programme.

⁹³ Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

emergencies (for instance a funeral or property damage) and a blue box that gathers funds coming from the outside.⁹⁴

Creation of Groups

The main targets established for MuSos and microfinance initiatives were:

- Microfinance programming benefiting 2,000 beneficiaries⁹⁵ – as of July 2015, 1,951 members reached; average loan of HTG 5,356⁹⁶ (USD 123⁹⁷) per person; loans accessed by 98% of members in 2013.
- Establishing MuSos (groups of 20 to 30 people) to pool regular savings and create a fund from which members can borrow – 81 groups established with agreed internal status.
- Providing training, coaching and guidance to MuSos and introducing them to business management skills.
- Supporting a tailored approach towards specific vulnerable groups to facilitate their economic inclusion – 1,951 beneficiaries in all; 720 beneficiaries (30 groups) in the target area; 387 beneficiaries (17 groups) in zone 3; 844 beneficiaries (34 groups) in zone 5.⁹⁸
- Developing partnerships with KNFP and HelpAge International to support the development of MuSos for older participants – 6 MuSos; total of 192 members aged 50 and over in all groups.⁹⁹
- Providing MuSo beneficiaries with health insurance coverage (6 months for those between 18 and 49 years of age, and 12 months for those aged 50 and over) in partnership with DASH – 7,000 beneficiaries.
- Facilitating linkages to MFIs – 17 MuSos legally registered.

These targets had to be achieved in short order, considering the limited timeframe in which to introduce new group savings and loan concepts, sensitise the community to the benefits of MuSo, create groups, support nominations to the MuSo executive committees, train members, establish formal operating procedures and identify signatories for banking procedures—all using a participatory process to arrive at consensus among the MuSo membership.

Creating new social structures is a challenging task, and is even more so in an urban slum where people lack trust and suspicion is strong. Thus, BRC provided support services, including training and guidance to the nascent MuSo groups. In similar programmes, establishing savings groups normally takes at least one full year, to allow members to grasp all the financial concepts, get organised, adopt and respect procedures, proceed with a cycle of savings and create a fund from which members can eventually borrow. All of this must be accompanied by thorough and regular coaching and monitoring to ensure that membership is maintained, that member attendance at meetings is regular, that savings shares are paid and registered every time, and that loans are repaid with interest and within the set timeframe.

⁹⁴ In the context of BRC's microfinance initiative, these three cases function as one bank account with Sogebank.

⁹⁵ Manell, Tenzin. *End of Mission, Lessons Learned*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2015].

⁹⁶ Balance of accounts of MuSo members [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2015].

⁹⁷ Based on the average historical exchange rate for 2013, which is the period in which loan transfer operations were made. Specifically, the average exchange rate for the period from January 1 to December 31, 2013 was HTG 1 = USD 0.0230 (minimum USD 0.0226; maximum USD 0.0246). Source: <www.oanda.com>.

⁹⁸ Register of loans taken by MuSo members. [N.p.], BRC, [2015].

⁹⁹ Register of loans taken by MuSo members. [N.p.], BRC, [2015].

In addition, evidence from the desk review and key informant interviews suggests that since 2010 the community had branded BRC as a provider of cash grants. This became an impediment to the microfinance activities, because beneficiaries expected to continue receiving cash grants.

Several key informant interviews highlighted that the switch to microfinance was challenging for a community accustomed to cash grants and required navigating a fair amount of resistance and even hostility within the community. These constraints required, among other things, a thorough communication process, verification of beneficiary entitlements, and the inclusion of older beneficiaries and individuals excluded from cash grants. Extensive work was undertaken by the BRC country team and the CMT—communicating the nuances of the programme, responding to pushback by and pressures from the zonal committees (such as withdrawing cooperation on a regular basis or requiring extended discussions), finalising beneficiary identification, ensuring beneficiary accountability, engaging community members in microcredit, and M&E. All of these activities were time-intensive and added pressure to the already short timeline.

Given the timeframe, impressive results have been achieved with respect to the creation of MuSo groups. Eighty-one MuSos have been formed and trained,¹⁰⁰ located as follows: 30 groups with a total membership of 720 people in the target area, 17 groups with a total membership of 387 people in zone 3 and 34 groups with a total membership of 844 people in zone 5, for a grand total of 1,951 beneficiaries (97% of the planned target).

Secondary data reviews and evidence from interviews and focus group discussions indicate that the following internal procedures and loan requirements have been standardised across MuSos:

- A monthly interest rate of 2%.
- A three-month loan reimbursement period.
- A loan ceiling of HTG 5,000 (approximately USD 115¹⁰¹), raised to HTG 7,000 (approximately USD 161¹¹⁰) for elderly members.¹⁰²

BRC's approach has been to provide each MuSo with a start-up fund of HTG 5,000 per member or HTG 7,000 for older members (funds deposited in the blue box). Although this start-up fund enabled the MuSos to start providing loans as quickly as after only one month of members' contributions, it also contravened both the basic principle of a sustainable community microfinance model (funds are expected to be self-generated, not topped up by the implementation organisation¹⁰³) and efforts to establish a savings culture that allows each member to save, contribute to the blue box and nurture over time a fund allocated for loans. Unconditional cash grants like these promote neither commitment and ownership of the savings and lending process nor accountability for the loans contracted by members. In future programming, BRC should refrain from financing start-up capital, as it does not encourage the development of a savings and lending culture among MuSo members.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ [McCance, Wendy]. *Haiti URRP Recovery Programme. Highlights Phase Three (Jun 2012-Jul 2015)*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [July 2015].

¹⁰¹ Based on the average historical exchange rate for 2013, which is the period in which loan transfer operations were made. Specifically, the average exchange rate for the period from January 1 to December 31, 2013 was HTG 1 = USD 0.0230 (minimum USD 0.0226; maximum USD 0.0246). Source: <www.oanda.com>.

¹⁰² A review of data supplied by BRC suggests that very few members have loans in the amount of HTG 7,000. Source: Register of loans taken by MuSo members. [N.p.], BRC, [2015].

¹⁰³ Where funds are given, this should occur following one full cycle of implementation and be linked to some form of condition.

¹⁰⁴ According to BRC sources who commented on an early draft of this evaluation report, the original plan was not to provide a cash injection to the MuSos. The original livelihoods programme was supposed to happen in a confined

Evidence from focus group discussions with MuSo beneficiaries reveals that participants were well aware of the rules and regulations and corroborated that these were decided on a consensual basis. Based on the information collected, the savings shares fluctuated between HTG 50 (approximately USD 1) and HTG 150 (approximately USD 3), payable every two weeks; however, according to executive committee representatives met by the evaluation team, several MuSo members did not pay their savings shares regularly, a finding corroborated by data gathered in the field.¹⁰⁵ Some participants expressed dissatisfaction with the size of the loan granted, adding that it was insufficient and that they preferred to borrow from family members, while others expressed concern about the timeframe for repaying loans and the interest charged, describing MuSo as “an impoverishment system.” Such comments illustrate a lack of comprehension of the basic principles of savings and lending groups.

Partnership with KNFP and MuSo Operations

BRC chose to partner with KNFP,¹⁰⁶ a Haitian association, but the partnership was somewhat different than that for SMEs. BRC decided to ask nothing more from KNFP than professional training expertise to complement BRC’s existing technical and professional competencies. At no point was KNFP consulted about or requested to follow up or coach MuSo groups, despite its years of experience. Two to three BRC staff were trained on the MuSo microfinance methodology, but instead of receiving the full 26 modules of training associated with this methodology, they had an abbreviated version with only 10 modules. Once trained, the BRC personnel were responsible for training the beneficiaries. MuSo executive committee members received initial training, as it was expected that they, in turn, would deliver key messages and information to the other members of their groups. The extent to which this happened is debatable. Some of the challenges identified were:

- A high percentage of members who did not pay their savings shares (in the case of one MuSo, as high as 42%), probably due to the value of individual shares.
- Not all members attending the MuSo meetings regularly, even though they were scheduled every two weeks.¹⁰⁷
- MuSo membership fluctuating between 14 and 47¹⁰⁸ and exiting members were often not replaced, sometimes leading to the disbanding of groups.¹⁰⁹

All of these problems point to an unclear or inappropriate savings group methodology being used as well as M&E limitations. Because the programme encompassed a large number of MuSos, monitoring raised an issue for BRC community mobilisers who needed to ensure that groups were financially healthy and

timeframe—first unconditional cash grant followed by a rapid conditional grant within one month and then a second conditional grant within three months. The cash grants were to promote business and create a financial environment where people had a secure financial status to start saving. Unfortunately, the cash grants were not delivered as per the original plan, with the result that the cash injection only served to pay off debts that families incurred rather than to create an investment opportunity. The separation in these elements of the programme prevented beneficiaries from saving.

¹⁰⁵ This raise an issue surrounding group design. Group members need to set the value of individual shares at a level that it is always affordable to buy at least one share every time the group meets, and this should be throughout the year, not just during certain times. For example, there will be times during the year where it is difficult for members to access money; those unable to contribute this amount throughout the year should join a group with a lower share value.

¹⁰⁶ Several NGOs in Haiti had implemented MuSos with the guidance of KNFP.

¹⁰⁷ According to participants in focus group discussions. This occurred in spite of groups having ground rules causing unjustified absences to be punished with a fine.

¹⁰⁸ According to membership data supplied by BRC.

¹⁰⁹ Where this happens, the executive committee and members of a MuSo should join efforts to replace members who leave to ensure they can sustain the amount of savings and loans.

stayed on track with respect to procedural compliance savings and loan requirements. Another option for BRC would have been to sub-contract KNFP to ensure regular mentoring and monitoring of MuSos. In fact, the mid-term review of the programme had already suggested, in 2013, sub-contracting a third party to provide additional support to the MuSos.¹¹⁰

All MuSo members in the focus group discussions led by the evaluation team said they had contracted a loan. Members also confirmed that MuSos were very helpful in providing access to financial resources and had enabled them to conduct their income-generating activities or pay for household expenses and/or their children’s school fees. However, a high percentage of loans were not and have still not been reimbursed. The amount in loans not reimbursed by MuSo members as of July 2015 was HTG 1,460,879 (USD 25,000).¹¹¹ Before exiting Haiti, BRC closed all the MuSo bank accounts at Sogebank and transferred the funds to a formal microfinance committee in charge of the follow-up after the end of the project.

Partnership with HelpAge International

In 2012, BRC established a formal partnership (MoU) with HelpAge International for the provision of programming and services to older beneficiaries living in targeted areas of Delmas 19 to increase their livelihoods security. Across the world, BRC has been partnering with organisations that have this kind of expertise, and this strategy was definitely selected in Haiti.¹¹² One HelpAge International staff member was embedded in the BRC team specifically to work with older residents of the community. Six MuSo groups have been formed with older members, taking into account two age brackets: five MuSos for members between the ages of 50 and 64 (“Ak Gason Vanyan,” “Chen Solidarité,” “Men nan Men,” “Verité” and “ED”) and one for those 65 and older (“Granmoun An Akyon”), benefiting a total of 146 individuals.¹¹³ This breakdown reflects the mobility and engagement of older people in economic activity. HelpAge International has also provided health support to 137 older people, as discussed later in the report. Interventions to support older residents are particularly pertinent considering that only 1% of the elderly population in Haiti has a pension.

Despite the challenges outlined in this section, the MuSos reached the marginalised segment of the community that had no access to banking services and provided a platform to introduce savings and financing instruments. Statements collected among beneficiaries underline that introducing MuSos has enabled very poor people to access money, which has in turn built their confidence to be able to save and repay their loans. As one partner said, “marginalised people have been empowered through the process.”

Box 7. Beneficiary Voices

“I am far more independent as I am now able to read poster information and do not have to wait for somebody to do the reading and explain it to me.”

— A focus group participant

“I am not the last to find out about things in the community because I am not able to read.”

— A focus group participant

Literacy Support

During the implementation of the microfinance intervention, it became clear that many beneficiaries lacked the reading or writing skills to manage the loan and repayment paperwork. As a result, a literacy initiative was developed in collaboration with the Haitian Secretary of State using government training manuals. Approximately 100 people were targeted by this initiative, and 70 graduated in March 2015.

¹¹⁰ Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

¹¹¹ Balance of accounts of MuSo members [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2015].

¹¹² *Memorandum of Understanding between the British Red Cross Society and HelpAge International. Delmas 19 Older People’s Mutual Solidarity Groups*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [August 2012].

¹¹³ Balance of accounts of MuSo members [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2015]. An analysis of enrolment data reveals that approximately 20% of MuSos had members aged 50 and over.

Data gathered through focus group discussions (see Box 7) revealed that the literacy training has been a life changing experience for participants, bringing them out of isolation. When asked how they apply what they have learned in their daily life, several women said that they were now able to help their children with homework and felt much better to be able to do so. Some commented that they are now able to read the Bible while others confirmed their new literacy skills have been useful for their income-generating activities.

Evidence from discussions with focus groups participants also confirms they were now able to read posters about hygiene, fevers and causes of diarrhoea and take action to protect themselves and their families. These people praised BRC for its literacy support and conveyed that, thanks to what they learned, they can now play an active role in their community.

Factors Influencing the Sustainability of SME Support

As explained earlier in this section, repayment of loans by SMEs has been problematic and has affected the revolving SME fund with Fonkoze/Zafen, which withdrew from the programme after reimbursing the amount of loans that had been repaid.

Support beyond July 2015 to cope with the problem of loan repayment and ensure the viability of a revolving community fund post project has prompted BRC to assess the market to identify a sustainable supplier for managing the SME programme in the future. It was determined that the most appropriate solution was to set up a formal SME community committee—legally constituted as the Entrepreneurs' Association for the Development of Delmas (AEDP)—and to transfer funds to this body.

AEDP is composed of business representatives and community members with a mandate to collect loan repayments and continue the granting of loans (second phase of the revolving fund). Representatives from this committee were clear that they would not hesitate to resort to a legal remedy if necessary to ensure that loans were reimbursed; however, costs associated with legal procedures could be higher than the amount outstanding. Criteria for loans have also been revised, with the inclusion of a legal clause and co-signing obligation for any loan granted. Larger loans have already been granted to businesses operating in Delmas 19.

Nonetheless, the evaluation team believes that AEDP will bear a heavy burden, given the pressure they may get from zonal committees wanting to access funding. BRC set up a system of oversight and clear reporting to BRC UKO, to follow the project closely for a few months after the programme completed until November 2015.

Factors Influencing the Sustainability of MuSo Development

MuSo members who participated in the focus group discussions seemed worried about the closing of their banking account, and several participants even felt short-changed by the process. Keeping in mind how vocally some community members express their discontent in Delmas 19, this situation should not be taken lightly. As it is, a high percentage of beneficiaries have been exposed to new risks because they have increased their debt with loans they cannot repay—something that will have a negative effect on their economic resilience and vulnerability. Considering the high degree of vulnerability among targeted beneficiaries, it was not realistic or sustainable to expect changed financial behaviour and increased understanding of the importance of savings over such a short timeframe, without extended follow-up at least six months after the programme.

BRC's initial plan was to withdraw services at the end of the programme and offer the MuSos the possibility to link with ID Microfinance (a Haitian MFI) if they were formally recognised by the Ministry of Social Affairs, a prerequisite for accessing microfinancing that is currently the privilege of only a minority

of MuSos created.¹¹⁴ At the time of writing this report, 64 MuSos have not been legally set up and some disbanded long before the programme closing, due to various problems, such as non-attendance, non-repayment of loans, or mobility of members. Another option could be for functional MuSos to continue to provide loans without linking with a MFI, based on the membership and regular payment of savings by members.

It must be recognised that the burden of accountability imposed on members of the formal microfinance committee set up at the end of the programme involves a reputational risk for BRC and Haitian Red Cross societies in Haiti, considering the need to repay loans and the looming threat of community representatives voicing their discontent. Being the permanent representative of the RCRC Movement in Haiti, HRC will receive both the credit and complaints arising from other Red Cross partners' performance after the programme ends. As a member of the RC Movement, BRC must mitigate potential risks incurred by HRC.

4.2.4 Community Governance

As discussed through the evaluation, the approach BRC took to helping people in Delmas 19 recover was a mixed strategy that involved construction of homes and infrastructure, livelihoods and training and public awareness campaigns. It also sought to invest in the long-term resilience of the community by training community members to carry out vulnerability assessment, analysis and prioritisation leading to the elaboration a plan of action, training local population as masons rather than outsourcing the work to external parties, and legally registering businesses and homes to protect property rights. These activities were designed to develop adequate governance structures within the community, and to strengthen the community relationship with local actors in Haiti to enable these structures to form a more resilient community. Their outcome is reviewed below.

BRC's Approach to Community Governance in Delmas 19

Delmas 19 is an extremely difficult environment in which to operate. The population is highly volatile and in the aftermath of the earthquake, people from different regions of Haiti had arrived there, with everyone living in survival mode, making social cohesion in the neighbourhood difficult. Because most people relied on remittances and support from bodies like the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Office for Project Services, World Vision or Oxfam,¹¹⁵ they had poorly-developed self-resilience. Therefore, working with the community and its representatives was particularly challenging. Phase 1 and Phase 2 had already highlighted the challenges of working with the Haitian community (such as poor administrative systems, lack of trust in public institution and strong reliance on aid culture). Based on that experience, it is not clear the degree to which such challenges were assessed, analysed and meant to be addressed by URRP

Nevertheless, BRC's approach to the regeneration of Delmas 19 attempted to foster community-driven solutions through the PASSA methodology and community action plans. This approach was aligned with BRC's corporate strategy, in that through its recovery operations BRC had committed itself to "seeking community participation in the design and implementation of recovery programmes to ensure these programmes meet the needs of beneficiaries."¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ To facilitate linkages to MFIs, BRC staff had been assigned to walk MuSos through the administrative procedures required in order to be recognised legally by the Ministry of Social Affairs. As of July 2015, 17 MuSos had obtained such formal recognition. MuSos who wish to apply need ongoing support, as the process requires a good knowledge of current legislation.

¹¹⁵ According to results from the survey conducted during the evaluation team's visit in Delmas 19.

¹¹⁶ Strategic Priority 1.6 quoted in: British Red Cross. *Concept Note. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration (URR) Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, October 2012.

However, engaging the community and building local capacity and consensus took much longer than expected with community consultations taking up to one year. In retrospect, it does not appear that BRC was adequately prepared to properly understand the reality of the areas targeted by the programme and how best to deal with it.

Working with Zonal Committees

At the beginning of its engagement in Delmas 19, BRC chose to work with existing zonal committees, assuming they were representative bodies. These self-appointed committees had formed following the 2010 earthquake, when a large portion of the population was living in camps and the national government encouraged people to develop spontaneous committees. The committees were powerful stakeholders for BRC, providing counterparts and focal points for discussions with the community. As time went on, however, the legitimacy and representativeness of the zonal committees with which BRC was engaged proved to be one of the most difficult issues to grapple with. Evidence from focus group discussions with beneficiaries clearly conveys that these committees were not representative of the community (women were only given a token role) and, in fact, did not represent their interests to the municipal authorities. Members were largely motivated by self-interest and were sometimes verbally abusive. As one participant explained:

“Zonal committee members are feared rather than respected for their contribution to the community. They work on their own agenda and for their own interests and even influence community members negatively by pressuring them for instance into not repaying loans.”

It was difficult to negotiate with committees and local partners also reported challenges associated with dealing with the pressure and complaints from the zonal committees. Nonetheless, BRC made strenuous efforts to hold community meetings to ensure direct contact with the beneficiaries and to make up for the shortcomings of the committees.

Throughout URRP, significant effort was invested in capacity building to enhance the zonal committees’ skills in interacting with the community and local authorities, and for participating in the planning and implementation of the programme. Evidence from focus group discussions with representatives of the zonal committees indicates that, thanks to BRC support, members benefited from several training or information sessions.¹¹⁷ However, despite all the training they received, committee members did not seem inclined to apply what they had learned and move forward without any material or financial incentives from BRC. Discussions also revealed that the committees have no clear plans for organising after BRC’s departure.

In retrospect, BRC could have envisaged other options to work with the community (see Box 8), but the choice to continue with the zonal committees may have been influenced by the timeframe set for developing interventions and the need to achieve rapidly tangible results in housing and infrastructure and in livelihoods. Nevertheless, to counterbalance the influence of the zonal committees, BRC introduced new mechanisms with the PASSA process and the CMT, discussed below. In addition, locating a BRC office in the target area in Delmas 19 improved the community’s

Box 8. Alternatives to Zonal Committees

BRC is not the only organisation to have faced challenges in its dealings with zonal committees. The French Red Cross reportedly realised that the self-proclaimed committees were not the way to go and opted to try to reform them, include women, disabled and religious representatives, and support elections.

For BRC, one alternative would have been to conduct an assessment to identify other key structures, groups and individuals to engage the community. For instance, Commune Board Councils (CASECs) and Assemblies of Communal Sections (ASECs) are elected communal bodies with which NGOs like Oxfam have chosen to work to facilitate the identification of beneficiaries. Dealing with such mechanisms is not without risk, though, including risk to associate to elections and risk of selection bias based on political affinity instead of vulnerability.

¹¹⁷ Including sessions on leadership, project management, how to conduct a meeting, how to sensitise beneficiaries, DRR, waste management, computer literacy and other topics.

perception of BRC. It enabled the community to communicate directly with BRC staff, which occasionally created tension, but mostly enabled synergy.

Community Capacity Building

The PASSA consultation process in 2011 was instrumental not only in ensuring that the recovery programme responded to beneficiaries' needs and fostering community engagement, but also in structuring the community's approach to identifying their own solutions and realistic, comprehensive strategies for addressing their problems. Focus group discussions with PASSA members indicate that participation in the consultation process established a positive dynamic between PASSA participants and community members for promoting information and creating a space to discuss changes. Some focus group participants commented that the participatory process provided the community with tools and processes to support a more self-driven response to the identification of problems and solutions, and to realise that they could and had to play a key role in the recovery of their area. It also allowed them to see that with a certain amount of support and advice from BRC, and through interaction with local authorities, the community had skills or abilities to drive the recovery of Delmas 19. Following the PASSA consultation process, several organisations have organised cleaning chores in neighbourhoods, managed waste collection and/or sensitised residents to the importance of hygiene. Although anecdotal, these reports demonstrate the impact of the consultation process and how the knowledge acquired can serve willing and proactive organisations to work for the well-being of their community.

In 2015, PASSA was repeated as a mechanism for the community to identify and plan activities beyond URRP. However, PASSA 2 as it became known, was not given sufficient time to establish a clear plan for sustaining results beyond the programme. Focus group discussions with PASSA participants did not highlight a sufficiently high degree of ownership or the will to continue once BRC exits the programme. While some associations claimed they would like to continue to manage waste and organise cleanliness drives in their neighbourhoods, there is no indication that the communities in the various zones are proactive enough to maintain the infrastructure themselves. Overall, there seemed to have been significantly less interest in PASSA 2, with only 27% of respondents in the survey administered by the evaluation team claimed to know about this initiative.¹¹⁸

Despite the training and coaching provided by BRC both to PASSA members, local associations and zonal committees, none of the committees that the URRP envisioned to set up to maintain infrastructures (street lighting, water management, waste management, see Annex 4 and 5) were ever formed.

Working with the Mairie

BRC recognised that engagement with the Delmas 19 Mairie, the local municipal authority, was essential to URRP and strived to strengthen community advocacy with municipal authorities. URRP housing and infrastructure personnel worked closely with the Mairie, a strategy that made sense considering, first, that the mayor is a democratically elected authority accountable to the population and, second, that all the processes and paperwork involving construction of shelter and infrastructure and land tenure need government approval. BRC took the decision to ensure that proper processes be established for planning construction and engaging the legal authority. Despite many challenges, BRC decided not to cut corners and established a robust process by which it had an official record and could demonstrate that the proper process had been followed. It took time for the Mairie to decide the minimum square footage for houses, but this approach created a baseline for planning, given that no planning processes were in place. Locally, other agencies have consulted BRC about the processes and plans developed for working with the Mairie, and BRC's model serves as a baseline for other construction. One of the intangible results that BRC left

¹¹⁸ 43% in the target area, compared to approximately 12% in each of zone 3 and zone 5.

behind was to contribute to developing construction standards, regulations and processes that will have a long-term impact in Delmas 19.

However, considering the limited number of visits made by the Mairie representative to the programme areas, there is little hope that the office is fully engaged to continue the work with the community begun by BRC. Similarly, the evaluators did not find any evidence that the community is able to advocate or represent its interest collectively to the Mairie.

The CMT

BRC worked very closely with the zonal committees and municipal authorities to spread its message to the community, in order to mobilise people to attend meetings to identify needs and participate actively in the design and implementation of URRP. However, because different groups had vested interests in the programme, communication problems arose, and BRC had to move around a multiplicity of voices to make sure that its plan of action was clear. BRC's relationship with the community began to suffer from the lack of a clear mechanism for capturing and relaying the community's questions to relevant decision-makers and, in turn, providing information back to the community. In 2012, this situation led BRC to set up the CMT.

The CMT consisted of competent and motivated BRC local staff: a mobilisation team (11 staff), a database team (2 staff), a call centre (4 staff) and a manager.¹¹⁹ This team took on the responsibility for all liaison with the community across all programme components. As a result, regular coordination between the team, zonal committees and other community-based organisations became a priority.

The CMT greatly improved the relationship and communication with community stakeholders, and enabled BRC to speak with one voice. Interviews and focus group discussions led by the evaluation team confirmed that the CMT played a key role in providing regular updates to the Delmas 19 community beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and local authorities, with information about the BRC programme and information on mechanisms for the community to convey their feedback and complaints. Through the call centre that was established, beneficiaries were able to voice their concerns and receive timely feedback. However, few people in the community reported as being aware of this service. In the survey conducted by the evaluation team, fewer than three out of ten respondents (28.3%) said they knew they could share ideas or register a complaint with the BRC. Of these, very few people (only 12.1%) were aware of the call centre and prepared to use it in case of need. While the CMT and the BRC offices offered the interface that allowed the community to provide its feedback to BRC, the call centre was used mostly for day-to-day programme operation. The evaluation noted that reports on community feedback were not translated from Creole to English, suggesting that the data could have been better used by BRC management, including for more strategic alignment of the programme.

Linking the Community with HRC

The CMT was only a temporary mechanism to mobilise the community, and throughout the programme BRC's attempts to build links between the communities in Delmas 19 and HRC, in line with URRP plans, met with limited success. BRC could have been in a position to allow for greater HRC ownership in Delmas 19 by providing a better link to public health actions as part of the programme. Similarly, building on the connection that exists between drainage and disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilience,¹²⁰ BRC could have offered HRC to play a greater role, such as taking on the task of handling canal maintenance from the onset. This way, the odds of having HRC continue to ensure maintenance duties beyond the end of the BRC programme would have been significantly increased.

¹¹⁹ According to BRC sources, the idea was discussed as early as November 2010, but was not implemented until 2012.

¹²⁰ Good drainage can prevent flooding and thus reduce the adverse effects of events like hurricanes.

The survey conducted by the evaluation team highlighted that while 43.3% of respondents were aware of the services or activities HRC offered in Port-au-Prince, only 12.9% knew who the representatives of HRC in Delmas 19 were.

Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction

The original target for this activity was to set up a DRR committee and develop a plan to strengthen the community resilience to future shocks and disasters. However, the evaluation team was not able to find exact records of what steps were taken towards this end and whether this was achieved. The CMT seem to have been running awareness campaigns on DRR.

Some evidence of the level of knowledge acquired on DRR is supplied by the survey carried out by the evaluation team. This survey observed that 86.4% of the respondents knew what to do in the event of an earthquake or hurricane.¹²¹ They could also describe many ways to prevent themselves from communicable diseases. Similarly, most people in focus group discussions claimed to know what to do in case of a hurricane, earthquake or other natural disaster. One participant, for example, explained that they needed to stock food, water, fuel and look for a secure place to stay. From the exchanges that followed, however, the evaluators did not get a sense that people knew about the appropriate evacuation routes.

Factors Influencing the Sustainability of Community Governance Work

The community governance component of URRP, just like health, also had an ambitious objective, considering the tight timeframe and the challenging context. Despite a substantial number of trainings, consultation and working sessions with the zonal committees that had been expected to serve as the primary bodies governing construction, infrastructure and livelihoods interventions, the programme fell short of fostering the committees' ownership of and engagement in maintaining the infrastructure after the programme ended. Partners and other stakeholders revealed that committee representatives had often worked at cross-purposes and negatively influenced beneficiaries. The evaluation team's meetings with zonal committees confirmed that there was no commitment to and plan for maintenance after the programme and that the commitment depends heavily on financial incentives available to the committees. The exit strategy should have considered establishing an agreement with the committees and municipalities describing their responsibilities for maintenance beyond the programme. Given the issues with the committees, it is questionable if they provide the best structure on which to build for sustainable community governance.

The evaluation team also has doubts about the sustainability of the other governance mechanisms established. Although the PASSA process did allow people to participate in planning development activities and motivated some organisations to go further and develop interventions to improve conditions in their neighbourhood, such as waste management, repairs to public pathways and grey water drainage systems, the extent to which the community groups will be sustainable over time without financial and material incentives is unclear. Will these groups be able to work under the influence of zonal committees? To what extent will the process last over time? This remains to be seen.

The main issue in ensuring a sustainable outcome of the interventions is the fragmented community that is still highly vulnerable and the lack of adequate governance at the community or municipal level. While BRC's focus was on delivering housing, infrastructure and livelihoods as a means to improve resilience, the community was most in need of a governance model to build self-reliance. To a large extent, BRC's efforts to build ownership and full participation within the community were obstructed by the actions of

¹²¹ For example, when asked specifically what action they would take during an earthquake, 63.2% said they would run out of the house, 40.3 % said they would move as far away as possible from any building, 15.7% said they would hide under a table or desk, and 13.2% said they would seek a safe place where they could find a triangle of life.


zonal committees and by the fact these committees were not attuned to the needs of their communities. In the future, one potential approach would be not to build anything until a representative governance model was established. BRC should ensure that organisations that speak for the entire community are selected at the initial stage of a project. This would result in a very different programme with very different outcomes.

4.3 Support Services

4.3.1 Human Resources

In implementing its response and recovery programme in Haiti, BRC had to pursue avenues that are outside its normal mandate and expertise, which made it very difficult to create adequate control frameworks. As pointed out in the mid-term review conducted in 2013, it was clear from the outset that, with a significant budget available, a limited timeframe of 24 to 30 months, and a bilateral/unilateral approach, this was going to be a programme of significant size requiring rapid scale-up. In effect, the programme required the rapid establishment of the equivalent of a medium-sized NGO¹²² with an annual turnover of between approximately GBP 5 million and GBP 8 million and operating in a complex and challenging environment. Most such organisations take many years to grow to this size.¹²³ Human resources and admin costs were consequently high (see Figure 7). However, according to key informants interviewed by the evaluation team, ongoing resources put into administration and human resources were inadequate for an operation of the scale of URRP.

Figure 7
URRP Total Expenditure, by Cost Category



Note: Categories were defined as follows: programmatic costs include all direct costs including material and technical support with the exception of delegates which are included under staff costs. Admin costs include office maintenance and supplies. Transport includes vehicles and flights. M&E includes regular monitoring and reviews.

¹²² The staff complement alone was over 100, including local personnel and delegates.

¹²³ Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

To undertake recovery operations in such a challenging context requires having highly qualified personnel in place, which was a challenge when the recovery programme started. Delays in recruitment across the board slowed implementation of the integrated programme overall and made the synchronisation of shelter, livelihoods and water and sanitation and public health activities more demanding. Most informants interviewed by the evaluation team underlined the difficulty and challenges BRC faced in recruiting experienced staff with skills in key areas such as cash grants, recovery, urban context, housing, repairs and community-based approaches. As a result, more than 50 delegates were involved in the programme at the point or another, between 2010 and 2015.¹²⁴

Evidence suggests there are several likely causes to this situation. One is the relatively low salary offered that was not adequate for the qualifications required. According to sources interviewed, salaries were not high enough to attract good candidates. Other factors specifically mentioned by informants include the reduced number of experienced professionals willing to work in Haiti, the inabilities of some delegates to cope in an increasingly antagonistic and volatile environment, uncompetitive terms and conditions for delegates, and the distance of the work from adequate living arrangements.¹²⁵

The programme also struggled to retain personnel. A case study on retention identified perks that may be considered to compensate for low salary, such as accommodations, learning and development, bonuses and leave.¹²⁶

Human resources problems have led to the production of a human resources toolkit that provides information for small- and large-scale interventions. These guidelines and templates still need to be adapted to local labour laws and to the programme-/country-specific context.¹²⁷

4.3.2 Management Tools and Systems

Planning

In June 2012, a comprehensive proposal was put together featuring a logical framework; a communications, accountability to beneficiaries and M&E plan; and an accompanying workplan and budget. These items encapsulated BRC's intended approach for URRP, set the direction for the formation of the CMT, and shaped key decisions such as establishing an office in Delmas 19. However, as noted in an earlier section of the report, the logical framework did not help articulate what activities were needed to achieve the intended results.

Information Systems

Management of the recovery programme has been a challenge, due in part to the lack of a BRC management system including "off-the-shelf" tools and mechanisms for programme management of this scale and complexity.¹²⁸ The Haiti team had to spend a lot of time developing and standardising new tools and applications involving considerable efforts in order to address the programme needs. For instance, procurement, budget management, and foreign currency exchange procedures¹²⁹ had to be adjusted and

¹²⁴ URRP, which was the most intense phase of BRC engagement in Haiti, had around 8 core delegate positions.

¹²⁵ British Red Cross. *Assessment Summary. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration (URR) Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, May 2012.

¹²⁶ British Red Cross. *Delegate Retention. Case Study Haiti Recovery Programme (May 2015)*. [N.p.], BRC, May 2015.

¹²⁷ Barnett, Kathy, and Cathy Fitzgibbon. *HR Toolkit for British Red Cross International Programmes [Version 2.0]*. [N.p.], BRC, June 2015.

¹²⁸ Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

¹²⁹ The 2013 mid-term review of the programme had flagged a potential challenge with the foreign exchange fluctuation between British and American currencies. Source: Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Alastair Punch. *Mid-Term Review of BRC Recovery Programme, Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March-April 2013.

re-written. Interestingly, according to informants interviewed by the evaluation team, a significant but intangible outcome of URRP has been the number of systems developed that are now being rolled-up and used for a series of responses in other countries like Nepal.¹³⁰ Throughout the programme, several processes have been well documented, such as the risk and decision log.¹³¹ As a result, there is now a wealth of experience at BRC from the new methods and tools that have been developed for programme management during the Haiti intervention; however, that experience is not yet standardised into a package that can be easily passed on.

Both BRC UKO and BRC personnel in the field have found the current project information storing platform (known as “PIMS”) to be inadequate for managing a programme of this size (large scale, long term, with multiple components or projects). PIMS is designed for single interventions of modest scale, not for large projects in which BRC plays an operational role. Nonetheless, it provides one central location to collect and store information from the field for access by all parties.¹³² The system portal was difficult to access from the field due to internet issues, but worked eventually.

Data Management

One comment made by most staff interviewed in the field was that the programme components were generally implemented in silos, with little synergy between them. Instead of sharing common systems, BRC staff developed their own management and monitoring systems within their respective components. As a consequence, the various lists of beneficiaries were incompatible and staff had to spend a lot of time reconciling the numbers and cleaning data (the evaluation team had its own issues with this; see Box 9). Staff dedicated to data management were often overwhelmed. According to interviews, these data management issues delayed the enrolment process for both SME and MuSo support, as well as for the DASH health insurance. The negative effects of siloing on data management and other aspects of programme operation are important lessons from BRC’s experience in Haiti.

Box 9. Management of Lists of Beneficiaries

An important issue flagged in key interviews was the inadequate process for identifying beneficiaries, especially in terms of maintaining and updating an accurate list of beneficiaries for each programme component. It has been very difficult for BRC staff to compile information on beneficiaries systematically in a central database. Lists of beneficiaries were dispersed among the different components, making it difficult to identify those who received more than one service from BRC. Most stakeholders of the livelihoods programme pointed to the need to centralise information and to use a simple system that shows all the services, goods and funds that have been provided for each beneficiary.

Working in urban areas proved to be very difficult for BRC and its methods were not well adapted to areas with dense populations, such as in Delmas 19. Maintaining information on beneficiaries, in particular, was very challenging. Because the cash grant initiative was delivered very quickly, BRC staff did not have the time they needed to map the area properly and select beneficiaries in full participation with local authorities. Selection criteria were not well understood by the people, and those who were not selected turned their anger on BRC staff. Moreover, after beneficiaries had been verified, BRC staff did not have time to set up an appropriate information system to keep track of them. The database contained much overlap and many mistakes. In addition, many people who had not met the selection criteria managed to find a way to beat the system, primarily by usurping the identities of others. The identities of many beneficiaries were falsely used to access the cash grant initiative and to obtain material, even for the participants in MuSos. One of the weaknesses in BRC’s system was that, at the beginning of the programme, beneficiaries were identified by name and phone number only—pieces of identification that are easy to forge.

To avoid identification problems and double-counting, informants interviewed by the evaluation team suggested that, in future, beneficiaries’ photographs should be taken and put in the database along with their names, as well as two or three personal questions that only the beneficiary would be able to answer. In addition, based on indications supplied by sources in the field, advertising the names of the beneficiaries for the cash grant initiative to let them know where and when to pick up their money could jeopardise the beneficiaries’ security. Many cases of extortion and theft were reported. In the future, beneficiaries should be advised more discretely, using cell phone or other means.

¹³⁰ Templates for budget management, establishment of a programme board, and foreign currency systems for financial officers.

¹³¹ *Haiti URRP Risk Register* [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [March 2015]; British Red Cross. *Decision Log* [Excel file]. [N.p.], BRC, [March 2015].

¹³² Notwithstanding the danger of drowning in data, with a focus on collecting and reporting data, while giving little time to critically analyse the information and make sound decisions.

Box 10. Audit Findings in 2012

Strategic planning: The Haiti programme is currently at a critical stage, as the next steps are dependent on a clear plan being conceived by the delegation and agreed by UKO management.

Monitoring and decision making: Completion of the new “urban regeneration” plan will help confirm the key documents and processes needed to control performance and the meeting of agreed milestones.

Contract management: There is no contract register maintained by the delegation. As result, the current status of each contract or for monitoring terms of conditions is not available. This has caused exposure to financial and legal risks.

Procurement and purchasing: Some delegates still believe that the regular bypassing of normal purchasing procedures is acceptable. This poses a significant risk related to making commitments to an unknown quality of goods and services with potentially inappropriate suppliers at high cost.

Human resource skills and staff: The personnel structure is currently in a state of flux due to uncertainty of the needs of urban regeneration phase and due to key positions remaining unfilled.

Information technology: Significant risks were recorded in the detail of our report around data back-up and protection.

Communications channels: Communication between delegates has been an issue due to team dynamics. This has resulted either in information not being shared or a culture of retaining every minor issue “on record.” We also noted issues with the office layout, which acts as a physical barrier between the delegates and does not provide the privacy required for confidential meetings or discussions.

Financial matters: There are key areas still requiring tools to further enhance controls. These include financial timelines, improved budget management and cost review using information from Agresso. Progress is being made in these areas.

Source: Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, April 2012.

Financial Management

Following an audit conducted in 2012,¹³³ which outlined several management risks associated with the programme and high priority actions to be taken (refer to Box 10), progress has been made on all of 35 of recommendations made in the report (as evidence by subsequent audits in 2013, 2014 and 2015¹³⁴). This demonstrates the capacity of the BRC management team in Haiti to adapt and solve problems. Among the important new measures adopted were an activity-based budget that was noted by the audit in 2013¹³⁵ to be an effective measure for monitoring finances for URRP. Thanks to the combined efforts of the BRC Delmas 19 office and UKO international finance department support, the financial control framework has greatly improved. One officer was stationed in Haiti for six weeks and made efforts to put in place effective processes, as evidenced by the improvements seen around financial controls.

From the evaluation team’s comparison of documents collected for the 2013, 2014 and 2015 audits and discussions with the departing BRC finance manager, the in-country finance team has continued offering good support to the delegation by maintaining ongoing review of budget variance analysis and day-to-day transactions (cash request, bank reconciliation, cash control, general accounting and help with

budgets). The link between finance and the URRP team is strong and allows information to be shared and progress to be properly recorded, including developing a better and more accurate cost review.

From the field, the accounting was done and updated at least monthly and often weekly and bi-weekly, using Agresso software through a portal developed by Citrix, an American multinational firm. The monthly forecast for cash was prepared regularly. Regular analyses of budget-versus-actual were conducted; however, the issues with allocation of expenses to the correct activity codes made some of the results look uneven, perhaps even incorrect.¹³⁶

¹³³ Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, April 2012.

¹³⁴ Nicholas, Paul, and Christine Howard. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, June 2013; Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme Desk Top Review*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2014; Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti programme 2014/15*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2015.

¹³⁵ Nicholas, Paul, and Christine Howard. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, June 2013.

¹³⁶ Retrospective changes in the field have not all been reflected correctly in the UK version in Agresso. Manual financial work going on leading to inconsistencies.

The finance department undertook a materials management exercise¹³⁷ in February and March 2015 to try to remedy some of the misallocations; however, they were bound by the paper trail that follows such transactions. Recommendations were made for corrective entries based on substantive records, and this was re-validated at the end of the programme. Overall, the improvements in financial management, combined with BRC's commitment to economy, have supported the good use of resources.

Logistic and Procurement Services

Systems and procedures for a construction initiative are different from those for emergency shelter programmes of the type commonly undertaken by BRC. Interviews conducted by the evaluation team have identified several challenges. The main activity was construction of a series of houses occurring in a high-theft zone; this meant a busy environment with many workers going in many directions. A fairly sophisticated supply and storage system has been designed for the programme, but it would have required much more person power (probably delegates) and investment to see it through properly. Some aspects of the design were incorporated into a stock location known as "The Bakery" ("la Boulangerie") and used effectively. For instance, soon after his arrival for the construction activities, the BRC head of delegation reduced the number of bags of cement used in constructing a single house from more than 190 to around 125, which indicates that a significant amount of shrinkage had been occurring prior to the implementation of controls.¹³⁸ The usual BRC systems were not suitable to this type of operation, although that would not have been apparent at the outset. Some examples would be:

- Bulk purchases for the activities were mostly conducted in accordance with BRC procurement procedures. Initially materials such as cement and iron bars would have been purchased (with the appropriate calls for tenders, bid, and reviews) and warehoused under one activity code, and then used on other activity codes. The warehousing tracking system was not integrated with the corresponding tracking when the items actually left the warehouse.
- Tracking was done using a basic Excel spreadsheet whereas, for the required level of resource management, most construction organisations would usually invest in application-specific software.
- The paperwork for releasing stock from the warehouses was manually tracked (bin cards, tally sheets, etc.) then entered into the Excel system. Despite efforts to improve it, the system did not reallocate materials released to the correct activity codes.
- Materials management was changed part-way through the programme, from warehousing large quantities to just-in-time deliveries, taking into account storage space limitations for certain bulk items; again, the changeover meant there was loss of continuity in the processes, although tracking specific activities became clearer in the paperwork.

Correctly matching materials used to materials purchased and identifying any other possible lapses in tracking would have required manually going over all the paperwork from the beginning of the purchases and re-entering the transactions into one system. The efforts that were made to improve control sometimes resulted in duplicate systems,¹³⁹ not only as in the example mentioned above, but in other instances as well, such as having binders full of copies of contracts (at times the originals), rather than having one reliable and properly-managed integrated system.

¹³⁷ The BRC head of delegation began to work on this in November 2014. He realised that the logistic systems were not functioning properly and requested a database technician to adapt the logistics materials control spreadsheets to show materials in a timeframe.

¹³⁸ This was implemented to reduce the possibility of theft of cement by reducing the number of people handling it.

¹³⁹ It should be noted that the project office on site and the support services office were in different locations, which justified a certain amount of duplication.

The whole BRC team eventually adopted tight and effective stewardship of resources that helped make up for procedures unsuited to the purpose, although gaps in key positions such as the logistics and finance manager had some impact. While reasonable systems seemed to be in place, there were visits from UKO and the BRC team in Haiti requested audits, controls and verification of the systems. As this was a one-off programme of this type, a lot of the issues became increasingly obvious towards the end when it was difficult to rectify them.¹⁴⁰

Decision Making Processes

In mid-2013, a Major Programme Board was put in place to oversee operations in Port-au-Prince. The board also ensured that BRC's corporate strategy, policy and procedures were an integral part of programme development, implementation and learning. It started questioning what was happening with the programme plans and results.

The board has fostered a change of culture characterised by more involvement, less siloing and piecemeal working, and bringing the right people around the table to discuss and make decisions. Both UKO and the BRC Delmas 19 office team recognise the value added by the board and even conveyed that an undertaking of this scale would have required such a structure from the beginning of the programme that could have guided BRC on the scope of reconstruction required. Thanks to the experience it has gained in Haiti, BRC has been able to replicate this mechanism for its subsequent interventions in Syria and Nepal.

M&E

With respect to M&E, different data collection systems exist with a wide array of tools.¹⁴¹ The evaluation team realised during the field visit that M&E activities were distributed among the members of the CMT, making it difficult to grasp the coherence of the process. In addition, monitoring tools and reports were available either in English or French or Creole, sometimes complicating the collection of important data.

Interviews with informants confirmed that vacant delegate positions (during phase 2 and the URRP) have reduced monitoring supervision at various points in the programme and that the quality of the data at times is poor; interviewees also added that CMT members should not have done monitoring in the field, that there was a high level of inaccuracy with the data collected because of that, and that the data was manipulated and inadequately collected. Expenditure into M&E was low for a programme of such dimensions, amounting to only 1% of the total (see Figure 7).

The evaluation team struggled with the logical framework used by URRP (see Appendix 4) as a tool to document properly the level of achievement of specific expected results for the following reasons:

- The intervention logic is not fully articulated through activities, outputs and outcomes. For instance, the construction of new houses is not captured by a specific output, despite having become the biggest single expenditure in URRP. In addition, several of the indicators are actually outputs (for example, "community solid waste is collected and disposed of" or "committees involved in advocacy on behalf of the neighbourhood") or activities (for example, "population continues to regenerate Delmas 19 at its own cost and motivation"), and it is unclear whether they are matched by activities planned for the programme.

¹⁴⁰ This information on logistics and procurement challenges is extracted from post-interviews.

¹⁴¹ Baseline survey, endline survey, technical visits, satisfaction interviews and community feedback, focus groups, diagnostic tool and technical monitoring, merchants survey, merchants interview, target survey, and technical survey.

- The indicators run against the “SMART” principle,¹⁴² lacking a clear unit of measurement. Indicators are supposed to give a measure of change and level/degree of achievement, to allow an organisation to assess the effectiveness of its interventions and determine how close it is to reaching expected results (or parts of thereof).
- Sources of data and means of verification are often either incomplete or too vague. Neither frequency nor responsibility for collecting data is clearly established.
- The BRC logical framework is not user-friendly and combines elements usually found in a results chain and a performance measurement framework, without being a complete tool that allows proper monitoring of the results. The logic of the results chain may lead to some confusion, especially with some outputs being worded as longer-term outcomes alongside the current outcomes in the framework.

The evaluation team proposed to adopt a new logic model based on a review of the logical framework, as noted in earlier sections of the report. The changes mostly relate to reorganising the flow of activities and the short-, mid- and long-term results, as well as rewording some statements to increase clarity. This revised model can be found in Appendix 5.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

Even though the results appear to be mixed, the programme still represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work.

By combining all lines of enquiry with financial data and results as perceived by beneficiaries, specific conclusions can be drawn on the delivery of the programme, as summarised by Table 2.

On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially with respect to drainage and the canal, which were the most valued by beneficiaries. However, the rationale for prioritisation of interventions is puzzling.

Assuming that the canal and drainage work benefited 4,000 households, cost of delivering the intervention¹⁴³ per household was an average of USD 434, whereas the cost of delivering housing was a disproportionate USD 19,242 per household, with 149 households benefiting and mixed beneficiary satisfaction.






The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for a lack of time and high turnover in programme staff. It was also the one that beneficiaries were less satisfied with. However, the literacy intervention was remarkably a low cost high benefit one.

Of all components, community governance was the most severely affected by the programme’s tight implementation deadlines and public health the least resourced, both suffering from poor design and unclear targets/achieved results. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable.

¹⁴² SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely.

¹⁴³ Including direct material costs and indirect costs such as staff costs, management, administration, travel, insurance, etc., based on VfM calculations.

Table 2
VfM Analysis

Outcomes	Delivery conclusion	Weighted cost in USD	Annual expenditure trend, Year 1-3 [note]	Budget execution
1. Safer living environment created and maintained	Partially delivered	6,704,692		104%
2. Increased economic security among target population	Partially delivered	2,382,388		118%
3. Improved public health of target population	Not delivered	1,306,296		114%
4. Improved community participation in local governance structures and partnerships with local authorities	Not delivered	1,691,853		105%
TOTAL	Partially delivered	12,085,231		107%

Note: Year 1 runs from June 2012 to June 2013; Year 2 runs from July 2013 to June 2014; Year 3 runs from July 14 to July 2015.

Whether this integrated model of development intervention is the way of the future remains a question for BRC to explore internally. If it is, then the lessons learned from the Haiti experience can inform strategies going forward. If not, they may still be useful to BRC for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations and programming.

There is promise in an integrated approach, as long as it comes with a clear, overarching vision of the expected outcomes, a precise description of how programme components fit together, and specific indicators with effective tools for measuring them in order to assess progress in achieving results.

In addition, unlike emergency humanitarian aid efforts that rely primarily on short-term technical assistance, development interventions need to address longer-term issues, such as sustainability and empowerment. These longer-term issues are best addressed through relationships with communities and collaboration with local stakeholders achieved by building close partnerships with trustworthy, local counterparts that can implement activities in communities, and continue as a local resource after the programme ends.

In the immediate future, one of the key challenges BRC faces will be to mitigate the reputational risks that are likely to arise in seeking repayment of the loans granted to SMEs and MuSos—a serious issue that will linger beyond BRC's withdrawal from Haiti. The first victim of popular discontent could be HRC. It is regretful, perhaps even unfair, that BRC has withdrawn without having first developed close ties with HRC and invested meaningfully in building the latter's organisational capacity. Moreover, since most beneficiaries fail to see the difference between HRC and other members of the RCRC Movement, BRC's own reputation could also suffer.

5.2 Recommendations

Considering that the URRP funding period is now completed, the evaluation team proposes recommendations to improve the implementation or delivery of future programming.

Operational

1. Before delivering a programme, BRC should pay special attention to setting up a suitable control environment to ensure all required support services are in place (human resources, finance and administration), and appointing a team experienced in integrated programming, to prevent delays associated with lengthy recruitment and to be able to initiate recovery interventions as soon as possible. The establishment of an international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts, experienced in setting up similar interventions, would help identify an ongoing source of appropriate human resources.
2. BRC should ensure proper induction of new delegates filling field positions to ensure they have access to basic knowledge on the status of the programme and access to key information pertinent to their field of expertise.
3. BRC should also consider the possibility, if financially feasible, of hiring delegates on long-term contract to ensure programming continuity in the field and to reduce extended absence of delegates in key management positions.

Housing and Infrastructure

4. BRC should adapt its programming to include a step that fully incorporates authorities into the planning and implementation of infrastructure interventions and not just the approvals, to ensure that ownership and maintenance of infrastructures will continue to be their responsibility.
5. BRC should ensure that beneficiaries are involved in and adequately informed about housing designs, to allow their expectations to align properly with the final product and delivery method. In doing so, BRC should remember that most communities are not adept at understanding technical drawings and that other forms of communication may be necessary, including physical models and 3D renderings—but remembering that what is shown should be the same as what they are receiving.

Livelihoods

6. UKO should adopt a livelihoods policy to support programme teams in the field.
7. BRC should consider expanding the timeframe for developing livelihoods interventions, especially if it is supporting the establishment of savings groups, as they require significant sensitisation and regular monitoring and coaching, given that the acquisition of financial skills and establishment of group procedures is a slow process. Rigorous and ongoing monitoring is key to ensuring members follow procedures, that savings shares are paid regularly and that loans are reimbursed. Usually such interventions require at least two years (two full savings cycles) and follow-up lasting from six months to a year. In urban settings, the duration of the sensitisation process should not be underestimated, as it takes time for people to get to know and trust each other.
8. BRC could consider relying on tested and proven methodologies that work well in the relevant context, and adopting existing software to monitor the health of savings groups. VSLA Associates has developed the Savings Groups Portfolio Tracking System, an off-the-shelf application used by

practitioners in several countries to monitor savings groups. It provides essential data for monitoring, rolling up information, and documenting progress achieved.

9. Without significant investment in skills and resources, BRC should refrain from financing the establishment of savings groups. The essence of savings groups is to teach the importance of savings and build loan capital as a group. The infusion of capital was perceived as another cash grant and may have reduced the level of members' accountability to reimburse their loans.
10. BRC may want to consider sub-contracting a specialised organisation to manage and supervise the savings groups throughout the intervention, as well as to provide post-programme follow-up and mentoring, and facilitate data collection for a future impact evaluation.

Community Governance

11. BRC should either pay more attention to the legitimacy and representativeness of the local structures with which it wants to collaborate, or limit the influence of non-representative groups in the early stages and throughout the programme, in order not to interfere with the implementation of its interventions.
12. BRC should consider applying processes that shift responsibilities to appropriate governmental authorities once the programme is finished. These processes should be discussed early on in the programme, with a view to ensuring the viability of interventions.
13. BRC should prepare and deploy advocacy and awareness-building efforts with community and authorities to ensure that mechanisms are discussed and established, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of interventions.

M&E

14. BRC should enforce a more rigorous M&E approach featuring a clear overarching vision of outcomes to be achieved (logic model), a precise description of how programme components fit into each other, the development of "SMART" (which stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely) indicators, and the utilisation of effective tools to measure progress in achieving the expected results (performance measurement framework).
15. BRC should have M&E delegates in the field to ensure proper supervision of efforts aimed at gathering programme information on a timely basis, and to set up quality assurance mechanisms that provide for accurate data collection. BRC should plan sufficient investments in M&E training, coaching and supervision to ensure that team members have all the required skills, especially with respect to M&E activities.
16. BRC should develop and define a list of standard indicators for sustainability and resilience (financial inclusion) to be able to measure livelihoods improvement and impact. The use of proxy indicators—asset acquisition, household goods, transportation means, human assets (skills, knowledge)—could be considered when working with highly vulnerable populations. Alternatively, BRC could opt for existing tools such as the "progress out of poverty" index or the "poverty assessment tool."

5.3 Lessons from the Programme's Experience

1. Rapid scale-up of large programmes can only be achieved if significant inputs are invested to ensure that administrative, human resources, finance and logistics systems are in place, as well as to support recruitment and training for local and international technical programme staff.

2. In developing a large programme, particularly in a complex environment such as post-Haiti earthquake, it is essential that the focus and scale of any intervention are consistent with the organisation's mandate, experience and delivery capacities. A thorough risk assessment, with appropriate governance sign-off, should be undertaken where such parameters will be exceeded.
3. It is essential to develop strong relationships with government authorities, not only to ensure they are informed, but also to foster their collaboration in planning efforts and their involvement in important decisions; this way, buy-in can be secured, and responsibilities can be formalised and handed out beyond the programme completion period, thus promoting greater sustainability.
4. In urban settings, it is essential to have good knowledge and understanding of the social fabric and local economic and political structures, with a view to identifying and selecting the proper community structures with which to work, set common interests, foster beneficiary engagement and promote sustained participation, in order to facilitate programme delivery.
5. The sequencing of livelihoods activities, from emergency to recovery, needs to be clearly defined and communicated to beneficiaries and must be sustained with effective, ongoing technical support and expertise from head office and from the field.
6. The creation of savings groups may require more time and a different sequencing of operations than anticipated at first, due to the need for programmes to sensitise beneficiaries beforehand in order to generate their trust and collaboration, train them in and build their understanding of financial concepts and administrative procedures, and give them a chance to work together to apply new concepts they have acquired.
7. A sound understanding of local culture and behaviours and a good knowledge of the national language are critical assets for communicating effectively with members of the community and for fostering their collaboration.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following is a slightly edited version of the Terms of Reference (ToRs) originally issued by the British Red Cross (BRC) in April 2015.

Summary

- *Purpose* – BRC seeks to evaluate its Haiti earthquake 2010 response and recovery programme.
- *Audience* – Members of the public, beneficiaries, BRC management and staff, Red Cross Red Crescent, other humanitarian actors.
- *Commissioners* – BRC Performance and Accountability Department.
- *Reports to* – Head of the BRC Performance and Accountability Department.
- *Timeframe* – Preferred start date May 25, 2015 (but no later than June 8, 2015) until end of August 2015.
- *Consultancy days* – Estimated 100 in total for a consortium of three consultants.
- *Methodology summary* – Desk reviews, interviews, focus group discussions, surveys.
- *Location* – Home-based with travel to London in June and August 2015. Field trip to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, preferred June 15 to July 4, 2015 but no later than June 29 to July 18, 2015.

Background

Haiti's earthquake of January 12, 2010 killed more than 220,000 people and left 1.5 million homeless. The Red Cross Red Crescent launched their biggest single country response in the immediate aftermath, sending 21 emergency teams to provide food, water, shelter and health support.

After the emergency response phase, BRC concentrated recovery efforts on two large-scale camps in the devastated capital. It also provided livelihoods support in Port-au-Prince and the South Department, where people who had lost everything in the earthquake had moved and were struggling to get back on their feet. These projects were completed by June 2012. Between 2010 and 2012, BRC also responded to the cholera outbreak that affected the population by setting up two cholera treatment units and three rehydration treatment points in camps in Port-au-Prince and the South Department. Overall, BRC provided support to around 400,000 people since the earthquake.

In June 2012, BRC began a third phase of recovery work, the community-driven URRP. The programme adopted an integrated approach to promote the regeneration of the most affected and vulnerable communities within selected areas of Delmas 19 in Port-au-Prince.

The programme consists of a series of multi-sectoral interventions covering areas of:

- Livelihoods (microfinance and small and micro-enterprise (SME) initiatives, literacy initiatives and health insurance support).
- Public health infrastructures (canal drainage and grey water management, provision of sanitation and solid waste management, health promotion and first aid).

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- Urban planning (upgrading and regeneration of housing stocks through repairs, new build and rental support, spatial planning and providing urban and social infrastructures).

BRC's engagement in Haiti will have spanned over five years from the initial emergency response to the URRP, which is due to end in June 2015.

Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

BRC has committed to report, reflect and learn about its entire engagement in Haiti. This final evaluation forms part of an exit process that will include internal and external reviews, audits, programme evaluations and an impact assessment to understand the successes and challenges of BRC's engagement in Haiti. An internal consultation, identifying key areas and questions, was undertaken in early 2015 to inform the scope of this evaluation to ensure that BRC is better able to respond more effectively in the face of future emergencies.

The main purpose of the evaluation is to be accountable internally and externally for the interventions delivered over five years in Haiti. The specific objectives of the evaluation are:

- To provide a summation of the extent to which BRC's engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions (January 2010 to June 2015).¹⁴⁶
- To assess the effectiveness and impact of the integrated approach adopted in the URRP in Port-au-Prince's Delmas 19 area (June 2012 to June 2015).
- To identify lessons (positive and negative) for improved programming and to inform strategic policy and planning.
- To inform management decision making for ongoing and future work.

Methodology

The nature of the evaluation—assessing different sector responses as an integrated programme approach, covering programme design, delivery and management, looking at community-level outcomes, and surveying a five-year intervention period—calls for the use of a wide range of information sources, both primary and secondary, quantitative and qualitative. It also calls for a variety of data collection methods, drawing upon different evaluation approaches. Triangulation of data sources and methods of analysis will be essential. An experimental design approach is not intended but appropriate use of sampling, across the spectrum from random to purposive, will need to be explored, especially when it comes to beneficiary- and household-level surveys.

BRC invites consultants to outline a proposed methodology in their application. BRC expects this to include but not be limited to:

- Desk reviews.
- Surveys.
- Focus group discussions.

¹⁴⁶ See Annex for an overview of studies, audits and evaluations already carried out. BRC anticipates this objective to be achieved by existing data review for interventions prior to the URRP.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- Key informant interviews.
- Beneficiary case studies.

Evaluation Questions

BRC has identified key areas to be addressed by the evaluation. Questions will include but are not limited to the following:

- Relevance and appropriateness:
 - ◆ To what extent did the respective BRC interventions support those most in need?
 - ◆ Was the scale and nature of the BRC response appropriate and proportional to the organisation’s capacity, experience and mandate?
 - ◆ How did the approach to the emergency phase inform subsequent interventions?
 - ◆ What was the quality of the needs assessments and analysis over five years?
 - ◆ Were the criteria for targeting of beneficiaries appropriate to the need and context?
 - ◆ How was support for different groups prioritised?
 - ◆ How much beneficiary participation was there in decision making, changes to plans, and implementation in Delmas 19? Was BRC’s model of community mobilisation in Delmas 19 effective?
 - ◆ Were beneficiaries complaints collected, analysed and acted upon efficiently and effectively in Delmas 19?
 - ◆ Were all key stakeholders fully aware of what BRC aimed to do and how?
 - ◆ To what degree did the programme’s objectives remain valid in each phase, in relation to what the wider humanitarian community was doing at the time and over time?
- Coverage:
 - ◆ To what extent were BRC’s interventions appropriate to meet the needs at the local, regional and national level?
 - ◆ Has the BRC approach of focusing on smaller areas with integrated programming had a greater impact on the improvement of people’s lives?
- Effectiveness:
 - ◆ Did the programme achieve its objectives both in terms of outputs and outcomes?
 - ◆ Was support timely according to the perception of key stakeholders, both internally within BRC and externally?

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- ◆ Were all aspects of the project cycle (assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), closure and exit) effectively undertaken, documented and acted upon appropriately?
- ◆ To what extent did plans change over the programme life cycle and was this effective?
- ◆ How effective was the monitoring system? What was the M&E data used for and by whom?
- ◆ How effective was BRC decision making and what factors hindered or facilitated the programme decision-making process?
- Efficiency:
 - ◆ Were inputs (financial, human and material resources) appropriate and relevant in relation to the desired and achieved results?
 - ◆ How effective was BRC in providing appropriate human resources to support field operations?
 - ◆ How effective were financial management systems in performing their function?
 - ◆ How effective were logistics and procurement services?
 - ◆ How effective was the support provided by the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement) in delivery of BRC's interventions?
- Impact:
 - ◆ What positive and negative unintended consequences has the programme in Delmas 19 brought to the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries?
 - ◆ To what extent did Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness (PASSA) and other participatory approaches employed in Delmas 19 result in community-led changes and action towards safer housing at community level?
 - ◆ What was the impact of integrated programming at household level? Did multiple packages of support such as cash grants, house repairs, literacy lessons and health insurance support have a multiplier effect on the quality and speed of household recovery?
- Coherence:
 - ◆ To what extent has coordination happened with other actors within the RCRC Movement and outside?
 - ◆ Was the programme in line with strategies set up by the BRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRC)?
 - ◆ What was the performance and impact of the BRC programme in the context of the wider Red Cross Red Crescent response?
- Sustainability and connectedness:

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- ◆ Was the link between early response, recovery and resilience considered as part of the URRP design?
- ◆ How did changes in information and context impact exit strategies? Were exit strategies in place from the beginning?
- ◆ How effective was coordination with local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and governmental partners in Delmas 19?
- ◆ To what extent has learning from past programmes, such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and 2010 floods and cyclones in Bangladesh, been used to shape this programme?
- ◆ What lessons can be drawn from the livelihoods, urban planning and infrastructure components of the URRP?
- Value for money:
 - ◆ With reference to existing data and key BRC value-for-money indicators, to what extent did the respective interventions demonstrate value for money?

Timeframe and Deliverables

The evaluation will take place between end of May/beginning of June 2015 and end of August 2015. The preferred start date would be May 25, 2015 with some flexibility. The field trip needs to take place preferably between June 15-July 4, 2015 but no later than June 29-July 18, 2015.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

Time schedule	Activities	Deliverables
Week 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Briefings. Desktop study: review interventions documentation and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation. 	Following briefings in London and preliminary desk review, the consultants will submit a <i>draft outline of the inception report</i> .
Week 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desktop study continued. Preparation and pilot of data collection tools. 	<i>Inception report</i> – The full inception report will include a revised methodology with a data collection and analysis plan.
Week 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desktop study continued. Development of data collection tools. Data collection in United Kingdom office (UKO). 	<i>Data collection tools</i> – This will include piloted data collection instruments.
Week 4 in Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection in target communities according to data collection schedule. 	Communities and individuals completed according to data collection plan.
Week 5 in Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection in target communities according to data collection schedule. 	Communities and individuals completed according to data collection plan.
Week 6 in Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection and analysis in target communities according to data collection schedule. 	<i>Field data validation workshop</i> – Following data collection in the field, the consultants will present and validate data through a workshop for key stakeholders in the field.
Week 7 Week 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data analysis. Draft evaluation report. 	<i>Draft version of evaluation report</i> – Following the field visit, and data collection in the field, the consultants will deliver a draft report for feedback and comments of key stakeholders.
Week 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Present initial findings, conclusions, and map of lessons identified to main stakeholders in London. Revise report based on workshop feedback. 	<i>Evaluation presentation workshop</i> – The consultants will present their findings and conclusions to key stakeholders in London.
Week 10 Week 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Circulate revised report to key stakeholders and collect written feedback. 	Feedback received and incorporated as appropriate.
Week 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revise and submit final evaluation report. 	<i>Final evaluation report in English</i> – This will include a standalone executive summary (maximum five pages), background of the programme, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations. <i>External evaluation report for publication</i> – A summary (maximum 15 pages) of the full evaluation report, ready for external publication. <i>Data sets</i> will also be delivered at the end of the consultancy.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

Evaluation Team

The nature of the evaluation calls for a team of three independent consultants: a team leader and two technical experts with strong evaluation skills. The team will be supported by internal BRC advisers and support staff, as well as in-country national and international staff.

The evaluation team leader has overall responsibility for the management and delivery of the evaluation. She/he reports to the BRC evaluation commissioner and is ultimately responsible for submission of all deliverables. The evaluation team leader also coordinates the work of the shelter and infrastructure evaluator and the livelihoods evaluator in evaluating the shelter and infrastructure and the livelihoods components of the programme.

BRC is looking for a team of three people who fit the following profiles:

- Evaluation team leader:
 - ◆ Minimum 10 years of experience conducting and leading evaluations, including of large-scale humanitarian programmes required.
 - ◆ Proven track record of conducting quantitative and qualitative research including the development of interview schedules, household surveys, and data analysis required.
 - ◆ Experience in recovery programming in response to large, complex emergencies, ideally in a management position required.
 - ◆ Strong coordination and facilitation skills and proven ability to design and facilitate planning processes and workshops required.
 - ◆ Excellent analytical, writing and presentation skills required.
 - ◆ Experience of working in Haiti required.
 - ◆ Excellent written and spoken English skills required.
 - ◆ Minimum qualification of a PhD or Masters in international development or related field required.
 - ◆ Experience in community-based programmes preferred.
 - ◆ Working knowledge of French and/or Haitian Creole preferred.
 - ◆ Knowledge and experience working with the RCRC Movement highly preferred.

BRC particularly welcomes applications from teams who can provide technical experts with experience of working in Haiti and French and/or Haitian Creole language skills, and an understanding of the RCRC Movement ways of working. BRC would prefer technical experts to have experience in community-based programmes in humanitarian settings in addition to the following role specific requirements:

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- Shelter and infrastructure evaluator:
 - ◆ Minimum 7 years of international humanitarian experience in the fields of urban planning, shelter and infrastructures, including experience in conducting evaluations.
 - ◆ Professional qualifications, such as Royal Institute of British Architects, Institution of Civil Engineers or Chartered Institute of Building, preferred.
- Livelihoods evaluator:
 - ◆ Minimum 7 years of experience in household economic security or related, including experience in implementing and evaluating livelihoods programmes.
 - ◆ Proven track record of conducting quantitative and qualitative household surveys and interviews, and data analysis required.

Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organisational learning and accountability. The evaluation standards are:

- *Utility* – Evaluations must be useful and used.
- *Feasibility* – Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
- *Ethics and legality* – Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- *Impartiality and independence* – Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
- *Transparency* – Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- *Accuracy* – Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that their worth or merit can be determined.
- *Participation* – Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process, when feasible and appropriate.
- *Collaboration* – Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, i.e., humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at:

<<http://www.redcross.org.uk/About-us/Who-we-are/The-international-Movement/Fundamental-principles>>.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

Application Procedures

BRC will consider applications from:

- Consultancy limited companies who can provide the full team of requested consultants.
- Self-formed groups of self-employed consultants who can cover each of the roles requested.
- Self-employed consultants who can cover one of the roles requested [this is BRC's least preferred option].

Interested parties should submit their application material to: Annalisa Tidona, Performance and Accountability Adviser, <atidona@redcross.org.uk> by midnight (British Summer Time) on 4 May 2015. Interviews (in person or by Skype) of short-listed candidates will be held on May 7 and 8, 2015. Application materials should include:

- Curricula Vitae for all members of the team applying for consideration.
- Cover letter clearly summarising the team experience as it pertains to this assignment, confirmation of availability in the timeframe indicated, and professional references.
- Proposal not exceeding four pages expressing an understanding and interpretation of the ToRs, a proposed methodology with time plan, and an outline of the roles and responsibilities of each consultant.
- Sample of evaluation reports most similar to that described in these ToRs.

Annex – List of Main Reports to Date

- *2010 mass sanitation module evaluation* – Haiti emergency response: Evaluation of the BRC mass sanitation module emergency response unit.
- *2010 six-month review* – Haiti emergency response: Reflection of BRC's response to the earthquake, in the sectors of logistics, relief, sanitation, health, economic security, and shelter.
- *2010 cash transfer programme learning review* – Haiti emergency response: Review commissioned by the American Red Cross and BRC to identify lessons learned from the approaches to cash transfer programming that were adopted in Haiti.
- *2011 mid-term review* – Haiti recovery programme: Mid-programme review of sanitation and hygiene promotion in two camps in Port-au-Prince, cholera response and livelihoods projects in the South Department, and the integrated (livelihoods, shelter, sanitation, hygiene) programme in Delmas 19 (later called URRP).
- *2011 South Department cholera response final report* – Haiti cholera response: End-of-response final report of BRC's cholera interventions in the South Department.
- *2011 South Department livelihoods evaluation* – Haiti recovery programme: End-of-response final report of the BRC's livelihoods programme in the South Department.
- *2012 Port-au-Prince camps sanitation evaluation* – Haiti recovery programme: End-of-response endline survey of sanitation and hygiene promotion in two camps in Port-au-Prince.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONTINUED)

- *2013 mid-term review* – Haiti recovery programme: URRP mid-term review.
- *2014 urban livelihoods recovery case study* – Haiti recovery programme: Lessons learned case study of the livelihoods component of URRP.

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXAMINED

Design and Planning Documents

- British Red Cross. *Accountability to Beneficiaries Plan. Haiti Recovery Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, October 2010.
- British Red Cross. *Beneficiary Identification Methodology*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.
- British Red Cross. *Concept Note. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration (URR) Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, October 2012.
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- British Red Cross. *Urban Development Plan. Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2013.
- Casagrande, Richard. *Project/Programme Plan. Haiti Recovery Operation*. [N.p.], BRC, February 2011.
- Haiti URRP Risk Register [Excel file]*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [March 2015].
- Potangaroa, Regan, Rafael Mattar Neri, and Dan Brown. *The Design Development and Costs of Several Key Housing Issues for Delmas 19, Port au Prince, Haiti*. Haiti, [N.p.], December 2011.
- Project Proposal. Haiti Delmas 19 Urban Reconstruction & Regeneration Programme (URRP)*. [N.p.], [n.p.], May 2012.
- Rule, Amelia. *Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter Awareness (PASSA). PASSA in the Post-Disaster Urban Context of Port au Prince, Haiti – 2011/2012*. [N.p.], BRC, 2012.
- Sfeir-Younis, Luis. *Haiti Recovery Exit Strategy*. [N.p.], BRC, October 2013.
- Terms of Reference Project Advisory Board: Haiti URRP*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2013].
- Timeline of significant events and BRC interventions in Port-au-Prince following the 2010 earthquake [pdf file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [n.d.].

Reports and Evaluations (Internal/External)

- Adam, Shamila. *Haiti Investigation: Shelter Final Report*. September 2011.
- Austin, Lois. *Cash Transfer Programmes: Haiti Earthquake Response – American Red Cross and British Red Cross. Documentation and Learning Review*. [N.p.], [n.p.], November 2010.
- Brazell, Andrew, and Makayla Drummond. *Risk and Audit: Haiti*. British Red Cross, February 16, 2011.
- British Red Cross Haiti Recovery Programme. Delmas 19 Target Area Cash Grants Handbook & Lessons Learned*. [N.p.], [n.p.], March 2012.
- British Red Cross. *Executive Summary, Lessons Learned Session*.

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXAMINED (CONTINUED)

- British Red Cross. *Learning from and Accounting for the Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme: A Brief on the Final Evaluation, Audit, Reports and Impact Assessment*. April 2015.
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- Chazali, Catherine, and Melvin Tebbutt. *Joint Livelihoods and Shelter Assessment. Needs and Opportunities for Vulnerable Households Living in Automeca Camp – Port-au-Prince – Haiti*. [N.p.], [n.p.], June 2010.
- Community Mobilisation Team. *Rapport de sanitation. Hygiène corporelle et environnementale. Delmas 19/Haiti*. [N.p.], BRC, Mai 2015.
- Développement des activités de santé en Haiti. Fréquentation des bénéficiaires au niveau des infirmeries communautaires et les cliniques du DASH. 20 juillet-20 août 2013*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [2013].
- Fairley, Laura-Louise, and Wendy McCance. *Final Project Review: Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme – Phase 3*. [N.p.], BRC, [draft, July 2015].
- Fortune, Vendela, and Prasad Rasal. *British Red Cross – Mass Sanitation Module. 2010 Haiti Earthquake Response. Post Deployment Learning Evaluation*. [N.p.], [n.p.], August 2010.
- Golberger, Mor. *Endline Evaluation La Piste & Automeca Camps*. March 2012.
- Hanley, Teresa, and Lois Austin. *Haiti Earthquake Response British Red Cross UK Office Six-Month Review*. September 2010.
- Hanley, Teresa, Libbi Lee, and Patrick Elliott. *British Red Cross Haiti Recovery Programme. Mid-Term Review*. [N.p.], [n.p.], September 2011.
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- McCance, Wendy. *Haiti Report – 2012. Key Challenges, Learning Points and Achievements*. [N.p.], BRC, January 2013.
- [McCance, Wendy]. *Haiti URRP Recovery Programme. Highlights Phase Three (Jun 2012-Jul 2015)*. [N.p.], [n.p.], [July 2015].
- Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme*. [N.p.], BRC, April 2012.
- Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti programme 2014/15*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2015.

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXAMINED (CONTINUED)

- Nicholas, Paul. *Risk and Assurance. Haiti Programme Desk Top Review*. [N.p.], BRC, July 2014.
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- Awareness plan – chikungunya campaign [Excel file]. [N.p.], [n.p.], [n.d.].
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXAMINED (CONTINUED)

- British Red Cross. *Delegate Retention. Case Study Haiti Recovery Programme (May 2015)*. [N.p.], BRC, May 2015.
- British Red Cross. *Decision Log* [Excel file]. [N.p.], BRC, [March 2015].
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS EXAMINED (CONTINUED)

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British Red Cross. *Cash Request Updated*. June 2015.

British Red Cross. *IMT Paper Covering Note*. November 25, 2013.

Drummond, Makayla, and Luis Sfeir-Younis. *Haiti Mid-Term Progress Report & Fiscal Statement*. British Red Cross, December 2011.

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Communication Documents

British Red Cross. *Haiti EQ Urban Reconstruction and Regeneration. Phase 3 – Plan of Action – V1* [PowerPoint presentation]. [N.p.], BRC, April 2012.

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McCance, Wendy. *Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme – Community Communication and Working with Local Authorities in Urban Reconstruction*. British Red Cross, April 2014.

McCance, Wendy. *Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme (Phase 3: June 2012-Sept 2014)*. British Red Cross, January 2014.

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN INTERVIEWS, FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND GROUP MEETINGS

Key Informant Interviews

Name	Title or role in the programme	Organisation
Face to face interviews conducted during a formal briefing session in London, United Kingdom (June 15-17, 2015)		
Ben Carpenter	Humanitarian Policy Adviser	BRC UKO
John English	Head of Office in Les Cayes, and then Recovery Programme Manager	BRC UKO
Cathy Fitzgibbon	International Human Resources Manager	BRC UKO
Laura-Louise Fairley	Programme Officer	BRC UKO
Alastair Punch	Performance and Accountability Adviser	BRC UKO
Paul Nicholas [note 1]	Senior Auditor	BRC UKO
David Peppiatt	Executive Director of International Division	BRC UKO
Ted Tuthill [note 1]	Recovery Operations Manager, and then Head of Region	BRC UKO
Face to face interviews conducted during the evaluation team's field visit in Haiti (June 30-July 23, 2015)		
Melvin Tebbutt	Shelter Adviser, and then Head of Delegation	BRC Haiti delegation
Wendy McCance	Programme Support Delegate, and then Deputy Head of Delegation	BRC Haiti delegation
Katie Barnett	Human Resources Delegate	BRC Haiti delegation
Enerson Belotte	Database Manager	BRC Haiti delegation
David Delgado	Construction Delegate	BRC Haiti delegation
Jean Paulson Dorsainvil	Former Warehouse Supervisor	BRC Haiti delegation
Holdie Cene Fleurilus	Logistics Administrator and Procurement Officer	BRC Haiti delegation
Kermens Gedeus	Warehouse Supervisor	BRC Haiti delegation
Petion James [note 2]	Community Mobiliser	BRC Haiti delegation
Petit-Frere Lysnel	Warehouse Manager	BRC Haiti delegation
Richardson Michel [note 2]	Community Mobiliser	BRC Haiti delegation
Jean Jules Mingot	Former SME Programme Manager	BRC Haiti delegation
Jean Baptiste Pierre [note 2]	Community Mobiliser	BRC Haiti delegation
Lenice Pierre [note 2]	Community Mobilisation Team Leader	BRC Haiti delegation
Wiskins Pierre [note 2]	Community Mobiliser	BRC Haiti delegation
Diane Rachiele [note 1]	Finance and Administration Delegate	BRC Haiti delegation
Jethro Sereme	Communications and Security Coordinator	BRC Haiti delegation
Ferdine Voltaire [note 2]	Community Mobiliser/Beneficiary Accountability Coordinator	BRC Haiti delegation
Badette Yonel	Database Entry Officer	BRC Haiti delegation
Ines Brill	Head of Delegation	IFRC
Elisabeth Verluyten	Head of Strategic Relations and Cooperation	IFRC
Brigitte Gaillis	Humanitarian Adviser	HRC
Dr. Guiteau Jean-Pierre	President	HRC
Jeannes Pierre	Branch Coordinator	HRC
James Bellamy	Programme Manager	American Red Cross
Marie David	Former Head of Delegation	French Red Cross
Sylvie Dupuis	Country Director	ILO
Yves Winchel Rivière	Deputy Mayor	Delmas Municipality
Paul Christian Namphy	Emergency Coordinator	DINEPA
Paul Théodate	Director, Technical Operations Centre, Metropolitan Region	DINEPA

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN INTERVIEWS, FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND GROUP MEETINGS (CONTINUED)

Name	Title or role in the programme	Organisation
Ulrich Edouard	Officer, Activity and Programme Development	DASH
Dr. Ronald Laroche	Chief Executive Officer	DASH
Irvyne Jean Baptiste	Programme Director	Fonkoze/Zafen
Joseph Smith	Financial Analyst	Fonkoze/Zafen
Ismène Paul	Head of Training	KNFP
Hélène Mauduit	Officer, New Product Development working with ID Microfinance	Entrepreneurs du monde
Daphnée Delice Forestal [note 3]	President	UNIFDEJ
Osnel Petit [note 3]	President	AJPNH
Louis Jacques Ricot [note 3]	President	AJECODECODE
Adelise Lubin [note 3]	Representative	Association Delmas Grand Moun
Charles Jasmin	Manager of a SME specialised in the cleaning of septic tanks	Meca Charlie
Alonso Meca	Manager of a SME specialised in the cleaning of septic tanks	Meca Charlie
Luc Cherichel	Coordinator	Microfinance Committee
Joseph Morales	General Coordinator	SME Committee/AEDP
Isabelle Fortin	Coordinator of the Haiti Observatory	Groupe u.r.d.
Interviews conducted remotely by phone or skype (July-September 2015)		
Patrick Elliott	Former Shelter Adviser	BRC UKO
Kris Flegg	Former Livelihoods Delegate	BRC Haiti delegation
Mor Goldberger	Former CMT Manager	BRC Haiti delegation
Rafael Mattar Neri	Architect	BRC Haiti delegation
Regan Potangaroa	Seismic Engineer	BRC Haiti delegation
Gas Saint Louis	Former Microfinance Programme Manager	BRC Haiti delegation
Xavier Genot	Former Shelter Coordinator	IFRC
Isabelle Hachette	Former Resettlement Delegate	Canadian Red Cross
Bertin Meance	Former Recovery Coordinator	HelpAge International
Tenzin Manell	Former Livelihoods Manager	

Notes:

1. This person also took part in interviews conducted remotely by phone or skype.
2. This person also took part in a group meeting with CMT members to validate early findings of the evaluation team's field visit in Haiti.
3. This person also attended either a focus group discussion with participants in PASSA or a group meeting with representatives of associations.

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN INTERVIEWS, FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND GROUP MEETINGS (CONTINUED)

Focus Group Discussions and Group Meetings

Type of participants	Number of participants	Description
Recipients of new houses	12	Focus group discussion with a random selection of people who received a new house from BRC
	18	Focus group discussion with a gender-stratified random selection of people who received a new house from BRC
Recipients of repairs	13	Focus group discussion with selected recipients of support from BRC to repair their homes
Participants in PASSA [note 1]	13	Focus group discussion with selected individuals who took part in the first PASSA consultations in 2011
	13	Focus group discussion with selected individuals who took part in the second PASSA consultations in 2015
SME representatives	5	Focus group discussion with selected recipients of SME support, including some who had already repaid their loans and others who had not
MuSo participants	10	Focus group discussion with a random selection of MuSo members who wish to continue operating their savings groups
	1	Meeting with a former member of a MuSo that terminated its operations
Masons	25	Focus group discussion with selected masons and recipients of mason training
		Focus group discussion with selected mason labourers
Community leaders	0	A focus group discussion was planned with selected community leaders who had agreed to attend, but did not show up; instead, they individually took part in group meetings with other participants
Recipients of public health support	8	Focus group discussion with selected males who received public health support from the programme
		Focus group discussion with selected females who received public health support from the programme
	14	Focus group discussion with selected families who received public health support from the programme
Recipients of literacy support	27	Focus group discussion with selected people who received or delivered literacy training as part of the programme
Market traders	3	Meeting with traders who use the public marketplace
Representatives of associations [note 2]	14	Meetings with two selected groups of partner associations
Zonal committee members	14	Meetings with three selected groups of representatives of zonal committees
SME/microfinance committee members	11	Meetings with one group of members of the SME committee and one group of members of the microfinance committee
CMT members [note 3]	9	Meeting to validate early findings of the field visit
Total	210	

Notes:

1. Some of the participants in these focus group discussions were also interviewed individually.
2. Some of the participants in these group meetings were also interviewed individually.
3. Seven CMT members were also interviewed individually by the evaluation team.

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Goal	0	The urban regeneration of the most affected and vulnerable communities within the selected areas of Delmas 19 and their improved resilience to future disasters/crises	Population continues to regenerate Delmas 19 at its own cost and motivation	Baseline UN-Habitat report 2009	Year after programme end	CMT
				Ex-post impact evaluation surveys one year after programme		
			% of houses occupied or rooms rented	Ex-post impact evaluation surveys one year after programme	Year after programme end	URRP
			Business activities continue or are renewed	Ex-post impact evaluation surveys one year after programme	Year after programme end	Livelihoods
Outcome	1	Improved security and public health of the target population in Delmas 19	% of reduction in diseases among target population due to improved sanitation and safe hygiene, e.g., through toilet, abattoir and water-source construction	Ex-post impact evaluation	Year after programme end	CMT
				Public health records		
				Knowledge and practice survey		
				Committee monitoring reports		
			# of inhabitants report improved and safer living environment (Delmas 19 and former Automeca residents), e.g., through better access to housing/construction, reduced flooding, cleaner canal, increased evacuation routes, street lights	Case studies	Year after programme end	CMT
				Field reports		
				Photographs		
				Surveys		
			Ex-post impact evaluation			
Outcome	2	Improved economic security among residents of Delmas 19 (and former Automeca residents)	Targeted Automeca households and grant beneficiaries have varied sources of income (access to credit, productive assets, etc.) in post-programme period	Project monitoring data	Year after programme end	IFRC
				Ex-post impact evaluation		
			# of small/micro businesses reporting increased profitability in post-programme period and improved knowledge/access to formal low-interest micro-credit	Business surveys	Six monthly	Livelihoods
				Project monitoring data (case management)		
				End-of-project evaluation		
				Profit and loss business accounts		
				Baseline of the SME		
			% of marketplace stalls used permanently by local traders	Project monitoring data (case management)	End of programme	CMT
Surveys						
Endline evaluation						

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Outcome	3	Improved community governance and resilience	Committees involved in advocacy on behalf of the neighbourhood	Training records	End of programme	CMT
				Survey of committees' interaction with local authorities and NGOs		
			Committees recognised and deemed competent by the community, reacting actively to community issues and needs through referrals, training, etc.	Registration records	End of programme and year after programme end	CMT
				Community survey		
				Endline evaluation		
	Training records					
	Ex-post impact evaluation					
Output	1.1	Targeted families are living in durable permanent housing	# of target households (rent or owned) living in adequate durable housing that meets appropriate national standards, with community participation	Endline household surveys Field reports	Six monthly	URRP
Output	1.2	Community and construction artisans are able to build/repair using general and seismic construction and repair techniques and methods	# of houses constructed or repaired using good construction practice and seismic techniques	Field reports Quality assurance/quality systems checks Survey/discussion groups	Six monthly	URRP
Output	1.3	Target area has improved public infrastructure	% of people with access to communal infrastructure facilities, e.g., drainage, footpaths, marketplace	Endline surveys M&E – usage of facilities	End of programme	URRP
Output	1.4	Target area has better access to sanitation facilities and waste disposal leading to fewer health risks	# of constructed sanitation facilities built, used and maintained by target population	Sanitary surveys	Six monthly and year after programme end	URRP
				Mapping		
				Ex-post impact evaluation		
			# of committees with resources to operate and maintain water facilities, access to technical support, and access to spare parts (cf. livelihoods work)	Regular meeting agenda point	Annually	CMT
			Community solid waste is collected and disposed of	Visual checks	End of programme	CMT
Collections made by the <i>Service métropolitain de collecte des résidus solides</i> monitored						
Recycling records						
Surveys						

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Output	2.1	Former Automeca camp residents are more financially resilient	% of grant beneficiaries who have opened bank accounts	Federation data collection	Six monthly	IFRC
				Project monitoring data		
				Grant-received data		
				End-of-project evaluation		
				International Organization for Migration?		
			Famine Early Warning Systems Network?			
# of grant beneficiaries attending informative learning sessions on life skills with a livelihoods component to identify possible income-generating activities and money management	Project monitoring data	Six monthly	IFRC			
	End-of-project evaluation					
Output	2.2	Established MuSos decide to continue business activities using microcredit finance	% of savings/microfinance members who choose to renew or transfer community-based savings and microcredit methodology to local institution-managed microcredit after 12 months	Project monitoring data	End of programme	Livelihoods
				End-of-project evaluation		
				Progress reports from partners/MFIs		
			% of savings/microfinance group participants who apply for credit and successfully repay their loans fully within 12 months	Profit and loss business accounts	End of programme	Livelihoods
Records of repayment of loans						
Output	2.3	Delmas 19 small/micro businesses have undergone training to improve employment capacity and maintain access to microfinance providers	# of funds established for SMEs	Signature of MoU	Once – end of 2012	Livelihoods
				Fund transfer		
			# of jobs created by SMEs	Employment records	Six monthly	Livelihoods
Output	3.1	Communities effectively represented and developed by local organisations, improving governance	# of committees with appropriate representation of all neighbourhood's profile, including gender and vulnerable or marginalised groups	Confidential equality survey	End of programme	CMT
				# of committees with improved mechanisms of transparency and accountability to their neighbourhoods	Training records	Six monthly
Accountability surveys						

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Output	3.2	Target area community has improved capacity and sustainable resilience to respond to future disasters and daily risks	# of trainings done with committees to improve knowledge in DRR and resilience	Training records	Six monthly	CMT
				Baseline questionnaire		
				Progress questionnaire		
				MoU with the Secretary of Education		
		% of community aware of risk-reducing behaviour (have information, construction, health, protection, DRR) and have knowledge on how to respond to risks	Baseline questionnaire	Six monthly	CMT	
				Progress questionnaire		
Output	3.3	Strengthened linkages with appropriate local authorities, HRC and the Delmas mayor's office	# of introductions facilitated for community with HRC, the appropriate local authorities and the mayor's office/ministry local-level offices	Contact names	Six monthly	CMT
				Regular meetings		
				Continued relationships with organisations (see Livelihoods, Outcome 2)		
			# of HRC DRR and community-based health and first aid BRC-funded/supported projects visible in West Branch area	Volunteer records	Six monthly	CMT
				Training records		
				Community interaction with sub-branch		
				Programme monitoring		
				Survey and knowledge		
Activity	1.1.1	Housing assessment, design, bill of quantities/specifications, building supervision and technical support to repair and construct damaged and new houses	# of owners and renters in the target area and zones 3 and 5 who have received adequate durable housing assistance (construction materials, technical assistance)	Distribution lists with sign-off for receipt	Six monthly	URRP
				Programme progress and quality monthly monitoring reports		
				M&E monthly reports		
				Register of and/property ownership title register or use agreements		
Activity	1.1.2	Rental owners are identified, replacement accommodations found where necessary, agreements drafted and properties occupied	% of target households who are living in adequate rental houses	Nil	Six monthly	URRP
Activity	1.2.1	Training of skilled workers and apprentices in basic best practice techniques for earthquake repair and reconstruction and construction	# of artisans trained in general construction and best practice techniques for reconstructing earthquake-resistant housing – workshops delivered and training completed	Training records	End of programme	URRP
				Certificates		
				Field reports		

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Activity	1.2.2	Community members given guidance in basic best practice techniques for earthquake repair and reconstruction and construction monitoring	# of community workshops held for understanding basic techniques of construction and repairs and monitoring quality	Training records	Six monthly	URRP
				Field reports		
				Video workshops/case studies put online		
Activity	1.3.1	Rehabilitate target area marketplace, including public health facilities, e.g., abattoir, public toilets (Cf. Outcome 2 – Livelihoods)	# of marketplaces rehabilitated	Field reports	Once – end of 2012	URRP
				M&E		
			# of traders who have stalls on the market	Field reports	Once – end of 2012	URRP
				Livelihoods surveys		
Activity	1.3.2	Formalise the use of the temporary office building as a community building (Cf. Outcome 3 – Governance)	Office handed over to the appropriate local authorities and community	Field reports	End of programme	CMT
				MoU between the mayor's office, the community and HRC		
Activity	1.3.3	Identify locations, prepare site, install and maintain public street lighting	# of street lights installed	IFRC MoU for street lights	End of programme	URRP
				Contractor reports		
				Field reports		
			# of street lights maintained by lighting committee groups	Weekly reports	Annually	URRP
				Spot surveys		
				Maintenance committee established		
Activity	1.3.4	Assess, design and construct surface water drainage and public access pavements in target area	# of square metres of public paving and drainage built	Construction records	Annually	URRP
				Site plans		
			# of houses with access to grey water drainage	Construction records	Six monthly	URRP
				Site plans		
Activity	1.3.5	Design and construct central drainage canal in target area (site survey and PASSA baseline data)	# of canals completed and connected to road drainage system	Construction records	Once – end of 2012	URRP
				Site plans		
Activity	1.4.1	Identify and provide an appropriate sustainable water supply for the target community	Potable water for area available through four newly-constructed water points or national piping	Water quality tests	End of programme	URRP
				Household-level water quality tests		
				Catchment area data		
				Supplier agreements, e.g., MoU with DINEPA		

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Activity	1.4.2	Establish water management committee in target area, including training, capacity building	Water committee established and trained	Committee and training records	End of programme	CMT
Activity	1.4.3	Identify, design and build appropriate latrines (private and public) for target community	# of fully functioning household toilets constructed which meet the national standard	Detailed beneficiary registration records Surveys	End of programme	URRP
			# of public toilets built	Detailed beneficiary registration records Surveys	Once – end of 2012	URRP
Activity	1.4.4	Hygiene promotion activities	# of people reached by hygiene promotion activities	Training records	Annually	CMT
				Promotion records		
Activity	1.4.5	Identify, design and build appropriate laundry facility for target community	# of laundry facilities built		End of programme	URRP
Activity	1.4.6	Develop sustainable community solid waste management and practice in the target area	# of households that received solid waste management promotion activities, including recycling as waste management and income-generating schemes	Training records	Six monthly	CMT
				Promotion records		
				Organisational recycling records		
				Agreements with/income from organisations, e.g., Environmental Cleaning Solutions S.A. recycling		
Activity			# of solid waste committees functioning, advocating for people to dispose of waste responsibly	Mapping	End of programme	CMT
				Solid waste cleared		
				Sanitation surveys and records		
Activity	2.1.1	Utilise Integrated Neighbourhood Approach to decongest Automeca camp	% of households receiving cash grant of approximately USD 500	Household survey	Once – end of 2012	IFRC
				Project monitoring data		
				Registration and cash disbursement		
Activity			% of families from Automeca and zones 3 and 5 resettled in adequate housing solutions	Household survey	Annually	IFRC
				Project monitoring data		
				Beneficiary details in rent housing		
Activity	2.2.1	Provide microfinance opportunities	# of MuSos formed then retained	Registration documentation completed and authorised	Six monthly	Livelihoods
				Training records		

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Activity	2.2.2	Create partnership with HelpAge International to support livelihoods for elderly in target area	Partnership created with HelpAge International	MoU with HelpAge International	Once – end of 2012	Livelihoods
			# of elderly livelihoods groups formed and trained	Formation records	Six monthly	Livelihoods
				Training records		
			# of group participants who apply for credit successfully and repay their loans fully within 12 months	Profit and loss business accounts	Annually	Livelihoods
Records of repayment of loans						
Activity	2.2.3	Establish DASH agreements and register beneficiaries for medical support (links to HelpAge International and credit programmes)	Project agreement	DASH MoU	Once – end of 2012	Livelihoods
			# of families benefiting from health insurance	Case records	Six monthly	Livelihoods
			% beneficiaries who register, use service and renew	Beneficiary registration	Six monthly	Livelihoods
				Beneficiary access and use records		
Activity	2.3.1	Provide SME training to support livelihoods for businesses in target area	Partnership with Fonkoze/Zafen created	MoU signed	Once – end of 2012	Livelihoods
			% of small businesses that graduate from the full training suite within 12 months	Training records	End of programme	Livelihoods
				Register of graduates		
			# of business plans written	Project monitoring data – business plans	Once – end of 2012	Livelihoods
Activity	3.1.1	Capacity build community and committees, developing governance structures and plans	# of committees formed and capacity built using agreed governance procedures and registered with relevant authorities	Registration documentation completed and authorised	Annually	CMT
				Committee records and activity reports		
			# of action plans developed and implemented	Committee baseline knowledge survey	Six monthly	CMT
				Plan is agreed, understood and available		
Notes/minutes from meetings						
Activity	3.2.1	Enable committee to develop and implement a DRR plan (see HRC development)	# of DRR plans developed through participatory approaches, agreed with community and local authorities	Community disaster risk reduction plans exist and signed off	End of programme	CMT
				Training workshop records		
				Evacuation routes identified and marked		
				Planning implementation records for situation response		
Activity	3.3.1	Develop relationships between committee and relevant contacts in the mayor's office, NGOs, HelpAge International, etc.	# of meetings regularly held with a contact	Minutes and action points filed	Six monthly	CMT

APPENDIX 4 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING URRP (CONTINUED)

Objective type	Number	Objective (intervention logic)	Indicator	Means of verification	Frequency	Responsibility
Activity	3.3.2	Introduce/strengthen community linkages with HRC	# of focal points introduced/initial meetings held between committee and HRC to help improve possible sustainable links with beneficiaries	Survey	Six monthly	CMT
				Minutes filed		
				Case management reports		
			# of HRC projects identified and supported financially and/or with organisation development	MoUs signed and filed	Six monthly	PSD
				Project reports		
				BRC participation in forums		

APPENDIX 5 – LOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED DURING THE EVALUATION

Ultimate Outcome	Urban regeneration and improved resilience to future disasters/crises of the target area and zones 3 and 5 of Delmas 19											
Intermediate Outcomes	1. Safer living environment created and maintained				2. Increased economic security among target population			3. Improved public health of target population		4. Improved community participation in local governance structures and partnerships with local authorities		
Immediate Outcomes	1.1 Increased access to durable, permanent housing	1.2 Improved ability of community and construction artisans to build and repair using general and seismic construction and repair techniques and methods	1.3 Increased access to improved public infrastructures	1.4 Reduced risk of flooding	2.1 Increased access to microcredit finance by MuSos	2.2 Increased knowledge of small/micro enterprises (SMEs) in Delmas 19 on business and financial management	2.3 Increased access to employment opportunities (links with 1.2)	3.1 Improved access to health services	3.2 Increased access to sanitation and waste disposal facilities (links with 1.3)	4.1 Improved capacity of communities to be effectively represented in local governance structures	4.2 increased knowledge on how to respond to future disasters and daily risks	
Outputs	1.1.1 Supervision and technical support to construct new houses provided	1.2.1 Skilled workers and apprentices trained in basic best practice techniques for earthquake repair and reconstruction and construction	1.3.1 Provision of sustainable water supply (links with 4.1.2)	1.4.1 Central drainage canal designed and constructed (links with 1.3.3)	2.1.1 Microfinance mechanisms developed with banks	2.2.1 Training in the development of SMEs conducted	2.3.1 Awareness-raising session conducted for SME owners on building employment capacity	3.1.1 Registered beneficiaries receive health services through DASH partnership (links with 2.1.2)	3.2.1 Appropriate latrines designed and built for target community	4.1.1 Capacity building sessions conducted for community and committees, on local governance planning	4.2.1 Committee established for the development of a DRR plan	
	1.1.2 Supervision and technical support to repair damaged houses	1.2.2 Guidance provided to community members in basic best practice techniques for earthquake repair and reconstruction and construction monitoring	1.3.2 Surface water drainage and public access pavements constructed		2.1.2 Partnership with HelpAge International developed to support livelihoods for the elderly	2.2.2 Awareness-raising session conducted for SME owners on accessing microcredit finance through MuSos		3.1.2 Awareness campaigns on infectious diseases spread by mosquitoes and water disseminated	3.2.2 Key community members trained in sustainable solid waste management and practices in the target area	4.1.2 Water management committee established and trained in water management	4.2.2 Committee members trained on DRR plan development and risk management	
	1.1.3 Automeca camp decongested		1.3.3 Target area marketplace rehabilitated, including public health facilities, such as butchery, public toilets		2.1.3 Literacy training provided to selected participants			3.1.3 Hygiene promotion campaigns conducted		4.1.3 Solid waste committee established and trained in waste management	4.2.3 Awareness campaigns on DRR measures conducted	
			1.3.4 Laundry facility built							4.1.4 Street lighting groups established		
			1.3.5 Functioning street lighting are installed and maintained (links with 4.1.4)							4.1.5 Relationships between committee and relevant contacts in the mayor's office, NGOs, HelpAge International, established		
			1.3.6 Formalise use of temporary BRC office as a community building (links with 4.1)							4.1.6 Community linkages with HRC introduced		



Where we are:

British Red Cross
44 Moorfields
London
EC2Y 9AL

redcross.org.uk

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